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On September 18
th
 2014, voters in a Scottish independence referendum were asked the yes/no 
question: "Should Scotland be an independent country?" Scotland voted ‘no’ to independence 
from the United Kingdom by a margin of 55% to 45%. The majority of the debate focused on 
what was termed ‘the economics of independence’. Whilst economic implications ought 
always to have been an important consideration, the key arguments for and against 
independence were built almost exclusively on how independence could influence the 
economic prospects of Scottish people. Essentially, through the articulation of the economic 
insecurities of either union or independence, unionists and nationalists drew on the 
assumption that people in Scotland are bound up within a shared community of economic 
fate, signified by the ‘Scottish economy’ and/or ‘UK economy’. Through the articulation of 
these insecurities arguments both for and against independence were justified, demonstrating 
the potential significance of economic security in the re/territorialisation of political 
geographies vis-à-vis more conventional matters of security thought predominant in this 
regard. Through a poststructuralist discourse analysis of key texts, including those issued by 
the official nationalist and unionist campaigns – ‘Yes Scotland’ and ‘Better Together’ 
respectively – this thesis challenges a fundamental assumption upon which such arguments 
are made, namely, the idea of ‘the economy’ as a unifying object space within which subjects 
are thought to have an especially shared economic (in)security. It is argued that the 
articulation of economic (in)security is inextricable from the very idea of the economy, and 
critically, the perceived legitimacy of arrangements made for its governance – an established 
discursive context that made possible almost entirely economistic arguments for and against 
independence, which served to obscure the necessarily ‘political’ underpinnings of what 
ultimately proved to be a sterile debate. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Taking the 2014 Scottish independence referendum as the key empirical context, this 
thesis looks at the way in which the ‘imagined economy’ served to shape the terms of 
the public debate. The debate revolved almost exclusively around what were termed 
‘the economics of independence’ and was characterised by utterances pertaining to 
the economic threats, vulnerabilities, and insecurities of independence. As will be 
shown, the presentation of a largely ‘economistic’ case either for or against 
independence was in part a deliberate ‘strategy’ by key protagonists. Ignoring the fact 
that the economic implications of independence could never really be ‘known’, such 
economistic arguments appeared to be practical, utility-based, and non-political. 
However, said justifications relied fundamentally upon the myth of ‘the economy’.  
 
The economy is imagined insofar as it does not denote an ontological given, but 
something ideationally or discursively re/constructed. This is not to deny that 
‘economies’ have no foundations in reality, just that those foundations are necessarily 
contingent. Moreover, those foundations are often significantly exaggerated. For 
instance, we might talk about a UK economy, attempt to measure it, compare its 
competitiveness with other economies, and over time create an institutional 
infrastructure (e.g. currency, public finance, international trade rules and regimes, 
etc.) that helps make it ‘real’, it does not represent an especially coherent entity or 
‘system’ within which our lives are especially determined. In fact, it will be shown 
that this conception of the economy is a pretty modern one. And yet, it will be 
suggested that the economy is in some respects seen as even more ‘real’ than the state. 
Whereas the imagined ‘state’ is increasingly recognised as contingent and 
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constructed, the economy is seen as especially real, as an objective or apolitical 
spatial-scalar referent that is nevertheless thought to speak to our lived experiences 
and life chances. 
‘Mapping’ all the ways in which the economy, or any given economic space, is 
discursively constructed is beyond the scope of this thesis, and represents a far 
broader challenge for approaches looking to better understand and employ the 
concept. The more modest aim here was to look at one aspect in particular, namely, 
articulations of economic threats/vulnerabilities/insecurities, and consider their 
potential role in re/affirming the idea of the economy. In the event, the thesis actually 
argues that the articulation of economic security is fundamental to the very idea of the 
economy. Explicitly or implicitly, to talk of the economy is to speak of the lived 
experiences of those deemed within it, of both their opportunities and vulnerabilities, 
their security or insecurity. In the case of the Scottish independence referendum, 
articulations of economic insecurities were central to the terms of debate.   
 
Yet articulations of ‘the economy’ are fundamentally political insofar as they serve, 
deliberately or not, to convey a space (and populace) as governable, and insofar as it 
is only really meaningful to talk of ‘the economy’ in correspondence with a political 
space. Crucially, whilst those for or against independence disagreed on the economic 
implications of independence, both fundamentally reasserted the exaggerated 
assumption that economies represent ‘real’ unifying object spaces within which 
subjects’ economic (in)security is both shared and largely determined. Through a 
poststructuralist discourse analysis of key texts from the referendum debate, including 
those from the official, opposing ‘Yes Scotland’ and ‘Better Together’ campaigns, 
this thesis seeks to challenge this fundamental assumption. 
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This introductory chapter will begin by setting out what are considered to be the key 
theoretical and empirical contributions of the thesis. It will then give an overview of 
the thesis to follow, including the key themes dealt with in each of the chapters.   
 
 
Contributions to Knowledge 
 
This thesis makes a number of theoretical and empirical contributions. One such 
contribution regards the conceptualisation of economic security, as well as its role in 
the territorialisation of political space. Economic security is hitherto an under-
theorised concept (Buzan et al. 1998; Dent 2007; Kahler 2004; Nesadurai 2006). One 
of the key reasons for this, it is argued, is that economic insecurity is a fundamental 
feature of modern economic life, and something that is often largely accepted 
according to dominant (neo)liberal economic reasoning. It is nevertheless important to 
better understand, for it is argued here that the articulation of economic (in)security is 
central to the re/imagination of ‘the economy’ as a real spatial-scalar entity, and 
therefore as something which is a significant determinant of the life-chances of 
ordinary people.  
 
An ancillary contribution is also made here insofar as this thesis represents a rare 
example of an analysis of security that more ‘honestly’ assumes the meaning of 
security to be fundamentally ‘constructed’. Chapter 5 presents a brief critique of the 
highly influential securitisation thesis (Buzan et al. 1998),  arguing that whilst the 
concept is illuminating in many regards, the specific ‘framework’ provided for its 
application by the so-called Copenhagen School is analytically and normatively 
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insufficient. Whilst stressing the constitutive role of language in how security is 
intersubjectively constructed through speech-acts, it leaves little room for recognition 
of either the broader contextual determinants of securitisation, the inevitable 
subjugation of other ‘voices’ in the construction of security, or the constitutive role of 
theorising in said construction (Ciuta 2009; Balzacq 2005; Hansen 2000; McDonald 
2008). Whilst other authors have highlighted this, this thesis provides an empirical 
application of this insight, through a discourse analysis of economic (in)security.  
 
‘The economy’ is a relatively recent invention (Mitchell 1998 & 2006) and remains a 
largely imaginative abstraction, and yet one that serves to shape political identities 
and legitimacies within political discourse. This thesis makes a contribution to what is 
a limited literature on the importance of the imagined economy as a distinct spatial-
scalar entity (Rosamond 2002 & 2012; Herrera 2007 & 2010; Tooze 1998). Whilst 
Rosamond (2002 & 2012) has looked at the importance of the imagined economy for 
the legitimation of governance capacities at the supra-state level, no comparable 
attempt has been made to do so at the sub-state, national level. This thesis also reveals 
a key (discursive) practice involved in its re/imagination of the economy, namely, the 
aforementioned articulation of economic (in)security. 
 
Better understanding both economic (in)security and the imagined economy – and 
their inter-relationship – also highlights a broader contribution to understanding the 
politics of identity and legitimacy and their role in the shifting of governance 
capacities within the plurinational (Keating 2004) UK state, where traditional 
analyses of expressions of national identity are insufficient alone for explaining 
claims to greater self-determination among sub-state actors (Harvie 2004; Mycock 
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2012; Soule et al. 2012; Ichijo 2012; Leith 2010; Keating 2009), both in the UK and 
elsewhere. Indeed, there is an important empirical contribution also to understanding 
what might loosely be referred to as ‘the terms of debate’ on Scottish independence 
specifically. Throughout the debate it was commonly asserted, albeit only 
anecdotally, that it hinged almost entirely on the so called ‘economics of 
independence’. The evidence presented here supports that view, and arguments are 
presented which help us to understand why this may have been the case. 
 
The economics of independence have similarly been noted to be a key locus of debate 
regarding other secessionist movements elsewhere in the world, such as in Quebec 
and Catalonia (Duch et al. 2000; Duchesne et al. 2003; Howe 2009; Muñoz & 
Tormose 2015a & 2015b). The conceptual arguments made herein help give some 
reasoning for why this might have been the case, and why this may well continue to 
be the case in future constitutional debates in Scotland. They may also have a wider 
currency given clear similarities with the terms of the debate on Britain’s membership 
of the EU prior to the referendum in 2016. 
 
Finally, there is a contribution of a methodological and indeed normative nature, with 
regards the thesis’ highlighting of the hidden politics at play in the legitimation of 
governance capacities. The ‘critical’ aspirations of postructuralist discourse theory 
(Laclau & Mouffe 1985; Howarth 2000; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Phillips 
& Jørgensen 2004; Torfing 1999; Torfing 2005) encourage efforts of reveal the 
hidden political implications of discursive practices, based on a fundamental 
assumption that discourse, or ‘the social’, is necessarily political. This thesis helps to 
reveal (some of) the ‘hidden politics’ at play in the Scottish independence referendum 
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debate, and illustrated, more generally, how the ‘politics’ is often ‘removed’ from ‘the 
politics of identity and legitimacy’.    
 
 
Outline of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 sets out the methodological assumptions underpinning this research.  The 
analytical approach used is underpinned by the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of poststructuralist discourse theory, specifically that inspired by Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985) and their successors in the so called ‘Essex School’ of discourse 
theory (Howarth 2000; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Phillips & Jørgensen 2004; 
Torfing 1999; Torfing 2005). After outlining the key research questions, Chapter 2 
progresses, therefore, with an explication of those assumptions and their 
methodological implication for the analysis. It is this view of the world as 
fundamentally mediated by discourse, and meanings and identities as strictly 
contingent (although often reluctantly so) that sits behind the theoretical and 
conceptual discussions that run throughout the thesis, shaping the author’s view of 
concepts such as nation, legitimacy, identity, politics, security, and perhaps most 
crucially, ‘the economy’. Chapter 2 then describes the empirical materials employed 
and the techniques used for processing the data gleaned. The remainder of the chapter 
addresses two additional theoretical considerations stemming from the research 
methodology employed, namely, the capacity for genuine critique in poststructuralist 
research of this nature, and the capacity to make claims to external validity (i.e. 
generalisations) from the findings of such research. These additional considerations 
are important given the ‘critical’ nature of arguments made and the broad claims to 
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the wider validity of these arguments for comparable constitutional debates 
elsewhere. Hopefully, they also rebuff some misconceived criticisms of 
poststructuralist research. 
 
Chapter 3 is essentially an introduction to the empirical and (overarching) conceptual 
context of the research. It provides a short historical introduction to contemporary 
Scottish politics and therefore the broader discursive context for the independence 
referendum debate. It then sets out the conceptual arguments pertaining to the so 
called shift from government to governance within which emergent and shifting 
governance capacities at the sub-state level are bound up. A number of fundamental 
political concepts are explicated - the state, the nation, identity, legitimacy – along 
with insights from political geographers pertaining to space, place and territoriality. 
Whilst the historical context and conceptual insights described provide a crucial 
background of understanding for the terms of referendum debate, it is argued that 
those terms of debate also demand a broader appraisal of the politics of identity and 
legitimacy, namely one which better considers explanations for the predominantly 
‘economistic’ focus of that debate, as well as the potential implications for shaping 
economic identities and the perceived legitimacy of proposed governance 
arrangements. 
 
Chapter 4 deals with one of the key ideas (or signifiers) featuring in the referendum 
debate, both in arguments for and against independence: the economy. One of the key 
research questions laid out in the methodology is ‘What is the (Scottish) economy?’ 
What appears at first to be a very straightforward question is, in fact, anything but 
straightforward. This is because the term ‘the economy’ is so familiar to us both in 
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everyday language - as well as that of political elites - that we take it almost entirely 
for granted and as something significantly representative of economic ‘realities’. 
Chapter 4 explains, however, that ‘the economy’ is actually a relatively modern 
conceptual invention (Mitchell 1998 & 2006), and one which remains a largely 
imaginative abstraction, not nearly as representative of economic realities as the 
‘acceptedness’ of the term would have us believe. This recognition of the 
fundamentally imagined and taken-for-granted nature of the economy is important for 
understanding the largely ‘economistic’ terms of the referendum debate, as well as the 
implications for shaping political identities and legitimacies.  
 
The predominant focus on the so called ‘economics of independence’ was noted by 
commentators at the time, if only anecdotally. Chapter 5 addresses this observation 
specifically. Drawing on various texts, mainly government documents, speeches, and 
the reported comments of key protagonists in the mainstream media, efforts to direct 
the focus of the debate towards ‘economistic’ arguments is evidenced. These 
arguments, it is shown, are explicitly conveyed as being more rational, utilitarian, and 
ultimately better. The implication it that voters can ‘know’ the right way to vote based 
upon largely objective rationalisations of economic implications of independence. 
However, drawing on the insights from Chapter 4 with regards to the imagined 
economy, it is argued that such arguments are misleading and serve to obscure the 
taken-for-granted, but necessarily political assumptions underpinning them. 
 
Up until this stage, it will have been noted several times in passing that one of the key 
‘techniques’ through which the economy is imagined is through the articulation of 
economic vulnerabilities, threats, or insecurities. Just as discourses of ‘conventional’ 
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security are thought to have been (and continue to be) key to consolidating the idea 
and legitimacies of the state (Campbell 1998; Kuus & Agnew 2008), it is argued that 
economic security is vital in the imagination of the economy - and by extension the 
legitimacies of the state and/or other governance arrangements. In Chapter 6 this 
proposition is developed. Given the theoretical ‘baggage’ that comes with the term 
‘security’ within academic literature it is necessary to address some of the key 
conceptual disagreements associated with that term. It is also argued that economic 
security itself is simultaneously all pervasive in everyday and elite discourse and yet 
conspicuous by its absence in security literature. Based on the assertion that the 
meaning of security, like all meaning, is mediated through discursive practice, 
justification is given for why this might be the case. It will be argued that through an 
analysis of articulations of economic (in)security, in this case by key protagonists in 
the Scottish independence referendum debate, it is possible to see how ‘the economy’ 
and ‘economic (in)security’ are reciprocally re/imagined through discursive practice,  
and to glean a broader understanding, therefore, of the role of the politics of identity 
and legitimacy in the shifting of governance capacities within modern multi-level 
political systems.   
 
Chapters 7 & 8 provide the main body of empirical evidence in support of this latter 
argument. These two chapters evidence the predominance of utterances of economic 
(in)security in support of arguments both for and against independence, the specific 
topics of economic (in)security identified, as well as the comparatively fewer 
utterances of more ‘conventional’ security concerns in the texts analysed. The reader 
will note that throughout these two chapters and the thesis generally, that the terms 
‘nationalist’ and ‘unionist’ are used to denote those favouring or rejecting 
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independence respectively. The author is mindful, however, that nationalism and 
unionism cannot be so easily defined, nor nationalists and unionists so easily 
separated. Within Chapter 3 it is explained that nationalism is not simply about 
seeking independent statehood, even though that is precisely what was at stake in this 
case. In fact, in the case of Scotland there has been a long recognised phenomenon of 
‘unionist-nationalism’, since many unionists will consider themselves ardent 
nationalists too. However, the decision was taken to employ these terms for the 
purposes of analytical distinction, because they were the ones used within the texts 
analysed and by key protagonists and other commentators besides. Therefore, based 
on a thoroughgoing analysis of some 1,200 articles across the opposing ‘Better 
Together’ and ‘Yes Scotland’ campaigns, Chapters 7 & 8 present the unionist and 
nationalist positions in turn, and reveal the specific types of economic (in)security 
uttered be each. Certain similarities between the two campaigns are noted, and clear 
differences too, which reveal underlying assumptions about how the economy is 
imagined and how it ought to be governed.  
 
In light of the findings presented in Chapters 7 & 8, Chapter 9 brings together the key 
theoretical themes of the thesis. It highlights the importance of articulations of 
economic (in)security in the imagination of ‘the (Scottish/UK) economy’ and stresses 
what this means for better understanding the role of the politics of identity and 
legitimacy within the referendum debate. Building on the observations of previous 
chapters with regards the different types of economic (in)security articulated, it 
addresses implications for the different ways in which ‘the economy’ is imagined, 
both spatially (i.e. with the ‘Scottish’ or ‘UK’ economy as the determining context of 
shared (in)security) and ideologically (i.e. as something corresponding with an 
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entirely material or at least partly ethical ‘community of fate’ (Williams 2003). The 
last and final section of the chapter reintroduces poststructuralist discourse theory. As 
stated above, the key ontological and epistemological assumptions of this approach, 
as laid out in the methodology, sit behind the theoretical and conceptual discussions 
developed throughout the thesis. However, at this juncture, there is explicit recourse 
to the intricate grammar of concepts which define the approach to discourse analysis 
advocated by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and developed by their successors in the 
‘Essex School’. Doing so provides an ontological language and conceptual 
architecture to explain the discursive construction of key signifiers like ‘the economy’ 
and ‘economic security’. In doing so, it also provides reasoning behind the effective 
depoliticisation of arguments for and against independence which rely almost entirely 
on the employment of these signifiers. Essentially, as per the title of the thesis, it 
provides a plausible account for the ‘hidden politics’ of independence. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
This chapter elaborates the methodological assumptions and tools employed in the 
research. Principally, the thesis is characterised by a methodological commitment to 
poststructuralist discourse theory. The underpinning ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of poststructuralist discourse theory are considered especially well suited 
to the topics of the research, principal among which: the idea (or discourse) of the 
imagined economy. Moreover, poststructuralist discourse theory provides a number of 
useful analytical tools for enquiry, which will be outlined below. The adopted 
methodological apparatus helped to both shape and ultimately answer the core 
research questions outlined below.  
 
Primary Research Question 
 
1. What role do articulations of economic (in)security play in the Scottish 
independence referendum debate? 
 
Subsidiary Research Questions 
 
1. What is ‘the (Scottish) economy’? 
2. What role do articulations of economic security play in the imagination of ‘the 
(Scottish) economy’? 
3. What are the implications of this for the debate on Scottish independence? 
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After addressing the core methodology, the chapter will outline the empirical focus of 
the research and the specific types of data used in the analysis. Finally, the chapter 
will address two further theoretical considerations. First, the capacity for critique in 
discourse theory research, and second, the capacity for external validity in discourse 
theory research and interpretive research more broadly.  
 
Discourse Theory/Analysis 
 
The type of discourse theory employed here stems principally from the insights 
of Laclau and Mouffe as laid out in their seminal 1985 text Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. Various thoroughgoing 
contributions explain the core assumptions of their theory in more detail than can be 
done here (Torfing 1999; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Howarth 2000; Phillips 
& Jørgensen2004) but it is still important to give a brief overview. So, what is 
discourse, and what are discourses? Discourse from the point of view of 
poststructuralists like Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe is essentially synonymous with 
how other social constructionists perceive ‘the social’ (this is different to other 
discourse analysis approaches, notably Critical Discourse Analysis – see below). It is 
the universal background of meaning that mediates our experience of the world. There 
is, to all intents and purposes, no reality for us external to discourse. In the words of 
Derrida, ‘[t]here is nothing outside the text’ (1976, p. 158, emphasis in the 
original). This does not however mean that there is no world external to thought as 
idealists would suggest. Rather what is denied is that that world could be understood 
outside of discourse (Laclau & Mouffe 1985 cited Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, p. 
3).  
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Discourse is populated by discourses. These are the historically specific systems of 
meaning which form the identities of subjects and objects (Foucault 1972). They are 
the specific ‘systems of signification’ that construct social reality (Milliken 1999, p. 
229). Moreover, discourses are intrinsically political and inevitably involve the 
exercise of power, for their constitution necessarily involves the exclusion of other 
interpretations and meanings. However, discourses are consequently contingent 
because they are ‘always vulnerable to those political forces excluded in their 
production’ (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000, p. 4). Howarth and Stavrakakis explain 
that ‘discourse theory investigates the way in which social practices articulate and 
contest the discourses that constitute social reality’ (2000, p. 3). Importantly 
discourses can be problematised and destabilised by illuminating their intrinsic 
contradictions. The approach used to do this is discourse analysis. 
 
Discourse analysis can be defined as ‘the process of analysing significant practices as 
discursive forms’ (Howarth 2000, p. 10). This can be done using a wide range of both 
linguistic and non-linguistic forms of data including speeches, reports, manifestos, 
historical events, interviews, policies, and ideas, which are treated as ‘texts’ (Howarth 
2000, p. 10). Importantly, critical/emancipatory approaches that share this assumption 
have a normative commitment to highlighting how certain texts are ‘depoliticised’ by 
essentialist, exclusionary discourses. This thesis explicitly adopts such a ‘critical’ 
position in the analysis of nationalist and unionist ‘texts’ from the Scottish 
independence referendum debate, with the aim of highlighting that which is taken-for-
granted therein, and the implications for the effective ‘depoliticisation’ of the 
referendum debate.   
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Poststructuralist discourse theory has its genesis in Saussurean structural linguistics. 
Saussure emphasised the relationships within which things are placed in sign systems, 
relations by which one object is distinguished from another in the system (Milliken 
1999, p. 229). Essentially things acquire meaning through the systems of signification 
in which they are situated. Within such systems, all meaning is relational i.e. things 
acquire their meaning by virtue of their relationship with what other things mean. 
However, whereas Saussure conceived of such systems or structures as rigid, 
poststructuralists such as Derrida recognised that they are conditioned by history and 
culture and are thus contingent. Poststructuralist discourse theory employs a strictly 
anti-essentialist ontology and anti-foundationalist epistemology and thus, 
following Derrida, argues ‘there is no pre-given, self-determining essence that is 
capable of determining and ultimately fixing all other identities within a stable and 
totalizing structure’ (Torfing 2005, p. 13). Torfing explains that there have been 
numerous attempts to ‘explain the course of history, the structure of society, and the 
identities of subjects and objects by reference to an underlying essence…[and] God, 
Reason, Humanity, Nature, and the Iron Laws of Capitalism and are some of the 
celebrated candidates for this transcendental determining centre’ (2005, p. 13). It is 
just such a transcendental centre, or underlying essence, that discourse theory 
abandons. We can therefore restate a definition of a discourse as ‘a differential 
ensemble of signifying sequences in which meaning is constantly renegotiated’ 
(Torfing 1999, p. 85). But the consequence is not a completely fluid picture of 
social reality, as is the common criticism levelled against such social 
constructionist approaches. As Torfing stresses, employing the vocabulary 
of Laclau and Mouffe, ‘The result is not total chaos and flux, but playful 
determination of social meanings and identities within a relational system which is 
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provisionally anchored in nodal points that are capable of partially fixing a series of 
floating signifiers’ (2005, p. 13). If all social meaning and identity is fluid in 
principle, the reality is that they often tend to be rather viscous in practice.  
 
Torfing states that ‘Within discourse, meaning is constructed either in terms of 
difference or equivalence…; Most often, meaning is constructed both through the 
assertion of difference and the articulation of chains of equivalence’ (2005, p. 
14). Through an analysis of various texts it should be possible to discern such ‘chains 
of equivalence’ whereby certain key signifiers are invested with meaning by being 
linked to other signifiers. That is, we can see how through acts of articulation, 
elements become moments in a given discourse (see below). As Philips 
and Jørgensen explain, ‘[w]hat the key signifiers have in common is that they are 
empty signs: that is, they mean almost nothing by themselves until, through chains of 
equivalence they are combined with other signs that fill them with meaning’ (2004, p. 
50). For example, liberal democracy only acquires its meaning by being combined 
with other signifiers such as ‘free elections’ and ‘free speech’ (Philips 
& Jørgensen 2004, p. 50). Similarly, economic (in)security only acquires meaning 
through association with specific types of insecurity and particular understandings of 
‘the economic’. 
 
In the absence of an ‘ultimate centre that is capable of invoking a totalizing discursive 
closure…tendentially empty signifiers will tend to function as nodal points for the 
partial fixation of meaning’ (Torfing 2005, p. 14). Furthermore given that a discursive 
system cannot be constructed by reference to an inner essence, we must look for that 
which is necessarily excluded by a given discourse - its ‘constitutive outside’ – in 
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order to account for the limits of said discourse (Torfing 2005, p. 15). It is the 
existence of this constitutive outside that necessarily gives rise to social antagonisms. 
Thus this process of ‘othering’ simultaneously helps to stabilise a discursive system 
while giving rise to a ‘radical other’ that threatens it. However, Torfing (2005, p. 
16) explains that the line separating the friendly inside from the threatening outside is 
never fixed and the everlasting struggle over who and what is included/excluded 
from certain discourses is fundamental to politics. As such, where there are conflicts 
across articulations we can ask ‘What different understandings of reality are at 
stake…?’ (Philips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 51). 
 
We can now reiterate some of these points in a more concise fashion by further 
explicating the grammar of concepts afforded us by Laclau and Mouffe. Moments are 
all the signs situated within a discourse. A discourse is formed by the partial fixation 
of meaning around a nodal point, which is a privileged sign around which other signs 
(moments) are ordered. As we have already said, signs are fixed by the exclusion of 
all other meanings that they could have had. The consequent surplus of 
meaning excluded by a discourse is what Laclau and Mouffe call the ‘field 
of discursivity’. Elements, therefore, are those signs whose meaning has not yet been 
fixed into moments. Discourses are re/produced through the practice of articulation, 
thus it is through articulation that elements are turned into moments. We can now 
bring together these ideas neatly in the words of Laclau and Mouffe themselves. 
‘[W]e will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements 
such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The 
structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we call discourse. The 
differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, we 
will call moments. By contrast, we will call element any difference that is not 
discursively articulated’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985, p. 105). 
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An important point is that while discourses attempt to create closure - to produce a 
‘totality’ – by turning elements into moments, ‘[t]he transition from the “elements” to 
the “moments” is never entirely fulfilled’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985, p. 110). This is 
because the fixity of meaning that a discourse produces is always in danger of being 
undermined by the other potential meanings that it excludes; thus ‘all moments stay 
potentially polysemic…[they] are always potentially elements’ (Phillips 
& Jørgensen 2004, p. 29). Hence, as we have already stated discourses are not fixed; 
they are necessarily contingent.  
 
It is this very contingency that points to the primacy of politics. For 
as Torfing explains, 'Discourse is defined as a relational ensemble of signifying 
sequences; but if the relational and differential logic prevailed without any limitation 
or rupture, there would be no room for politics’ (1999, p. 91). The usage of the term 
politics from the point of view of discourse theory is rather more fundamental than its 
usage in common parlance. As Phillips and Jørgensen (2004) explain, it is not used in 
the narrow sense to refer to say party politics, but it instead refers to the way in which 
the social is constituted in a manner necessarily involving exclusion. 
‘Politics, then, is not just a surface that reflects a deeper social reality; rather, it 
is the social organisation that is the outcome of continuous political processes’ 
(Phillips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 36). 
The concepts of objectivity, hegemony and antagonism need addressing here. 
Objectivity refers to those discourses that become so sedimented, so naturalised, that 
their contingency becomes forgotten, they appear apolitical; they are taken for 
granted, seen as ‘common sense’. To all intents and purposes they appear 
to represent truths. Yet, however unlikely their contestation might seem, 
such sedimented discourses are necessarily contingent (due to their vulnerability from 
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that which they necessarily exclude), and, can ‘at any time, enter the play of politics 
and be problematized in new articulations’ (Phillips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 
36). Phillips and Jørgensen (2004, p. 36) state that ‘hegemony comes between 
‘objectivity’ and ‘the political’’. It refers to instances whereby articulations 
re/produce dominant or hegemonic discourses.  
‘Articulations that manage to provide a credible principle upon which to read 
past, present and future events, and capture people’s hearts and minds, become 
hegemonic’ (Torfing 2005, p. 15). 
However, Torfing (1999, p. 101) explains how such articulations - given that they 
necessarily include an element of force and repression in the negation of alternative 
meanings, or alternative identities - take place within a political terrain of power and 
resistance, inevitably giving rise to social antagonism. In sum, 
‘[I]f we put all of this together we can define hegemony as the expansion of a 
discourse, or set of discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation 
and action by means of articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed 
moments in a context criss-crossed by antagonistic forces’ (Torfing 1999, p. 
101). 
Another discourse theory concept that needs to be outlined here, which also features 
in the empirical component of this thesis, is floating signifiers.  
 
Floating signifiers help us to better understand antagonism and hegemony. More 
specifically they help us see how different discourses struggle over the ascription of 
meaning to certain key signifiers. Crucially, floating signifiers differ to empty 
signifiers outlined above.  
‘...[G]eneral equivalents can be either empty signifiers or floating signifiers. 
Their status depends on whether the conditions are stable (normal or ‘the 
social’) or relatively unstable (‘the political’). General equivalents in the 
former are empty signifiers where as in the latter they resemble ‘floating 
signifiers’. Floating signifiers are general equivalents that have multiple 
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meanings because actors grounded in multiple discourses are seeking 
to hegemonise their meaning during a period of dislocation’ (Jeffares 2007, 
pp. 58-59). 
Defined simply, a floating signifier is ‘a signifier that is overflowed with meaning 
because it is articulated differently within different discourses’ (Torfing, 1999, p. 
301). It is not uncommon of course for certain terms to have completely different 
meanings. This is a consequence of the Derriderrian arbitrariness of the sign (there is 
no necessary relationship between signifier and signified) and the consequent unfixity 
of all meaning. But Laclau shows us that a distinction needs to be made between 
instances of equivocality and those of radical ambiguity.  
‘For example, when I say “down the hill” or “the soft down on his cheek: the 
term down is equivocal: its meaning varies in relation to different contexts, 
although in each context its meaning is perfectly clear. On the other hand, if I 
speak about “democracy” in the political context of Western Europe during the 
cold war years, the ambiguity of the term proceeds from the context itself, which 
is constituted to some extent by the simultaneous presence of communist and 
anticommunist discourses. The term, therefore, is radically ambiguous and not 
simply polysemous. It is not a matter of its meaning one thing in communist 
discourse and another in anticommunist discourse; this, of course, may happen, 
but if that were the sole distinguishing circumstance, we would be left with a 
plurality of perfectly well-defined contexts and, consequently, with a case of 
simple equivocalness. Something very different, however, takes place: since 
both discourses are antagonistic and yet operate largely in the same 
argumentative context, there is a loosening of the relational systems that 
constitute the identity of the term. Thus, the term becomes a floating signifier’ 
(Laclau, 1988, pp. 70-71).  
‘Floating signifiers are the signs that different discourses struggle to invest with 
meaning in their own particular way. Nodal points are floating signifiers, but 
whereas the term ‘nodal point’ refers to a crystallisation within a specific 
discourse, the term ‘floating signifier’ belongs to the ongoing struggle between 
different discourses to fix the meaning of important signs. The ‘body’ is thus a 
nodal point in medical discourse, and a floating signifier in the struggle between 
medical discourse and alternative treatment discourses’ (Phillips 
and Jørgensen 2004, pp. 28-29). 
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In sum, floating signifiers help us to see ‘[w]hat different understandings of reality are 
at stake, [and where they are] in antagonistic opposition to one another’ (Phillips & 
Jørgensen2004, p. 51).  
 
The above grammar of concepts helps to make sense of how meanings within 
discourse are re/configured. Within discourse theory the social practices which 
orchestrate this re/configuration are referred to as articulations. The concept of 
articulation accounts for the necessarily performative nature of discursive practice, 
where what is ‘said’ through discourse necessarily has an impact – however minute – 
on the social and political world. Put very simply, discursive approaches recognise the 
performativity of language; to say something is to do something.  Speech act theory 
stresses the capacity of speech and communication not simply to communicate but 
rather to act or consummate an action, or to construct and perform an identity (see 
Austin 1962; Searle 1969). Butler (1988) famously built on the notion of the speech 
act by exploring the ways in which linguistic constructions serve to create our reality 
in general through the speech acts we participate in every day. Focusing specifically 
on ‘gender acts’, Butler stresses how in the act of performing the conventions of 
reality, and by embodying certain fictions (e.g. regarding gender) in our actions, we 
make those artificial conventions appear to be natural and necessary.  
 
However, as stressed in the critique of the securitisation framework in Chapter 6 - 
according to which security can be understood through an analysis of speech acts – it 
is vitally important to not only consider the performativity of the utterance, but also to 
recognise that the utterance itself would be meaningless were it removed from its 
essential discursive context. In other words, acts of communication are both shaped 
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by and help to shape their discursive context. Importantly, unlike other approaches to 
discourse theory (e.g. Critical Discourse Analysis), Laclau and Mouffe do not make 
an ontological distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic phenomena as 
components of discourse (see below). As such, the concept of articulation can actually 
account for all sorts of other social practices as well as simply the linguistic practices 
which might be assumed from the expression ‘acts of communication’. This is 
consonant with the assumption that all the world is mediated through discourse, or in 
Derrida’s terms, ‘[t]here is nothing outside the text’ (1976, p. 158, emphasis in the 
original). It is nevertheless the case, as explained below, that analyses conducted for 
the purposes of this thesis were of linguistic phenomena, specifically ‘concrete’ texts, 
including speeches, news articles and policy documents. In any event, as with textual 
utterances more narrowly defined, articulations should be viewed as both conditioned 
by and serving to condition the social and political world. 
 
Weldes provides a useful description of articulation as referring to the construction of 
discursive objects and relationships out of ‘cultural raw materials’ and ‘linguistic 
resources’ that already make sense within a particular society (1999, p. 154). In 
combining and recombining extant cultural materials, and in repeating successful 
combinations, ‘contingent and contextually specific representations of the world’ can 
be forged that ‘come to seem as though they are inherently or necessarily connected 
and the meanings they produce come to seem natural, to be an accurate description of 
reality’ (Weldes 1999, pp. 154-155). It is through an ensemble of articulatory 
practices that the identity of objects and subjects is re/configured in discursive 
practice. As such, objects and subjects are necessarily positioned, and performed, 
within a discursive context.  
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The name given to the process through which subjects are ‘hailed into’ (Althuser 
1971, p. 174) subject positions through certain discursive formations, and come to 
recognise the representations of ‘reality’ purported therein, is ‘interpellation’. As 
Weldes stresses, ‘Once they identify with these subject-positions, the representations 
make sense to them and the power relations and interests entailed in them are 
naturalized. As a result, the representations appear to be common sense, to reflect ‘the 
way the world really is’’ (1996, p. 287). Moreover, subjects necessarily ‘speak’ (or 
‘articulate’) from within a given discursive context, having different discourses (some 
more hegemonically determined than others) available to them, and of course they 
themselves play a part (some more powerfully than others) in shaping that discursive 
context through acts of re/articulation. However, those subjects may find that in 
certain contexts they are ‘overdetermined’ where their identities clash (Laclau stresses 
that subjects are always overdetermined given the impossibility of fixity) and find 
they have to ‘choose’ between those different subject positions (e.g. when voting one 
may have to choose between being an environmentalist, a social democrat, and 
feminist, or a pacifist, depending on the espoused ideals and proposed policies of 
those for whom they are voting). As will be shown in later chapters, there were clear 
instances of such overdetermination of the subject within texts from the independence 
referendum debate.  Ultimately, this relationship between discourse and identity, and 
the consonant implications for what is or is not considered a legitimate view of social 
reality, has fundamental implications for understanding the politics of identity and 
legitimacy. As such, this poststructuralist view of identity construction runs like a red 
thread throughout the thesis. 
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Contrary to what is commonly assumed about discursive approaches, articulation 
need not necessarily refer simply to that which is spoken, or even that which is 
written. As Laclau and Mouffe stated, an articulation is ‘any practice establishing a 
relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the 
articulatory practice’ (1985, p. 105 emphasis added). Indeed, articulation can refer to 
any type of social practice, irrespective of how menial they might appear at a 
superficial level. Crucially, both ‘linguistic’ and ‘non-linguistic’ phenomena are 
instances of discourse and both serve an articulatory purpose 
that shapes discursive reality, consonant with Derrida’s claim that ‘[t]here is nothing 
outside the text’(1976, p. 158, emphasis in the original). Indeed, as Howarth points 
out, the distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic data is ‘pragmatic, rather 
than ontological’ (2004, p. 335). This clearly differs to the Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) of Norman Fairclough for instance, who, when describing his approach, 
explains that ‘There is a major contrast here between textually- (and therefore 
linguistically-) oriented discourse analysis (henceforth abbreviated as TODA) such as 
mine, and Foucault’s more abstract approach’ (Fairclough 1994, p. 37). 
  
Nevertheless, it is the case that the analysis here is based principally on concrete 
instances of spoken and written language (the aforementioned linguistic phenomena). 
It is however commonly assumed that poststructuralists are not interested in such 
things and tend to shy away from any allusion to the sort of methodologism that 
characterises other approaches focusing on discourse. Fairclough explains that 
‘whereas the analysis of spoken and written language texts is a central part of TODA, 
it is not part of Foucault’s discourse analysis’ (1994, p. 38). On the contrary 
however, many discourse analyses employing the insights 
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of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory do study written and spoken texts. As Philips 
and Jørgensen explain, Laclau and Mouffe ‘do not supply concrete 
methods for analysis, but a range of analytical focus-points can be extrapolated from 
their model’ (2004, p. 165). Indeed, far from being an exercise in navel-gazing, 
discourse theory provides us with significant analytical tools that can help us to make 
sense of the empirical world (Milliken 1999; Howarth 2005). These analytical focus 
points comprise the grammar of concepts such as chains of 
equivalence/difference, hegemony, antagonism, nodal points, floating 
signifiers, articulation, etc. as set out above. Nevertheless, it is still possible to employ 
other concepts and methods from other more linguistically oriented approaches to 
discourse analysis, such as Fairclough’s CDA, while still remaining faithful to the 
ontological assumptions of a more poststructuralist discourse theory. In fact, doing so 
can help demonstrate the practical utility of discourse theory, which is something that 
many critics of poststructuralism incorrectly refute.  
 
Another concept commonly employed by discourse analysts is intertextuality, which 
refers to ‘cases where one oral or written text directly or indirectly quotes another text 
or alludes to another text in yet more subtle ways’ (Paul Gee 2014, p. 
61). Fairclough says of intertextuality that it is 
‘how the 
`
outside
'
 of a text is brought into the text, as we might put it…how 
texts draw upon, incorporate, recontextualize and dialogue with other texts. It is 
also partly a matter of the assumptions and presuppositions people make when 
they speak or write. What is 
`
said
'
 in a text is always said against the background 
of what is 
`
unsaid
'
 — what is made explicit is always grounded in what is left 
implicit’ (Fairclough 2003, p. 17). 
 
‘Intertextuality refers to the condition whereby all communicative events draw 
on earlier events’ (Phillips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 73).  
27 
 
Although both essentially describe the same broad phenomenon, a useful distinction is 
often made between intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Intertextuality broadly writ 
refers to links between ‘texts’, but this can be specific concrete texts, like speeches, 
reports, news articles, etc., or indeed to ‘grander’ texts, which we might otherwise call 
narratives, or discourses. Interdiscursivity is often used to refer specifically to the 
later, ‘when different discourses and genres are articulated together in a 
communicative event’ (Phillips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 73). Phillips and Jørgensen 
explain, therefore, that ‘Interdiscursivity is a form of intertextuality’ (2004, p. 73). In 
Chapters 7 & 8 instances of both intertextuality and interdiscursivity are highlighted 
in the materials analysed from Scottish independence referendum.  
An important concept related to intertextuality that Fairclough discusses 
is dialogicality, which refers to the way in which different ‘voices’ can be interpreted 
from a given text. Dialogicality can apply to both ‘types’ of intertextuality described 
above, but I think it is particularly useful with regards the latter (i.e. interdiscursivity), 
insofar as it can address the extent to which different discourses can (and must) be 
implicated through given texts. He stresses for instance that one important 
difference between intertextuality and assumption is that intertextuality 
illuminates the dialogicality of a text, ‘the dialogue between the voice of the author of 
a text and other voices’, while assumption does not, since it ‘assumes common 
ground’ (Fairclough 2003, p. 41). Fairclough argues that all texts are dialogical, to the 
extent that other ‘voices’ are always implicated by a text, however, they differ with 
regards the extent to which those other voices are made obvious. Such instances of 
dialogicality are revealed in the analysis. Fairclough points out 
how Laclau and Mouffe build on the Gramscian view that politics is essentially a 
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struggle for hegemony based on the understanding that power is exercised through 
consent, not mere coercion. In the language of discourse theory we might say that 
various discourses aim to assert themselves as the representations of reality. But as we 
have already seen, such discourses can only ever be contingent since they are 
vulnerable to that which they necessarily exclude, and thus we must ask, what 
versions of reality are at stake in any given text? Drawing on Butler et 
al (2000), Fairclough stresses how ‘The hegemonic struggle between political forces 
can be seen as partly a contention over the claims of their particular visions and 
representations of the world to having a universal status’ (2003, p. 45). By way of 
illustration, Fairclough uses a European Union text in which globalisation, in 
particular global economic change along neoliberal lines, is seen as an inevitable 
development distinct from human agency (2003, p. 45). Dialogicality is in this 
instance reduced, and done so in a manner that obscures the fact that the version of 
reality purported therein is but one of many possible versions. As such it works to 
obscure the political or ideological nature of all social practice and with it the 
inescapable contingency of the social. On a more practical note, it is worth pointing 
out that different types of documents will likely differ in the extent to 
which dialogicality is apparent in them. With policy documents for instance it is often 
that case that dialogicality will be less explicit. Paul Gee states that ‘Research, when it 
is mentioned, tends to speak with one voice and a voice that supports the policy in the 
policy document’ (Paul Gee 2014, p. 48). 
 
Whilst some of the concepts outlined above are drawn upon throughout the thesis, 
some are not returned to fully until the Conclusion. However, for the most part, 
Laclau & Mouffe’s grammar of concepts effectively sits behind the thesis, informing 
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the ontological and methodological lens through which observations are made 
throughout. As such, the reader need not be intimately familiar with discourse theory 
to make sense of said observations per se, providing they are at least familiar with the 
assumptions of postructuralism broadly defined; specifically, but not exclusively, that 
reality is indeterminable other than through discourse, and that all discourse is 
inevitably ‘political’.  
 
 
Collection of Empirical Data 
 
For this research a triangulation of methods was used. Hewson defines triangulation 
as ‘a research strategy that involves approaching a research question from two or 
more angles in order to converge and cross-validate findings from a number of 
sources’ (2006, p. 180). Denzin distinguishes between ‘within-methods triangulation’, 
where either multiple quantitative or qualitative methods are used, and ‘between-
methods triangulation’, where a mixture of each is used (Denzin 1978 cited in Gray 
2009, p. 205). The latter type of research is commonly known as ‘mixed methods’ 
and has a number of benefits for particular types of research questions. 
However, mixed methods research is not suitable in many cases where a single 
approach, either quantitative or qualitative, is all that is needed. Ultimately, at the end 
of a mixed methods research project the end product should exceed the sum of its 
constitutive quantitative and qualitative parts (Bryman 2007). Indeed, while 
quantitative methods are not necessarily incommensurable with the epistemological 
and ontological assumptions of this research, they were not suitable for this research. 
Here a ‘within-method’ or ‘multi-method’ approach was used to glean data.  
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Interviews were conducted at the Scottish Parliament with a number of Members of 
the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) from a cross section of political parties during 
November 2012. Interviews were semi-structured (or semi-standardised) to offer 
flexibility, but also a certain level of standardisation. An initial pool of respondents 
was identified and contacted, after which ‘snowball sampling’ was used, whereby a 
respondent interviewed was asked to identify further potential respondents to be 
approached. Besides more obviously helping to identify appropriate respondents, such 
a practice successfully lead to respondents acting as ‘gatekeepers’, facilitating access 
to other respondents. Respondents were afforded informed consent; they were briefed 
on the nature of research and the interview process, and given the right to withdraw at 
any stage should they wish. However, given the non-sensitive nature of the 
questioning this was not to be a problem. Interviews were recorded using a voice-
recorder, and accompanying hand-written notes were taken. Interviews lasted 
approximately forty-five minutes to one hour. In total, 14 interviews were conducted, 
not all of which produced material that has been used as extracts in the body of the 
thesis. This was felt to be sufficient at this early, exploratory stage of the research 
process. Interviews were useful for uncovering MSP’s opinions regarding the 
independence referendum and their different understandings of economic security. 
They were also very useful for helping to determine the discursive context within 
which those views are articulated. At the time the intention was to return at a later 
date for further interviews. However, as research progressed it became clear that other 
types of data from publicly consumed texts such as speeches, policy documents and 
manifestos, press releases and media reports, would be more meaningful for 
answering the research questions given that they could be considered to command 
greater performative significance. 
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The issue of performative significance is important given that a guiding 
assumption of a discourse theoretic approach is discourse’s productivity. One could 
question whether or not what is uttered in the relatively private setting of an interview 
can be treated as significantly performative. In response to this one might argue 
that as far as the respondent is concerned they are still ‘performing’ when taking part 
in an interview research because as far as they are concerned the findings will be 
publicly disseminated and consumed. In fact, whilst the context may not be quite the 
same as if they were giving a public speech to a large audience, carried on popular 
media platforms, what they were able to meaningfully say would have been 
delimited by their discursive situatedness and thus indicative of it. Hansen 
and Sørensen explain that through interviews ’knowledge is obtained about the ways 
individuals in different positions within a given discursive structure construct 
meaning and identity – and thus knowledge – about themselves and the other actors, 
and how and where they draw discursive patterns of inclusion and exclusion’ (2005, 
p. 99). However, the other data sources used were considered more useful, not least 
because of their assumed performative significance. 
 
In addition to published government documents, of particular use were the online 
materials of the opposing Better Together and Yes Scotland campaigns in the 
referendum debate. The campaigns’ respective websites re-published speeches by key 
protagonists, as well as media reports and government press releases, and various 
other publicly consumed materials in support of their cases either for or against 
independence. These materials are a particularly useful gauge of the terms of the 
debate as they represent managed collections of articles including text from key 
32 
 
speeches, documents and reports, along with editorials, blogs, etc. In total, 
approximately 1,200 such texts were ‘read’ for the purposes of this analysis
1
.  A basic 
content analysis was used for the purposes of processing these ‘texts’ in particular, the 
detail of which are elaborated upon in Chapter 7. 
 
Online news media resources (principally from the BBC) were also used extensively, 
not for opinions or as substantiating evidence in themselves, but for direct quotes 
from key protagonists in the debate. It was judged often to be more meaningful to 
access this data from these sources as they were clearly in the public domain and 
would have been widely consumed, and therefore, could be thought to command 
greater performative significance in the debate and in shaping public opinion. The 
timeframe for data used in the analysis was from the summer of 2012 up until the 
referendum on Scottish independence in September 2014. Details of these online 
materials are elaborated upon in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, and are listed in full in the 
Appendices. 
 
To manage the data, computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) 
was used, specifically the programme NVivo. Perhaps the main advantage of using 
CAQDAS is it allows one to store vast amounts of data of various formats (text, 
audio, images, videos) in one place. One other basic, but nonetheless very useful 
function it has, is to allow the analyst to run text search queries, thus enabling one to 
navigate through the data and potentially find analogous information. It also has the 
                                                          
1
 Full lists of titles and information on accessing full articles can be found in the 
appendices. Full articles were not inserted in the appendices as they would have run to 
several thousand pages. 
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significant advantage of making the process of coding such data easier, faster, more 
flexible and virtually limitless. Put simply by Miles and Huberman,  
‘Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or 
inferential information compiled during a study. Codes usually are attached to 
‘chunks’ of varying size-words, phrases, sentences, or whole paragraphs’ (Miles 
& Huberman 1994, p. 56). 
From the point of view of discourse analysis, being able to assign codes to chunks of 
text was useful for highlighting important signifiers and relationships. Coding was 
particularly useful for gleaning the data used in Chapter 7 pertaining to the different 
types of economic (in)security uttered by nationalist and unionists in the referendum 
debate. Coding qualitative data is traditionally a very laborious and time-consuming 
process, but with the advent of software like NVivo this is less the case (Gray 2009, 
pp. 518-521). Moreover, unlike with a filing cabinet of data, CAQDAS allows you to 
jump from coded data to its context and back again almost instantaneously (Richards 
& Morse 2007, p. 149) making the process of analysis both easier and more thorough.  
 
Additional Theoretical Considerations 
 
A Capacity for Critique? 
 
Given the poststructuralist conception of truth, what is the capacity for critique and 
normative conviction in discourse theoretic research? Torfing states that ‘Truth is 
always local and flexible, as it is conditioned by a discursive truth regime which 
specifies the criteria for judging something to be true or false’ (2005, pp. 13-14). But 
does this mean that there can be no conception at all of what is true, right or good? 
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And if so, what are the implications of this for knowledge production, and for 
normatively driven critique? Phillips and Jørgensen (2004) engage excellently with 
questions such as these in a chapter dedicated to understanding the potential for 
critique in light of the premises of social constructionism. They explain how ideology 
critique has its roots in Marx and the Frankfurt School, and the idea that critique 
‘should undermine power by revealing the reality behind ideology’ (Phillips 
& Jørgensen 2004, p. 179). People can be seen therefore to suffer from a ‘false 
consciousness’ whereby they are blinded from how things really are by ideology.  
 
But Norval explains how in ‘Hegemony and Socialist Strategy’ Laclau and Mouffe 
critique the essentialism (specifically the class determinism) at the heart of the 
Marxist conception of ideology by rejecting the view of society as a ‘given’ object of 
analysis, and stress ‘that society is traversed by antagonism and that it lacks 
an essence since it is an overdetermined and precarious unity resulting from 
discursive, articulatory practices’ (Norval 2000, p. 328). Thus, against a more 
traditional ideology critique that ‘aims to unmask power with truth’ (Phillips 
and Jørgensen 2004, p. 179), a discourse theory approach raises various objections. 
For one, it contests that there is a truth behind the various discourses through which 
we experience the world and to which the researcher has privileged access, and, also, 
that this truth can somehow be free from power. There is in fact no extra-discursive 
reality to which we have access, nor – as Foucault among others has shown us – can 
there be a conception of truth as divorced from power. Thus, when we say that 
hegemonic articulations (as discussed above) always comprise an element of 
ideological totalization (Laclau 1996 cited in Torfing 2005, p. 15) we employ a 
modified conception of ideology. No longer can it be understood as a distorted 
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representation of an immutable, objective reality, but as obscuring the 
necessary undecidability of all social identity (Torfing 2005, p. 15). However, it might 
seem to follow from this that there is no longer any room for critique, for if all 
representations are ideological how can we positively say what is true, right or good?   
 
Norval (2000) stresses how some have asked in light of the ‘linguistic turn’ 
fundamentally challenging the idea of absolute truths and absolute falsities whether 
we should abandon the concept of ideology from our analyses altogether. However, 
rather than abandoning it, and thus assuming that we live in a non-ideological world, 
many contemporary approaches, including those drawing on the insights of Laclau 
and Mouffe, have chosen to stress the very ubiquity of discourse (Norval 2000). Of 
course the problem that arises is one of relativism. However, the fact that all truths are 
discursive constructions and thus fundamentally contingent does not dispose 
discourse theory to the sort of nihilistic relativism that many critics of 
poststructuralism suggest, whereby ‘it is impossible to defend any particular set of 
claims about what is true right or good’ (Torfing 2005, pp. 18-19). In fact, since we 
are never divorced from discourse we are never in a position where we can contend 
that all claims are equally valid or just.    
‘God is the only entity capable of rising above the historically contingent 
discourses and viewing all the competing truth regimes and ethical standards as 
equally valid. We mortals are tied to a particular discursive framework within 
which we define and negotiate our criteria for accepting something as true, right, 
or good’ (Torfing 2005, p. 19).  
Contrary to what the critics say then, poststructuralist discourse theory stands opposed 
to the very nihilistic relativism it is accused of inspiring. Just as there can be no extra-
discursive position from which to determine what is really true, right, or good, there 
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can be no similar position from which to consider all claims to the latter as equally 
valid. Therefore, Phillips and Jørgensen state ‘if critique is understood in a broad 
sense as the proposal of one understanding of the world at the expense of other 
possible understandings, we do not think that one can avoid being critical at all’ 
(2004, p. 204). The assertion that knowledge is always political means ‘one can 
neither present the absolute truth nor completely avoid saying something’ (Phillips 
& Jørgensen 2004, p. 206). As researchers we ought to take responsibility for the fact 
that we are saying something about the world that has consequences, while being 
mindful that ‘other representations cannot be rejected on the grounds that researchers 
have privileged access to truth’ (Phillips & Jørgensen 2004, p. 205). Furthermore, in 
addition to accusations of nihilistic relativism, the anti-essentialism of 
poststructuralist discourse theory, some argue, results in an essentialist statement of 
its own, namely, that the world is devoid of essence. However, as Torfing (2005, p. 
21) points out, this supposed paradox is based on ‘a fallacy of equivocation’. 
‘when discourse theorists claim there is no essence they take issue with the 
metaphysical idea of a positively defined essence that is given in and by itself 
and from which it is possible to derive a whole series of determinate effects. 
Now, for the claim that there is no such essence to be an essentialist stipulation 
it requires that the affirmation of the absence of a deep ground of social 
identities produces a series of determinate effects. This requirement is exactly 
what is not fulfilled’ (Torfing 2005, p. 21). 
Thus, this fallacy of equivocation is based on two very different understandings of the 
‘essence’. 
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A Capacity for External Validity? 
 
Something rarely addressed in qualitative work of this sort is the issue of 
generalisation. However this need not, and perhaps ought not, be the case (Williams 
2000a; 2000b; Payne & Williams 2005). Generalisation pertains to the 
external validity of research findings; ‘A concern with the question of whether the 
results of a study can be generalized beyond the specific research context in which 
they were generated’ (Bryman & Teevan 2005, p. 383). Clearly deterministic 
generalisations are not possible in the social world. The fundamentally constructed 
and interpretative nature of social phenomena makes such generalisations impossible. 
However, even if possible in principle, they certainly are not in practice, as indeed is 
the case with most natural sciences where one is dealing with complex and open 
systems e.g. geology, oceanography, biology, etc. Furthermore, interpretive research 
does not lend itself to the sort of statistical, probabilistic generalisations found in 
much quantitative survey work either. In such research generalisation is a guiding 
rationale, given the need to generalise from sample to population. However, it is a 
strategy predicated upon large samples of easily quantifiable data that qualitative 
researchers cannot replicate, since, after all, their aim is to look at fewer, or even a 
single case, in much greater depth (Seale 1999, p. 107). Consequently there is often 
seen to be a ‘trade-off’ between external validity and internal validity, the latter being 
facilitated trough ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz 1973) that quantitative researchers 
cannot replicate. However, despite the scope for generalisation obviously 
being restricted in interpretative research, it need not, as some commentators have 
argued (Denzin 1983; Guba & Lincoln 1982; Seale 1999), be precluded altogether. 
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Indeed, despite the fundamentally constructed and interpretive nature of the social and 
political world it is still perfectly reasonable to assume that there will be similarities 
between interpretations, for everyday life depends on the existence of such 
regularities. Where Marsh and Stoker deal with the question of generalisability in 
interpretive research they stress that ‘it is rarely the case that a sample of interviewees 
is so unrepresentative or the interpretations so misleading that suggestion about the 
wider incidence of certain phenomena is wholly specious’ (2002, p. 207). From the 
point of view of discourse theory the constructed and contingent nature of social and 
political world does not preclude cautious explanations and generalisations for the 
reality is that such constructions, while contingent in principle, tend to be rigid and 
stubborn in practice, and while different cases represent unique contexts the fact 
remains that there are often regularities and resemblances across cases. As Phillips 
and Jørgensen stress, ‘even if in principle everything can be different, it does not 
mean that everything is in flux or that change is necessarily easy’ (2004, p. 54). It can 
be argued that an intermediate and limited form of generalisation, called 
‘moderatum generalisation’ is in principle possible, albeit with inescapable 
limitations (Williams 2000a; 2000b; Payne & Williams 2005). Williams explains 
that moderatum generalisations, ‘in their simplest form are the basis of inductive 
reasoning…; they are the generalisations of everyday life’ (2000b, p. 215). But, just 
as with the aforementioned generalisations, they are ‘testable propositions that might 
be confirmed or refuted through further evidence’ (Payne & Williams 2005, p. 
297). Moderatum generalisations are considered to be moderated in two senses; first, 
in terms of the scope of what is claimed they are moderated (given inescapable 
limitations) and second, they are moderately held (given the 
contingent and temporally specific nature of social phenomena). 
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While it is worth noting that generalisation is not always an important consideration 
for research such as this, it is nevertheless the case that it usually is, if only 
implicitly, for ‘there is little point in conducting research studies whose significance 
cannot extend beyond their local context’ (Seale 1999, p. 41). Moreover there are 
instances where it is crucial to assess the external validity of research, for example 
when formulating public policy or legislation it is necessary to ask whether findings 
are authentic enough to be acted upon (Lincoln & Guba 2000, p. 178). Indeed 
interpretative researchers do make generalisations either knowingly or unknowingly 
when they hope ‘to persuade us that there is something to be learned from that 
situation that has a wider currency’ (Williams 1998, p. 8). After conducting an 
analysis of a single volume of the journal ‘Sociology’, Payne and Williams (2005) 
discovered that whilst the issue of generalisation was barely dealt with in the thirty-
eight articles, the seventeen empirically based qualitative articles all made 
generalisations of some sort. They stress that whilst generalisation is clearly central to 
social research ‘avoiding the question [of generalisation] is apparently a legitimate 
practice under contemporary canons of academic publishing in sociology’ (Payne & 
Williams 2005, p. 299). They thus advocate the explicit consideration 
of generalisation in interpretative research from the stage of research design onwards; 
they stress that ‘moderating generalization does not reduce the importance of internal 
validity, but rather adds an emphasis to external validity’ (Payne & Williams 2005, p. 
310). Moreover, being explicit about claims to validity will put readers in an 
arguably better position to judge the research for themselves. 
 
These considerations are pertinent to instances throughout the thesis where insights 
are drawn from and comparisons are made between the imagined Scottish economy, 
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and imagined economies elsewhere and at other scales, such as the Welsh economy or 
the European economy. It is the same set of assumptions that sit behind comparative 
case study research. Howarth highlights this in his discussion of the use of 
comparative case study research in the application of discourse theory (see Howarth 
2005, pp. 332-335).  
‘[T]he practice of comparison needs to be related to the practice of interpreting 
problematized phenomena. This means that a comparative perspective in 
discourse theory has to be detached from purely positivistic and quantitative 
stances’ (Howarth 2005, p. 332) 
For this research, the case study used clearly represents a unique context and set of 
circumstances. I could simply say that generalisation from this are impossible and 
thus should be avoided. The alternative, as discussed above, would usually to be to 
point out that I am instead interested in them as individual cases; with their ‘thick 
description’, or internal validity. But it is still possible to meaningfully compare and 
contrast with other cases - as is the case with most research in the interpretive 
tradition – in the hope of saying something about the wider significance of my 
findings based on the assumption that there are discernible regularities in the social 
world. Again, Howarth is useful here. 
‘Even though we are interested in why and how one set of patterns exist rather 
than another, comparative research in discourse theory does not involve the 
comparison of identical practices or institutions which are treated as purely 
equivalent units. Instead we compare practices and objects which share 
certain family resemblances, rather than essences. It is for this reason that the 
interpretation of particular phenomena necessarily precedes the comparative 
dimension’ (Howarth 2005, p. 334, emphasis added). 
Ultimately, whilst the data presented here are not vast, the aim is nevertheless to 
contribute something to wider knowledge and understanding of the economy, of 
economic security, and of processes at work in the re/configuration of political 
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geographies. This assumption about the external validity of interpretative findings 
underpins the discussion in the Conclusion to this thesis, wherein it is suggested that 
the insights of this research may have implications for other contemporary debates, 
such as those surrounding ‘Brexit’, Welsh devolution, and indeed a potential future 
referendum on Scottish independence.  
  
 Conclusion 
 
This chapter began by introducing the key research questions underpinning the thesis. 
It then presented an explanation of poststructuralist discourse theory, specifically 
(though not exclusively) that of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and their successors in the 
so called Essex School. The ontological assumptions (and consonant normative 
convictions) of discourse theory, and of poststructuralism more generally, inform the 
conceptual discussions that follow in the thesis, which along with associated 
epistemological and methodological insights informs the analytical approach used in 
the empirical elements of the research. The specific methods used in the research were 
also elaborated, although the specific details of the ‘texts’ (or data) analysed will be 
outlined later when they are actually analysed. The chapter finished with a discussion 
of what is considered to be two important additional methodological considerations 
stemming from the postsructuralist approach adopted for this thesis, specifically, the 
capacity afforded for ‘critical’ enquiry, and for claims to external validity from the 
research findings.   
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Chapter 3: Shifting Governance Capacities within a 
Plurinational State 
 
On Monday 15 October 2012 the First Minister of Scotland, Alex Salmond, and the 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, David 
Cameron, met in Edinburgh and signed an agreement to hold a single-question 
referendum on Scottish independence. The question put to the Scottish electorate on 
18 September 2014 was, ‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’ Scotland 
voted ‘no’ to independence from the United Kingdom by a margin of 55% to 45%. 
Despite the outcome, the referendum represented a momentous juncture in Scottish 
and British politics and generated an enormous amount of interest both in the UK and 
abroad. But how did a Union that had stood for nearly 300 years get to this point? In 
what follows this chapter will give a basic historical introduction to Scottish politics 
from the Union of 1707 to the 2014 referendum.  
 
Thereafter, it will explore a number of basic but fundamental political concepts and 
look, more broadly, at the significance of the politics of identity and legitimacy for 
understanding shifting governance capacities within the ‘plurinational’ (Keating 
2004) UK state. Of particular interest is the concept of the nation and associated 
theories of nationalism. The rise of Scottish nationalism has played an important part 
in shaping the politics and society of Scotland and is an important contextual factor to 
the independence referendum. Yet matters of national identity were largely 
‘backgrounded’ in favour of utilitarian, economic arguments for and against 
independence in the referendum debate, as will be stressed at the end of the chapter.  
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This thesis is principally concerned with the role of the imagined economy and 
economic (in)security in the referendum debate on Scottish independence; themes 
which will be advanced in subsequent chapters. However, the overarching themes of 
governance, legitimacy and identity addressed below are ever present, and represent 
an essential academic background for understanding a (re)emergent Scottish polity, 
and more generally, the shifting powers of governance within an increasingly 
complex, multi-level governance setting.  Moreover, it is towards this broader 
literature on political geography that this thesis aims, at least in in part, to contribute - 
albeit through a novel application of new conceptual insights. In sum, the purpose of 
this chapter is to set the scene for the main thesis, both theoretically and empirically. 
 
 
The Road to Referendum: 
 
Under the Union of the Crowns in 1603, King James VI moved south to become King 
James I of the Kingdom of Great Britain. By the later 17
th
 Century two of the key 
conventional prerogatives of the sovereign state, foreign policy and war, had already 
migrated south with the crown (Devine 1999; Pittock 2012). Thus, prior to the Union 
of 1707 Scotland was already in a situation of shared sovereignty with England. The 
Acts of Union, passed by the English and Scottish Parliaments in 1707, led to the 
creation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain on 1
st
 May of that year. The UK 
Parliament met for the first time in October 1707. A Scottish parliament would not 
meet again until 1999. Importantly, whilst parliament had been unified, a number of 
distinctly Scottish institutions of civil society remained, notably its legal and religious 
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systems (Brown et al. 1998; Devine 1999; Paterson & Wyn-Jones 1999; Harvie 
2004). 
 
It is a simplification to claim that the union was simply imposed on Scots by the 
English. There has also been a long held popular narrative attributing the Union of 
1707 to the selfish interests of elite contemporaries in Scotland, supposedly bribed to 
smooth the way for union. Scotland’s national poet, Robert Burns, famously said in 
1791, ‘We're bought and sold for English gold- Such a parcel of rogues in a nation!’ 
Yet there is evidence that many Scottish parliamentarians fervently wanted the union 
(Whatley 2006). It is, however, thought that economic insecurity had a part to play 
legitimating the Acts of Union in the eyes of Scottish contemporaries. Many have 
cited the catastrophic failure of the attempt to create a Scottish colony on the Isthmus 
of Panama for trading with the Far East (the so called Darien Venture – see, for 
example, Watt 2007) as having made union almost unavoidable, meaning Scotland 
needed to profit from access to British trade. In any event, the pursuit of economic 
benefits was clearly a central justification for union.  
 
Professor William Miller states that the union was always a marriage of convenience 
rather than one of affection; ‘the Scots who supported the Union supported the Union 
as a means of advancing Scottish nationalism’ (BBC 2007). Scots can be said to have 
assumed ‘unionist-nationalism’ (Brown et al. 1998, p. 11). Similarly, McCrone 
explains that the Union ‘was, classically, a mariage de raison, a marriage of 
convenience, which suited both sets of ruling elites. It kept the Scots out of the 
clutches of the French, and it gave them access to burgeoning markets at home and 
abroad’ (2012, pp. 72-73). He argues, ‘the rationale for joining the 1707 union in the 
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first place was to take advantage of economic opportunities afforded by empire, first 
English then British, membership of that union was always pragmatic and 
opportunistic’ (McCrone 2012, p. 73). In addition to the widely held belief that 
Scotland had a mission to spread Scottish liberalism and Scottish Protestantism, 
something for which the political influence gained from union was essential 
(Brown et al. 1998, p. 11), they were, in no small part, using the union to get access to 
the wealth of the English empire and reap the spoils in a manner that would have been 
totally impossible for a small country like Scotland without being part of a large 
empire. Cumbers explains that ‘Scotland was at the heart of the British imperial 
project’, and Glasgow, ‘with its massive industrial growth at the centre of the world's 
greatest heavy engineering and shipbuilding complex in the nineteenth century, was 
famously the ‘second city of the Empire’ (2014, p. 33).  
 
If the Union was predicated in part upon the perceived benefits of a joint imperialist 
project (Colley 1992), it was in part the erosion of the perceived economic benefits of 
union at the end of Empire, and the concurrent Scottish deindustrialisation and 
economic decline – as well as a strong rejection of economic policies of Thatcherism - 
that is thought largely responsible for re-invigorating Scottish nationalism in the 
1960s (Devine 2012; The Economist 2014). As Cumbers stresses, ‘the decline of 
empire also coincided with the decline of industrial power, as formerly captive and 
actively policed colonial markets were lost, and new competitors, with more efficient 
and productive deployment of capital gradually displaced British manufacturing’ 
(Cumbers 2014, p. 33).  
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Incidentally, it has been noted that nationalist discourse has tended to convey the 
notion that Scotland itself can be considered a colonial subject, clearly ignoring the 
very active role Scotland played in empire (Devine 2012; Mackenzie & Devine 2011; 
Ichijo 2012, pp. 29-30). As Ichijo states, ‘The Nationalists typically present the Union 
as a shackle that prevents Scots from realizing their full potential and therefore as 
something to be liberated from’ (2012, p. 29). And yet, as Brown et al. (1998, p. 11) 
stress, ‘All the evidence is, moreover, that the mass of the Scottish population shared 
this enthusiasm for Empire’. We can see this discourse of victimisation at play behind 
many aspects of the nationalist argument for independence. 
 
McCrone explains that ‘Much of the decades after 1945 seemed to confirm Scotland’s 
relative economic backwardness compared to England, reflected in much higher 
levels of unemployment and out-migration. Being British seemed a matter of common 
sense rather than commitment’ (McCrone 2012, p. 73). The 1970s brought the 
discovery of oil in the North Sea, for which ‘the impact on political psychology was 
considerable’ (McCrone 2012, p. 73). For many the discovery of oil enabled them to 
imagine a secure future outside of the British state (McClean et al. 2014 – see Chapter 
7). This coincided with the rise of the Scottish National Party (SNP), with the slogan, 
‘It’s Scotland’s Oil!’ The SNP breakthrough came in 1974, when it won 11 seats in 
Parliament with 30 per cent of the Scottish vote, which led the then Labour 
government to propose establishing a devolved assembly (Dardanelli & Mitchell 
2014, p. 90). The Labour Government commissioned a white paper and bill for 
devolution which resulted in a referendum on devolution in 1979. The referendum 
was undertaken with the odd stipulation that 40% of people on the electoral list must 
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vote ‘yes’, so whilst 51.6% voted in favour, with a turnout of just 63.8%, the ‘Nos’ 
effectively won. 
 
McCrone explains that the constitutional anomaly within the new British state, 
whereby there was a single shared legislature as opposed to a federated system, was 
not an issue for a long time, but then democracy and universal suffrage ‘presented the 
greatest challenge’; it ‘gave legitimacy to the state, but contained within it the nub of 
a later crisis’ (2012, p. 73). For as long as Scotland and England voted more or less in 
the same way, the fact that Scotland would always get the government the English 
voted for was not an issue, but this would all change as interests and ideologies later 
diverged. The period following the 1979 referendum saw significant political 
divergence between Scotland and Westminster, which, coupled with the continued 
and rapid deindustrialization of Scotland’s key industries, proved a significant fillip 
for the nationalist agenda. Soule et al. explain that ‘Heavily industrialized Scotland 
asymmetrically felt the negatives of economic decline, and cultural and political 
consequences followed’ (Soule et al. 2012, pp. 2-3).  
 
Cumbers argues that ‘British deindustrialization was first and foremost a process of 
spatial uneven development as the old industrial regions (especially Scotland, Wales 
and the north of England) saw their economic and employment bases collapse while 
London and the south east of England embarked upon a new growth phase around the 
City of London's financial sector’ (Cumbers 2014, p. 33). Cumbers argues that 
deindustrialization, followed by a period of neoliberal market deregulation from the 
1980s onwards (and concurrent growth of financial and services industries in London 
and the South East) has resulted in ‘historical spatial imbalances in the UK economy 
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to a point where the UK's economic geography is dysfunctional’, and the UK’s 
‘territorial integrity may well be untenable’ (Cumbers 2014, p. 33). Presiding over 
this period of neoliberal transformation was a series of Conservative UK 
Governments, most notably, those of the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. 
Dardinelli and Mitchell state that, ‘If Scottishness was defined in contradistinction to 
some ‘other’, that other came to be personified in Mrs Thatcher’ (2014, p. 90). 
  
It was the perceived economic insensitivity of Thatcherism (and neoliberalism more 
generally) to Scottish economic needs that drove the clearest wedge of all between 
many Scots and the Union.  
‘The Thatcher and Major governments, which never enjoyed even a plurality 
of support in Scotland, were widely seen as violating not just the welfare 
tradition of the post-war years but also deeper conception of community and 
solidarity embedded in Scottish self-understandings. As England moved 
towards the combination of neo-liberalism and social authoritarianism known 
as Thatcherism, Scotland appeared to be a bastion of social democracy’ 
(Keating 2007, p. 9). 
Brown et al. (1998) state that the Conservative administrations of 1979 – 1997 
stressed a rejection of Keynesian demand-management techniques aimed at full 
employment, in favour of a macro-economic approach aimed at reducing inflation and 
public expenditure, which coupled with free market policies was contrary to the 
policy position of all the main opposition parties in Scotland (Brown et al. 1998, p. 
71-72). Soule et al. explain that the consequence was that ‘Conservative success in 
Scotland declined to the extreme of losing every Scottish seat in the 1997 Labour 
landslide…The Conservatives, on the other hand, became seen as an English 
party…antonymic to Scotland politics’ (Soule et al. 2012, p. 3).  
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McCrone states that this is when the concept of ‘democratic deficit’ entered into the 
lexicon of Scottish politics as ‘Conservatives were returned overwhelmingly on 
English votes. Scots were too few to matter’ (2012, p. 74). The SNP effectively 
capitalised on this situation by moving from a party defined almost entirely by the 
commitment to national independence, to being a part of ideology too. Lynch charts 
the decline of Conservative electoral support in Scotland (and the later decline of 
Labour support too) vis-à-vis the rise and rise of the SNP, made possible by the 
adoption of ‘the ideology of social democracy’ (2009, p. 619). The reasons he cites 
for this are: ‘the ideological position of elites, the policy preferences of the party’s 
membership and the adoption of an electoral strategy to challenge a dominant political 
party in the region (Labour)’ (2009, pp. 619-620). Yet the evidence was not that 
Scotland was especially socially democratic. Rosie and Bond (2007) show that Scots 
are not especially left wing; surveys reveal them to be only very slightly to the left 
and close to voters in the North of England. Keating explains that it was not so much 
that the English had embraced Thatcherism on a popular level because social 
democratic values remained strong, rather it was the case ‘that in Scotland social 
democracy was underpinned by a revived and repoliticised national identity’ (2007, p. 
9). 
 
In 1997, New Labour won a landslide victory at Westminster and with that came a 
second referendum on Scottish devolution. Despite the significant popularity of New 
Labour in Scotland, three terms of Conservative governments which Scots had not 
supported meant that devolution presented an opportunity to preserve what had 
become seen as ‘Scottish values and institutions’ from Westminster. Dardinelli and 
Mitchell (2014, p. 90) state that: 
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‘When Scots voted overwhelmingly in favour of a Scottish Parliament in the 
referendum in 1997, they did so for conservative reasons. Scots saw 
devolution as the means of conserving Scottish institutions and welfare 
policies. In essence, devolved government was a means of conserving 
institutions from the Conservatives’ 
Electoral turnout was 60.4%, and nearly 75% voted yes to independence. Voters were 
also asked a second question of whether the new Scottish Parliament should have tax-
varying powers, which 63.5% supported. Incidentally, the latter powers have never 
been used. There were clearly different views at the time about how devolution would 
impact upon the nationalist agenda and calls for independence. Georg Robertson 
argued “Devolution will kill Nationalism stone dead”, whilst Tom Dalyell argued 
“Devolution will be like a motorway to independence with no exits” (both cited in 
Cairney & McGarvey 2013). In the event, neither prophecies were accurate; 
nationalism is alive and well, and if devolution proves ultimately to be a ‘motorway to 
independence’, the failed referendum in 2014 surely represented at least an exit of 
sorts. 
 
The first two fixed term Scottish Parliaments (1999-2003 and 2003-07) were Labour-
led coalitions with the Liberal Democrats, with the SNP as the main opposition party. 
During this time, Scottish Labour ‘gained a reputation, deserved or not, for slavishly 
following the party line from London’ (Dardinelli & Mitchell 2014, p. 91). In 2007 
the SNP won and, failing to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, and with 47 
out of 129 seats, established a minority government. The SNP then won an overall 
majority in 2011. However, support for the SNP could not directly be correlated with 
support for independence; ‘Scots liked the party of independence more than they liked 
independence itself’ (Dardinelli & Mitchell 2014, p. 92). The SNP knew this and has 
been careful not to build their electoral platforms on independence, though had stated 
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their future commitment to holding a referendum. With an overall majority in 2011 a 
referendum was more or less assured. The Edinburgh Agreement between the UK and 
Scottish Governments, with subsequent approval by the Westminster parliament, 
ensured there would be no legal challenge to a referendum. 
 
The aforementioned political context is important for understanding the broader 
context for the debate on independence immediately prior to the referendum in 2014. 
The 2010 general election brought the Conservatives back into government, albeit in 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats, and as Dardinelli and Mitchell stressed in the 
lead up to the 2014 referendum, ‘Scottish independence is seen as a means of 
avoiding the prospect of a succession of Conservative governments’ (2014, p. 94), 
just as devolution in 1997 had done before. Lynch (2009) had argued that the SNP 
had ‘moved from social democracy back to no ideology’ from the mid-1990s and 
‘adopting policies across the left-right spectrum to compete with different parties and 
especially with New Labour’ (Lynch 2009, p. 620). However, if this was true at that 
time, it no longer is with the ‘traditional’ Tory enemy reinstated again in Westminster, 
a much greater rhetorical commitment to social democracy has been made in recent 
years. This becomes a significant analytical point later in the thesis where this will be 
shown to be the case in nationalist arguments for independence, specifically, the 
positioning of ‘Westminster’ as the threatening ‘other’ in economic security 
discourse, and the articulation of economic insecurities that clearly resonate with 
social democratic sentiments.  
 
Thus far this chapter has attempted to address the historical and political context for 
the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, and the associated shifting of governance 
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capacities with the UK state. The remainder of the chapter explicates a number of 
fundamental conceptual discussions pertaining to that shift. It will look at the so 
called shift from government to multi-level governance, and the role of the politics of 
(specifically national) identity and legitimacy in the (re)territorialisation of political 
space. This provides the essential academic context from which the thesis stems and 
forms an ever-present background, or set of overarching themes, for the subsequent 
conceptual and empirical discussions in later chapters.   
 
From Government to Governance 
 
It is within the context of a broader shift from government to governance in an era of 
the ‘post-sovereign’ state (Keating 2004) that we need to consider the emergent, 
continually shifting and differential capacities of the Scottish polity. Governance is a 
fundamental political term, and a useful descriptor - without normative connotation - 
of the shifting of political authority among entities. Until quite recently the term 
governance carried no significant theoretical baggage and was largely used as a 
synonym for government (Wilson & Game 2006, p. 141). Yet governance pertains to 
the recognition of the heterogeneity of actors involved in the process of governing 
besides that of a formal, national government. 
‘[Governance] is no longer assumed to involve a single, homogenous all-
powerful government, but rather a shifting combination of public departments 
and agencies, quasi-public bodies, private and voluntary sector organisations, 
operating at different but interdependent levels’ (Leach & Percy-Smith 2001, p. 
22).  
In addition to the horizontal shift from traditional government to governance, 
characterised by a growing interdependence between governments and non-
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governmental actors, there has been a notable shift along a vertical axis too, whereby 
governance is characterised by a growing interdependence between governments 
operating at various territorial levels, on a ‘multi-level’ basis (Bache & Flinders 2005, 
p. 3). The UK remains a unitary and highly centralised state (Wilson & Game 2006) 
vis-à-vis developed comparators (e.g. fully federated systems), but there have been 
significant shifts along both these horizontal and vertical axes. The vertical axis alone 
requires consideration of an increasingly complicated (multi-tiered) system of local 
government, three ‘regional’ governments at the sub-state level (including the 
Scottish Government), and the various bodies of European governance at the supra-
state level. As such, nation-states have to ‘justify their right to govern in competition 
with other potential territorially or functionally demarcated polities’, raising questions 
regarding legitimacy such that one might ask ‘what polity is the legitimate body of 
authoritative decision-making’ (Hansen & Sørensen 2005, p. 94). 
 
Legitimacy is another fundamental political concept, and is crucial to understanding 
the shifting of political geographies. In the context of Scottish devolution and 
independence, it usefully describes the dynamic by which a (re)emergent Scottish 
polity establishes and/or maintains authority in the minds-eye of the public. Heywood 
explains that legitimacy is usually defined as ‘rightfulness’, and in contrast to the 
concept of power can be seen as ‘the quality that transforms naked power into rightful 
authority’ (1999, p. 141). Thus, legitimacy asks ‘who has the right to govern’, the 
answer to which is considered to hinge on the consent of those governed. Rousseau 
stated in ‘The Social Contract’ that ‘[t]he strongest is never strong enough to be 
always the master unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty’ 
([1762] 1969 cited in Heywood 1999, p. 142). In this formulation then, legitimacy is 
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essentially a normative concept. However, Heywood explains that in contrast to most 
political philosophers attempting to ascertain a moral or rational basis for legitimacy, 
Max Weber’s understanding was that if people were prepared to comply with a 
system of rule then that system is legitimate. Rather than legitimacy being seen as a 
predominantly normative concept and political enquiry being concerned with seeking 
some moral ‘essence’ to legitimacy, within this formulation legitimacy is deployed as 
a descriptive concept. This is not to preclude debates about what should rightfully 
constitute legitimate political authority - fascism, for example, generated a remarkable 
following in parts of Europe during the inter-war period, but most would contest in 
normative terms its ‘rightfulness’ as a legitimate political ideology vis-à-vis liberal 
democracy – but rather it opens up discussions of legitimacy as an empirical 
phenomenon operating in practice.  
 
A useful distinction often made within literature on European Supranationalism is that 
between input and output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). In many respects this mirrors the 
above point about the difference between applications of legitimacy as either a 
normative term, or a descriptive term. According to input-oriented legitimacy, 
‘political choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the 'will of the people' - 
that is if they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a 
community’ (Scharpf 1999, 7). In other words, they are representative. Input 
legitimacy might therefore include the various ‘nationalisms’ discussed below, 
including for instance, both ethnic and civic expressions, as ‘inherited’ qualities 
which establish legitimacy. By contrast, according to output-oriented legitimacy, 
‘political choices are legitimate if and because they effectively promote the common 
welfare of the constituency in question’ (1999, 7). In other words, they are judged by 
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their results. Bogdanor (2007, p. 5) explains that ‘legitimacy depends ultimately on 
the individual citizen feeling that he or she is part of the polity under which he or she 
lives’. However, Bogdanor also explains that in addition to the EU’s acceptance as 
being bound up identity, it is also predicated upon effective delivery insofar as ‘EU 
citizens ‘tend to judge it by results’ (2007, p. 5).  
 
In the context of Scottish independence, output legitimacy appears to have been 
crucial in delivering support to the SNP, and ultimately appearing to provide the 
mandate the SNP required to call a referendum on independence.  The SNP garnered 
a lot of support on the basis that they were considered to form a government that 
delivered on its promises in its first two parliamentary terms. McCrone stresses that 
‘Scots have consistently placed more trust in Holyrood than Westminster when it 
comes to running Scotland’s affairs. From the outset, well over two thirds have 
thought the former should have more influence, while at most 30 per cent think it does 
have such influence—a figure which has grown steadily over the devolution decade’ 
(2012, p. 74). He points out that ‘The success of the SNP in 2007 lay in capturing a 
much higher proportion of those who were in favour of independence, as well as 
persuading many in favour of devolution that they would provide competent 
government, and be more likely than Labour to stand up for Scotland’s interests 
against Westminster’ (McCrone 2012, p. 74). Citing the electoral success of the SNP 
2011, Dardinelli and Mitchell stress ‘that victory had little to do with independence. 
The SNP won because it was deemed to have been highly competent in government, 
especially as compared to its rivals’ (2014, p. 92). As will be explained in later 
chapters, the Scottish Government has been keen to stress its successes on ‘the 
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economy’ to date, and instil confidence in the electorate of its capacity to govern 
successfully an independent Scotland, delivering economic prosperity and security.  
 
A poststructuralist approach, as employed here, would argue that the meaning of 
legitimacy in theory, and the realities of it operating in practice, are both necessarily 
mediated through discourse. Moreover, it would remind us of the constitutive 
relationship between theory and praxis. Legitimacy does not therefore have some 
essential meaning; rather it is socially/politically/discursively contingent. Liberal 
democracy’s success as a model for government is thought to hinge on its ability ‘to 
guarantee continued legitimacy by ensuring that government power is not unchecked 
or arbitrary but is, rather, exercised in accordance with the wishes, preferences and 
interests of the general public’ (Heywood 1999, p. 143); consent is established 
through a ‘social contract’ between government and the governed. Yet historically the 
‘right to rule’ has been justified in other ways, such as through the divine right of 
monarchs. Democratic credentials of representativeness and accountability may well 
be considered normatively desirable but are based on a particular understanding of 
what legitimacy means, and the advent of liberal democracy has not come about 
because humans have managed to grasp the ‘real’ meaning of legitimacy; it is the 
outcome of pronounced political struggle and normative debate over a protracted 
period of time. 
 
That the sovereign state is the single legitimate site of political authority in world 
politics is a staple assumption (whether explicit or implicit) in much of social and 
political science. It is perhaps unsurprising then that the democratic nation-state has 
typically been used as the yardstick against which the legitimacy of other polities 
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have been measured, as in extensive debates about the legitimacy of the European 
Union for example (Bogdanor 2007; Moravcsik 2002; Follesdal & Hix 2006). Yet the 
world has not always been divided into states, rather all sorts of polities and political 
geographies have existed (Agnew 2002, p. 9). Moreover, 
globalisation, supranationalism and sub-state nationalism, along with the general 
decentralisation and privatisation of governance, we are told, increasingly undermines 
the institutions of the sovereign state. However, whilst these factors certainly 
engender a more diffused picture of governance, the sovereignty of the state has never 
been an absolute. As Keating stresses, ‘The classic doctrine of sovereignty has always 
been intellectually problematic and, in the modern world, is becoming increasingly 
untenable’ (2004, p. 27).  
 
John Agnew (2002) has done much to challenge taken for granted assumptions about 
sovereignty and the territorial state. He points out that there is an unhelpful tendency 
towards either/or arguments concerning state sovereignty, whereby the state is seen to 
be either in imminent decline or as an enduring absolute. 
‘States have never actually monopolized politics in the way they have 
monopolized political theory. Now they do so even less. But if we allow 
political understanding to be dominated by a particular territorial form, then we 
remain oblivious to the emergence and the possibilities of other geographical 
entities such as politically reinvigorated cities, stronger municipalities, and 
supranational modes of political organization’ (Agnew 2002, p. 10).  
In analysing the conceptual link between sovereignty and state territoriality, a 
distinction is often made between de jure (legal) and de facto (effective) 
sovereignty. Agnew suggests that it is effective sovereignty which is crucial for 
understanding the dynamics of political geography and he stresses that ‘[effective] 
sovereignty is neither inherently territorial nor is it invariably state-based’ (2002, p. 
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9). Kuus and Agnew stress, ‘territoriality is only one type of spatiality or way in 
which space is constructed socially and mobilized politically’ (2008, p. 101). Much 
poststructuralist work has been done to unravel the essentialist assumptions of state 
sovereignty.  
 
Within political geography, Kuus and Agnew explain how critical approaches have 
revealed ‘state sovereignty not as a universal and foundational principle of politics, 
but as a historically specific construct, whose effects vary across space’ (2008, p. 97). 
The authors stress that the state has no ontological status separate from the practices 
which constitute it, and yet, ‘To say that states have no separate ontological existence 
is not to say that they have no materiality’ (Kuus & Agnew 2008, p. 98). However, as 
stressed in Chapter 2, the material world is necessarily mediated by discourse and, as 
such, ‘the materiality of state power is part and parcel of, not prior to, the discourse of 
sovereignty’ (Kuus & Agnew 2008, p. 99). Likewise, within the discipline of political 
economy, Bruff has stated that the state only appears ‘real’ due to ‘the constant and 
widespread repetition of practices providing for regularized sets of ‘facts’ which 
validate the notion that there is a state’ (2011, p. 94). 
‘‘[T]he state’ exists only because we implicitly accept such ‘existence’ on an 
everyday basis. As such, it has a self-reproducing social purpose only because 
of the way in which human activity - and thoughts about the world embodied 
in it – validates this ‘capability’. In consequence, the state is a ‘natural’ fact or 
‘structure’ only in phenomenological terms; it is humans and their common 
sense which comprise, validate and reproduce the state. In this sense, the state 
does not exist’ (Bruff 2011, p. 95). 
Moreover, within the discipline of International Relations, Cynthia Weber stressed the 
constitutive nature of discourse for state sovereignty, arguing that ‘to speak of the 
sovereign state at all requires one to engage in the political practice of stabilising this 
concept’s meaning’ (1995, p. 3). Such discourse effectively ‘writes the state, with 
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particular boundaries, competencies and legitimacies available to it’ she argues, but 
what we should be asking is ‘how is the meaning of state sovereignty is fixed in 
theory and practice’ (1995, p. 3). Weber looks specifically at discourse 
on ‘international intervention’ in both theory and practice, urging that far from 
undermining state sovereignty, we consider said discourse partially culpable for 
‘writing’ the state. It was stated by another scholar of International Relations, R. B. J. 
Walker, that questions about sovereignty are rarely asked, and far from being an 
‘essentially contested’ (see Gallie 1956) concept, state sovereignty expressed instead 
a ‘commanding silence’ (Walker 1992).  
 
In practical terms it can be argued that the aforementioned shift towards multi-level 
governance, despite presenting a challenge to the sovereignty of given states, does not 
really challenge the notion of state sovereignty itself. In the case of the UK, 
devolution does not present a challenge to the existing UK state or the notion of state 
sovereignty itself, so long as one accepts that state sovereignty has never been an 
absolute. And whilst Scottish independence might be an existential challenge to the 
UK state as currently configured, the notion of the sovereign state as the legitimate 
actor remains unchallenged given that formal statehood is the end goal of Scottish 
independence. Nevertheless, if it remains the case that the sovereign state remains the 
legitimate model on which governance is based, albeit in the context of an 
increasingly complex array of other governing bodies, it raises questions as to why 
governing legitimacies are shifting among different scales through devolution, or why 
one state might be considered more legitimate than another through the 
materialisation of a newly independent state? Why is it that one configuration of 
61 
 
political geographies arises rather than another, and how and why does that 
configuration continually shift?  
 
These are important questions insofar as the analysis is concerned with the looking at 
how independence is justified by key protagonists within the public debate and thus 
how the legitimacy of the respective governing arrangements (either Union or 
Independence) and associated bodies (either the UK or Scottish Government) is 
conveyed. In order to try to answer these questions it is necessary to address the 
purported connection between the politics of identity and the politics of legitimacy. 
The following section looks at the conceptualised connection between identity and 
political geography, more specifically, how identity serves as a determinant of a 
subjects’ connection with ‘place’ and the implications for governance and legitimacy. 
Identity construction is central to social science, and very clearly so in the case of 
poststructuralist approaches to social and political enquiry (see Chapter 2). Forefront 
among literature on the role of identity in shaping political geography is the focus on 
concepts of the nation and nationalism. However, whilst the idea of a Scottish nation 
and fervours of Scottish nationalism have undoubtedly been (and continue to be) 
important influences in Scottish politics, it will be argued below that matters of 
national identity were largely back-grounded in favour of ostensibly less political, 
economistic arguments for and against independence in the texts analysed for this 
research. This has implications for how we might understand the politics of identity 
and legitimacy in cases like this. 
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Political Identity and the Demarcation of Political Space 
 
Given the insights of ethologists on the territorial behaviour of animals it is perhaps 
unsurprising that people have wondered whether there is a basis for comparison 
between humans and animals in terms of territoriality. Is the acquisition or control 
over space an instinctive impulse for humans? Muir (1997) explains that while it is 
difficult to resist the idea that there may be biological determinants of human attitudes 
towards place and territory, social factors like cultural norms are clearly very 
significant in shaping our feelings about these things. As Agnew (2002, p. 6) 
observes, ‘People also invest meaning in the places they inhabit’. Muir reiterates 
Smith’s statement the ‘Territoriality is…not some innate human trait but a social 
construct’ (Smith 1990 cited in Muir 1997, p. 9).  
 
Furthermore, Muir stresses that ‘Territorial identification need not be an exclusive 
phenomenon. There will, for example, be many who regard themselves as being 
simultaneously Dalesmen or Daleswomen, Yorkshire folk and English and/or British’ 
(1997, p. 13). It is commonly recognised that such identities can be multiple (Smith 
1992). Similarly Agnew explains that,  
‘The scales by which they [people] identify themselves and their group 
memberships (national, local, international) vary both from country to country 
and over time. Since the nineteenth century in Europe the national scale has 
often been presumed as the scale for establishing primary political identity. But 
sense of place at the national scale can coexist with or be replaced by alternative 
ones’ (2002, p. 6). 
Keating employs the term ‘plurinational’ in recognition of the complex and multi-
layered nature of identity whereby citizens often identify with the local nation, the 
(‘nation’-) state, and the supranational order; unlike multinationalism which might 
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refer to ‘the coexistence of discrete and separate national groupings within a 
polity’, plurinationalism recognises that ‘more than one national identity can pertain 
to a single group or even an individual’ (2004, p. 27). Crucially, Keating argues that it 
is in the interest of democracy that decision-making spaces are developed at the level 
of these communities. 
 
Human identification with geographical space
2
 creates a ‘sense of place’, of which 
territoriality is an example. ‘Sense of place’ then amounts to far more than some 
physical geographical entity, and shows how we can have strong emotional 
attachments to particular places like landscapes, monuments, architecture, etc. Storey 
explains how it may refer to ‘the place we grew up in, places we have spent some 
time in, places with which we have fond memories, places associated with love, etc.’ 
(2001, p. 19). In terms of national identity the importance of place is obvious. First of 
all, ‘all nations possess a geographical referent in their claims to a particular territory’ 
(Jones et al. 2004, p. 83). Additionally Jones et al. (2004) stresses that while 
nationalism is an ideology existing at a national scale, generally manifested in claims 
for a piece of geographical territory, ‘nations always draw on specific places as 
sources of ideological nourishment’ (p. 87), such as national monuments, memorials, 
or specific pieces or types of architecture. And in addition to specific places such as 
these, the national imagination may be fired by more general images of the landscape 
too, such as the mountains, the rivers, or the lakes (Jones et al. 2004).  
 
                                                          
2 Jones (et al. 2004, p. 3) summarise the sometimes confusing distinction between 
space, place and territory when he states that ‘space (or spatial patterns or spatial 
relations) is the core commodity of geography. Place is a particular point in space, 
while territory represents a more formal attempt to define and delimit a portion of 
space, inscribed with a particular identity and characteristics’. 
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Furthermore, as with all identity, our identification with place is never fixed or 
generalizable (in any deterministic sense) across time and space. 
‘Mapping politics involves showing how political identities and interests are 
structured geographically as the result of human agency in the places where 
people live. Human agency and the changing conditions under which that 
agency takes place, however, mean that mapping is never complete. Just as a 
map comes into focus, it is transformed into another one’ (Agnew 2002, p. 1).   
Indeed this is a product of the constructed and contingent nature of social identity 
generally, whereby identities are continually re/produced through 
social practices. Indeed, discourses of nationalism represent just one of the ways in 
which the sovereignty of the territorial state has historically been sedimented. The 
notion of sovereign states being the subjects of international politics rests on them 
being seen as sites of legitimate political authority, which according to the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty resides with the people. Drawing on Yack (2001), Kuus and 
Agnew posit that ‘states are the masters of territory and peoples the masters of states’ 
(2008, p. 99). It is the concept of the nation that has been used to define the collective 
identity of ‘the people’, and which has proven paramount in the territorialisation of 
the state. Storey stresses that democracy requires people to have a say in how they are 
governed, and ‘this implies some idea of who the ‘people’ are’ (2001, p. 74). But 
nationalism has been equally important in the general decentralisation of political 
systems and the growing importance of sub-state actors where governments have had 
to try to appease the forces of bottom-up regionalism; ‘a political force, expressing 
itself as a demand for more autonomy for areas that lacked an institutional outlet to 
express their identity’ (John 2001, pp. 111-112). In any event, the significance of 
nationalism in Scottish politics, to which the wealth of literature on the topic is itself a 
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testament to, demands a better understanding of this concept (see Devine 1999; 
Harvie 2004).  
 
Nations and Nationalism 
 
Heywood states that ‘For over two hundred years the nation has been regarded as the 
proper, indeed only legitimate, unit of political rule’ (1999, p. 97). Moreover, he 
states that ‘nationalism is, at heart, the doctrine that each nation is entitled to self-
determination, reflected in the belief that, as far as possible, the boundaries of the 
nation and those of the state should coincide’ (Heywood, 1999, p. 97). It was stated 
earlier that sovereignty, predicated upon the perceived legitimacy of political 
authority, had previously been derived not from popular consent but divine right. 
However, the ideas of the likes of Rousseau, Locke and Mill, such as the general will, 
popular sovereignty, majority rule and representative government based on individual 
self-determination, changed this (Penrose & Mole 2008, p. 273). Though not 
specifically employing the concept of nation, Rousseau did stress that where the 
‘general will’ would be likely to emerge was where there were culturally related 
communities already in existence.  
 
This is congruent with Anthony D. Smith’s (2001) understanding of nations as being 
based on pre-existing ethnic groups, or ethnies, which are long established cultural 
groups with their own iconography and folk myths. This approach contrasts with that 
of those labelled primordialist, where nations, or certain features of 
nations, are considered to have always existed, and are thus not produced. Obviously 
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the anti-essentialist assumptions underpinning this thesis preclude primordialist 
explanations, given that identity is seen to be constructed and contingent. Modernist 
theories of nationalism, conversely, see nations as modern fabrications (Gellner 1983; 
see also Hobsbawm 1990). Somewhere in the middle lie perennialist theories like 
Smith’s which posit the long development of nations out of already existing ethnic 
communities, while recognising the impact of institutions of modernity, like capitalist 
industrialisation and the state.  
 
Benedict Anderson famously argued that the nation is an ‘imagined political 
community’;  
‘[I]magined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because 
the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the 
image of their communion’ (Anderson 2006, p. 6).  
This sociological understanding of the nation corresponds with my conceptualisation 
of ‘the economy’ as imagined and socially (or discursively) constructed and 
contingent. It will be argued in the next chapter that the economy necessarily 
corresponds with an assumed ‘community of fate’ (Williams 2003). Crucially, 
imagined communities are no less ‘real’ in the everyday lives of their constituents, or 
as a determinant of social and political action. As Storey reiterates,  
‘none of this makes the nation ‘unreal’ for an ordinary man [sic] born into a 
concrete society, culture, and state, and faced with concrete choices on the 
social and political as well as the spiritual and existential planes. The nation 
need not be “rational” in order to be “real”’ (Nodia 1994 cited in Storey 2001, 
p. 74).  
Anderson stresses, nations may be but ‘the shrunken imaginings of recent history’ but 
they have made ‘it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of 
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people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings’ (2006, p. 
7). As Keating stresses, ‘The nation is a sociological concept, based upon a 
community which, while constructed, represents a reality based in social institutions 
and practices’ (Keating 2004, p. vii). Moreover, nations and nationalisms are far from 
transient, indeed they (and constructed identity generally) can be incredibly resilient. 
As will be argued in Chapter 4 and throughout the thesis, the very same is true of the 
idea of ‘the economy’. 
 
The following quote from Muir succinctly highlights the emergent, socially 
contingent nature of nations, but also how they often draw on more deeply rooted 
cultural and historical characteristics. 
‘Most of the evidence shows that until quite recent times ordinary people did not 
regard themselves primarily as members of nations, but as belonging to families, 
villages, localities, and provinces. National consciousness arose as a Romantic 
movement among the European middle classes. But having said this, when it did 
arise, there already existed among the various peasant societies a long-
established heritage of national folklore, costume, dance and mythology to 
sustain it. There was also a powerful territorial component – the national 
territory – which gave issues of nationalism the potential to reshape the world’ 
(Muir 1997, p. 47). 
It seems to be the case that ‘nationalism as an instrumental political device of the 
modern age performed a central task in the state-building project by providing the 
ideological glue adhering the loyalty of the populace to the physical space of the state’ 
(Tierney 2011, p. 119). Penrose and Mole (2008, p. 274), point out that nation-state 
formation occurred both where the state preceded the nation, ‘which began with the 
state based on new political doctrines and then sought to create a nation within its 
boundaries’, for example in France after the French Revolution of 1789, and where 
the nation preceded the state (i.e. where the cultural unit of the nation sought its 
perceived right to self-determination through statehood).  
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However, while the nation has been a crucial feature of the modern state the 
boundaries of the nation and of the state have rarely coincided so neatly as is often 
thought. Anthony D. Smith points out that the ‘nation-state’ is very rare indeed, much 
more common is the ‘national state’ (see Smith 2001). Nevertheless, it remains the 
case that the two terms are often, misleadingly, used synonymously. Keating stresses 
that we are ‘moving from a world of sovereign nation-states (although this was never 
more than an ideal type) to a postsovereign order, in which states must share their 
prerogatives with supra-state, sub-state and trans-state systems’ (2004, p. ix).  
 
In an increasingly complex multi-level governance setting, wherein national identities 
are often multiple/layered, discerning the impact of the nation as a determinant of 
shifting political geographies (including motivations for Scottish independence) is far 
from straightforward. In fact, other bases for governing legitimacy also need 
consideration, as argued here in the case of the referendum debate where economistic 
justifications were made for and against independence. In the case of the latter, 
formulations of group identity are still crucial, albeit on the basis of seemingly more 
practical, shared economic intersubjectivities largely separate from sentiments of 
nationhood. Nevertheless, it is clear that nations, and nationalisms have been (and 
continue to be) instrumental in the delineation of political space and the re/production 
of legitimate political authority. There is a vast literature on nationalism. In what 
follows some of the ideas most directly relevant to this thesis and the conceptual 
arguments developed in subsequent chapters are addressed, including the relationship 
between nationalism and calls for independent statehood, and the commonly made 
distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms. 
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Nationalism and Statehood 
We are told sub-state nationalism acts as a challenge to the institution of the sovereign 
state. Putting aside the fact that where nationalist groups do seek statehood they do 
not in principle pose a threat to the idea of the state (just to the existing territorial 
jurisdictions of the state of which they comprise), it is not always the case 
that nationalists necessarily seek independent statehood, seeking instead other forms 
of self-determination short of independent statehood (Keating 2004). A rather 
simplistic distinction is often made between political and cultural nationalisms, 
whereby the former refers to calls for greater political self-determination – principally 
independent statehood – while the latter refers to moves to preserve cultural 
symbols, like language, or national foods. Thus, for instance, Heywood points out 
that ‘the desire of the French Basques to preserve their language and culture is every 
bit as ‘nationalist’ as the openly separatist struggle waged by Basques in Spain’ 
(Heywood 1999, p. 99). Ultimately, what unites nationalist movements is the desire 
for self-determination, but the principle of self-determination ought not necessarily be 
associated with calls for independent statehood.  
 
The problem with this argument, Keating (2004) points out, is that all that would then 
be necessary to refute claims for self-determination would be to point out that there 
are far too many nations to all be ‘given’ a state. Self-determination can instead be 
seen as ‘the right to negotiate one’s position within the state and supranational order, 
without necessarily setting up a separate state’ (Keating 2004, p. 10). This may in 
theory challenge the institution of the sovereign state if we see it as an encroachment 
on the absolute sovereignty of the state, but as we have shown, such absolute 
sovereignty has only ever been an ideal. Tierney states that ‘the classical Westphalian 
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formulation of the state as a legally autonomous unit was always an exercise 
in hyperbolic self-aggrandisement by states that failed to reflect the reality of 
international interdependence and the relative strengths and weaknesses of different 
states at different times’ (2011, p. 121). He points out that sub-state forces have often 
achieved a level of autonomy, not just in federal states, but in unitary ones like the 
United Kingdom too. As was explained near the outset of this chapter, ‘even before 
the devolution settlement embodied in the Scotland Act 1998, Scotland through 
‘administrative independence’ enjoyed a level of autonomy comparable to other small 
European nations which, despite formal independent statehood, have always had to 
negotiate their autonomy in relation to big powers’ (Paterson 1994 cited in Tierney 
2011, p. 121).  
 
Sub-state national societies are not necessarily bent on secessionist programmes, but 
are able to re/negotiate their constitutional aspirations in accordance with changing 
circumstances; circumstances, that is, of an increasingly postsovereign environment. 
Guibernau’s (1999) analysis of Western ‘nations without states’ (including Scotland) 
suggests that the future may not be one of an ever closer fit between nations and 
states, but rather an evolution of differential and layered political communities. 
Within the current ‘asymmetrically devolved’ system of UK governance, the 
devolved administrations of the UK may be united in calls for greater autonomy over 
economic governance, but there are clear differences in the extent to which said 
administrations see this as an end in itself, or as a step towards full independence. 
Mycock asserts that ‘Within the UK, nationalist groups are a product of their 
particular historical and contemporary national circumstances and independence is not 
necessarily a primary political aspiration’ (2012, p. 55). 
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Many unionists will have considered themselves ardent nationalists too. Soule et al. 
stress that: 
‘all Scotland’s politicians are nationalist in their outlook (McCrone, 2001, p. 
126) but the UK state has provided a context in which a variety of 
constitutional and policy preferences have been claimed to be in the interest of 
Scotland, and resultantly said to be in the national interest’ (Soule et al. 2012, 
p. 4) 
In fact, a key feature of unionist rhetoric is the mandatory reference to the importance 
of their nationality and their sentiments of patriotism to reiterate that unionists are 
nationalists too (Ichijo 2012, p. 26; Leith 2010). As such, one can speak of what 
might ostensibly appear as the oxymoron of ‘unionist-nationalists’ (Morton 1999; see 
also Ichijo 2012). McCrone (2012, p. 73) explains that after the union of 1707 one 
might consider Scots generally as unionist-nationalists, as ‘they remained Scots in 
strictly national terms, while embracing Britishness as and when appropriate as their 
state identity’. For many the union and the opportunities it afforded many Scots in an 
age of empire, helped to preserve and promote Scottish national identity and interests. 
This form of nationalism, or ‘Scottishness’, has, however, regularly been challenged 
as a less genuine form of nationalism by those who support independence though. 
Mycock states that the SNP has often denigrated the views of Scottish nationalists that 
do not translate into separatism as those of ‘pseudo-nationalists’ who disingenuously 
play the Scottish card for electoral purposes’ (2012, p. 56). Drawing on an article that 
Alex Salmond wrote for the Wall Street Journal in 2006, Mycock points out how 
Salmond ‘asserted ‘Scotland remains an anomaly, a stateless nation’ whose destiny is 
independence’, thus suggesting he believes that all nations should seek self-
determination and become sovereign states’ (2012, p. 55). Results from the Scottish 
Social Attitudes Survey have repeatedly shown that many Scottish people consider 
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themselves Scottish and would wish to preserve that identity, but do not seek 
independent statehood (see www.whatscotlandthinks.org; see also Keating 2009).  
 
With the above in mind it is worth re-stating an analytical decision employed in this 
thesis, which was outlined in Chapter 1. Throughout the thesis, and notably in the 
analyses of texts from the independence referendum debate, the opposing sides are 
referred to as ‘the nationalists’ and ‘the unionists’. The former being those who 
supported independence and the latter being those who did not support independence. 
I might instead have chosen to refer to the nationalist campaign as secessionist, but 
chose not to as this is not how they were referred to within the texts analysed 
themselves, nor by key protagonists and other commentators. Ultimately, given that 
independence is what was at stake in the debate, it ought not to present any real 
confusion to the reader. However, I use these terms whilst mindful of the fact that 
nationalists and unionists cannot be so easily categorised, or indeed separated, and 
that nationalism need not necessarily be about independent statehood. 
 
Ethnic or Civic Nationalism? 
Ethnically based explanations of nationalism were mentioned above in relation to 
primordialist, modernist and perennialist explanations, with the latter accounting for 
the importance of pre-existing ethnic groups as well as the emergent quality of nations 
in the modern era. Another related distinction is often made between ethnic and civic 
nationalisms.  According to ethnic nationalism, nationhood is defined by a shared 
ethnic origin, including language, religion, customs and traditions. According to civic 
nationalism, nationhood is defined by common citizenship and is based on common 
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subscription to shared civic values - typically those of liberal democracy – 
irrespective of ethnic differences.  
‘Civic nationalism is a different mode of nation building. It is a collective 
enterprise of its members but it is rooted in individual assent rather than 
ascriptive identity. It is based on common values and institutions, and patterns 
of social interaction. The bearers of national identity are institutions, customs, 
historical memories and rational secular values. Anyone can join the nation 
irrespective of birth or ethnic origins’ (Keating 1996, pp. 5-6). 
Drawing on Hearn (2000, p. 94), McCrone and Bechhofer state that ‘the distinction 
between ethnic and civic has more to do with opposing styles of argument than with 
measurable concepts’ (2010, p. 924). Both ethnic and civic expressions of nationalism 
remain important in the imagination of the nation. Certainly it is clear that elements of 
both are key to understanding Scottish politics.  
 
Mycock (2012) presents an excellent appraisal of the importance of both ethnic and 
civic nationalisms in Scottish politics, and the roles that they have played in shaping 
sentiments about independence. Mycock explains the emergence of civic nationalism 
as a key factor in Scottish political discourse in the 1990s through discursive efforts of 
the SNP; ‘For some, the SNP now promotes a non-ethnicized, territorially located 
‘impeccably civic’ Scottish nationalism (Mycock 2012, p. 55; see also Keating 2009, 
p. 17). Civic nationalism is often espoused with deliberate political motivations, given 
that modern liberal democratic thinking typically denigrates ethnic nationalisms as 
‘illiberal, ascriptive, particularistic, and exclusive’ versus civic nationalism which is 
‘liberal, voluntarist, universalist, and inclusive’ (Brubaker 1999, p. 56). We see this in 
the denigration of ethnic nationalisms in Eastern Europe for instance, where we see 
‘the invocation of a dubious series of linked oppositions – between universalism and 
particularism, inclusion and exclusion, civility and violence, reason and passion, 
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modern tolerance and ancient hatreds, transnational integration and nationalist 
disintegration, civic nationhood and ethnic nationalism’ (Brubaker 1999, p. 56). 
Mycock also points out, however, that the SNP’s discursive strategies are not as 
‘wholly civic’ as it might like to attest. 
‘It is clear that claims that the SNP version of Scottish nationalism is not 
‘wholly civic’ and that its shift from ethnic-based nationalism during the 
1980s and 1990s has not been absolute’ (Mycock 2012, p. 64) 
Torrance (2014) points out how Alex Salmond urged in a speech at the Glasgow 
Caledonian University's New York City campus that Scots would vote ‘based entirely 
on consensual, civic, non-ethnic and peaceful principles’ in the referendum, despite 
earlier referencing US citizens claiming Scots ‘ancestry’, the Declaration of Arbroath, 
statues of Robert Burns and Sir Walter Scott in Central Park, and other typical 
reference points for non-civic nationalism.  
 
Crucially, the actual sentiments of Scots in many instances are not as wholly civic 
either. McCrone and Bechhofer (2010) demonstrate through a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of respondents in both Scotland and England that 
people’s willingness to accept or reject others’ claims to nationhood often hinges on 
‘identity markers’ (e.g. birth, accent, parentage, etc.) besides that of permanent 
residence. The authors essentially argue that the SNP’s all-inclusive civic vision 
ignores certain realities about how people both self-identify and identify others in 
actual practice. The distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism is not 
straightforward in practical terms, either analytically or normatively; ‘nationalism 
resists neat parsing into types with clearly contrasting empirical and moral 
profiles…[and] The civic-ethnic distinction is overburdened; it is expected to do too 
much work’ (Brubaker 1999, p. 69). Interestingly, McCrone and Bechhofer (2010) 
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argue that the independence debate would likely bring the importance of these 
contrasting expressions of national identity more clearly into focus.  
However, it is argued here that this did not happen, with issues of national identity 
being largely ‘backgrounded’ in favour of issues of economics in public texts. That 
said, one suspects that in many cases ethnic forms of nationalism remain significant 
motivators for people, even if publicly they might not say as much due to the stigma 
attached to such arguments. In the case of Scottish independence, however, ethnic 
divisions were probably less important, not least due to the length of the union and the 
broad cultural assimilation it has made possible. A latent commitment to Scottish 
national identity has never really been in question, let alone existentially threatened, 
and Scottish cultural symbols have often been celebrated elements of ‘Britishness’. 
Certainly a commitment to the Scottish nation alone is insufficient to mobilise popular 
political support in favour of independence. As such, one of the strengths of the 
imagined economy and the economistic arguments it facilitates, as outlined in 
subsequent chapters, is the potential it affords to speak to a different (and more 
materially) shared set of circumstances largely irrespective of ethnic particularities.  
 
Back-grounding the Nation in favour of ‘The Economy’  
 
In subsequent chapters it will be argued that national identity, whilst clearly a highly 
significant underlying factor in the debate, was in fact less emphasised than might 
have been expected. As stated above, discerning the extent to which national identity 
acts as a determinant of views on independence has always been difficult, and yet 
underlying commitments to ‘Scottishness’ are hardly an irrelevance. Wood explains 
that given the significance of national identities for the shaping political geographies, 
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‘It is surprising…that relatively little is being said about culture and identity in 
debates on Scottish independence’, however, she argues ‘this is in part a purposeful 
act by those who are trying to secure independence’ (2014, p. 40), as the following 
two quotes from the then Deputy First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, illustrate:  
“But for me the fact of nationhood or Scottish identity is not the motive force 
for independence. Nor do I believe that independence, however desirable, is 
essential for the preservation of our distinctive Scottish identity. And I don’t 
agree at all that feeling British – with all of the shared social, family and 
cultural heritage that makes up such an identity – is in any way inconsistent 
with a pragmatic, utilitarian support for political independence” (Sturgeon 
2012). 
“The central debate we are having is a very practical debate. A utilitarian
3
 
debate… It is about the economy…And whether with independence Scotland 
would be better off or not” (Sturgeon 2014) 
As the latter quote suggests, the terms of the debate revealed a far greater emphasis on 
what have been referred to as ‘the economics of independence’. Utterances of national 
identity were back-grounded in favour of apparently less political, economistic 
arguments for and against independence.  
 
It should be stressed at this juncture, however, that economic rationalities and 
expressions of (national) identity are not necessarily mutually exclusive, for in some 
instances they can be viewed as mutually reinforcing. Exploring the changing role of 
identity in Cornish economic development, Willett (2013) and Willett and 
Tredinnick-Rowe (2016) have stressed the importance of identity not simply as a 
good in and of itself, but as a utility, a means to an end, insofar as it has been used to 
stress the particularities of the Cornish case for regional economic development.  
                                                          
3 Within this same speech Sturgeon explains the difference between this ‘utilitarian 
nationalism’ and ‘existential nationalism’, which supports ‘independence for its own 
sake’ (Sturgeon 2014). 
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‘identity has utility as a social, economic and even governance tool, 
encouraging regions to celebrate their identities and the things that make them 
different and distinctive from other spaces, in order to compete better in the 
European and global economy’ (Willett and Tredinnick-Rowe 2016, p. 772). 
Through an analysis of economic development documents, Willett and Tredinnick-
Rowe stress how in the 1970s and 1980s ‘identity is conspicuous by its absence’ 
(2016, p. 774), whereas from the late 1990s onwards it began to play a significant part 
in the articulation of Cornish economic development strategies. Similarly, Bond et al. 
(2003) have looked at the importance of Scottish identity for economic development, 
making it clear that Scotland’s nationalism and economy are deeply intertwined. They 
show that national identity is not ‘essentially cultural and/or narrowly political’, but is 
also mobilised in a more ‘banal’ fashion ‘within strategies and discourse of economic 
development’ (Bond et al. 2003, p. 371).  
 
In the case of the Scottish referendum debate it is possible to reverse this argument. 
Whilst difficult to prove, it is likely that many who supported independence did so – 
at least in part - for ‘deeper’ and more emotive reasons of national identity, as 
opposed to the purely utilitarian economic reasons they purported, as in the above 
examples from Sturgeon (2012; 2014). Indeed there were some revealing instances of 
this in the materials analysed. However, as argued in Chapter 6, there was an explicit 
aim to downplay seemingly less rational, emotive reasons for independence in favour 
of seemingly more objective and rational, economistic arguments. This is one of the 
ways in which the politics of the debate were effectively hidden. 
 
This was made possible, it will be argued, by ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions about 
‘the economy’, such that Scottish subjects are encouraged to see themselves and their 
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economic life-chances as especially bound up within shared material communities of 
fate (Williams 2003). Crucially, whilst forms of political or ethical association with 
those whom we are considered to share our fate may well further the legitimacy of 
those communities in our minds-eyes, and thereby necessitated governance 
arrangements, they are not strictly necessary to them being viewed as real. This 
observation has been made by Rosamond (2002) with regards the imagined ‘European 
economy’, but the same is also true at the sub-state level. In any event, whilst national 
identity, per se, was effectively downplayed in the debate, identity politics and their 
significance for shaping political legitimacies remain central, albeit assuming a 
broader understanding of identity consonant with poststructuralism. Crucially, 
poststructuralism reminds us that all identity is ‘political’ (See Chapter 2 -
Methodology).   
 
Scottish people are still very much encouraged to imagine themselves to be a part of, 
or identify with, what is still a fundamentally political spatial-scalar entity (‘the 
economy’) even if said identity and said entity might not appear so ostensibly 
‘political’. Like the state, ‘the economy’ is not an ontological given, it is discursively 
constructed, and the extent to which economies like ‘the Scottish economy’ even exist 
as material ‘realities’, determining the economic life-chances of subjects located 
therein, is hugely exaggerated. It is therefore, necessarily, a political designation, 
despite often being presented as somehow more real, and in spite of the general 
‘depoliticisation’ of the economic. The implications of the imagined economy, and of 
economic arguments for and against independence, are very much political insofar as 
Scottish economic subjects are encouraged to view proposed governance 
arrangements (either continued union or an independent Scotland) as legitimate.  
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Moreover, the ways in which subjects are encouraged to imagine the Scottish 
economy reveal attempts to assert the distinctiveness and particularities of ‘the 
Scottish case’. The Scottish economy has historically been imagined in accordance 
with certain narratives, such as the ‘underdevelopment/dependency theory’, ‘branch-
plant economy status’, the ‘north-south divide’, and ‘de-industrialisation’ (Brown 
1998, pp. 77-85), all of which present the Scottish economy as structurally 
disadvantaged; the first three explicitly because of the Scottish economy being tied to 
that of the wider UK economy, and the latter because of the Scottish economy’s 
structural (re)composition, which, according to critics of Thatcherism and monetarism 
at least, can also be attributed to the Scottish economy being tied to the wider UK 
economy and policy choices in Westminster. Whilst such narratives may well have 
resonated with the lived experiences of many Scots, they represent broad 
generalisations about the Scottish experience.  
 
Tomlinson notes that de-industrialisation was proportionally greater in its impact in 
Scotland that the UK as a whole given the predominance of industry there, but also 
that there is a misplaced tendency to refer to de-industrialisation in ‘declinist terms’ 
and ‘as evidence of a pathological failure in the Scottish economy’ (Tomlinson 2014, 
p. 173). Tomlinson stresses that this is despite the fact that Scottish incomes have 
continually grown in the wake of de-industrialisation and relative to the UK average. 
Indeed, despite economic growth in Scotland to the extent where it is now the second 
wealthiest region in the UK in aggregate terms, and consonant discursive efforts by 
nationalists to project an image of Scotland as economically stronger than the UK as a 
whole, the legacies of these older narratives are still apparent in the way in which the 
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Scottish economy is typically presented in unionist arguments against independence, 
wherein the Scottish economy is argued to be dependent on the UK for its survival.  
As argued above, and explored in Chapter 8, the Scottish economy is also thought to 
be more especially defined by a commitment to social democracy (Keating 2007; 
McEwan 2002; Lynch 2009), which may not appear to pertain to either ethnic or civic 
expressions of national identity, but which has nevertheless become a part of how 
Scottish identity is often understood. Willett argues the same to be the case with 
regards Cornish (and Welsh) nationalism, whereby it ‘comes from a cultural 
assemblage that combines identity with inequality and social justice’ (2013, p. 307). 
This is also has implications for the way in which economic (in)security is articulated 
by Scottish nationalists in the independence referendum debate, whereby those 
insecurities are given to resonate with an established narrative of social democracy 
and the Scottish economy. 
 
Key to conveying the idea of the economy and an associated community of fate, and 
therefore the legitimation of their governance is the explicit articulation of shared 
threat. Kuus and Agnew (2008) argue that nationalist discourse and security discourse 
have been (mutually) reinforcing with regards legitimation of the state.  
‘The whole inter-state system is based on the fusing of identity and security so 
that each state supposedly protects its territorially defined national identity. 
Insecurity therefore is not external to the state, but it is an integral part of the 
process of establishing the state’s identity’ (2008, p. 99).  
However, whilst Political Geographers like Kuus and Agnew, and students of 
Security Studies too, have emphasised the historical role played by assertions of 
‘conventional’ (in)security (i.e. national defence), this thesis looks at role of economic 
(in)security and the articulation of shared economic threats of either union or 
81 
 
independence within the Scottish independence debate, wherein more ‘conventional’ 
utterances of security were all but absent. Across the next two chapters it will become 
clear just how the ‘interpellation’ of identities based on shared (in)security is a crucial 
determinant of the imagined economy.  
Conclusion:  
This chapter has presented an historical introduction to Scottish politics, and the 2014 
referendum on Scottish independence, and has elaborated upon some of the 
fundamental political concepts underpinning the thesis. In doing so it has set the scene 
for the further development of the thesis’ conceptual framework in Chapters 4 and 5, 
as well as the empirical application of that framework in the remaining three chapters. 
Whilst the thesis is principally concerned with the concepts of the imagined economy 
and economic (in)security, and their specific significance to the independence 
referendum debate, the overarching themes of governance, legitimacy and (national) 
identity explored above provide the broad thematic background upon which these 
concepts are latterly developed.     
 
Political geographers remind us of is the importance of space, place and territoriality. 
They remind us how the delineation of these geographies is predicated upon the 
politics of identity and legitimacy. The themes of identity and legitimacy run 
throughout the thesis. Identity is key, as indeed it is to all poststructuralist work, 
insofar as discourses serve to ‘interpellate’ subjects into subject positions wherein 
representations of the world make sense to them and become naturalised, and given to 
reflect ‘the way the world really is’ (Weldes 1996, p. 287; Althusser 1974, p. 174). 
82 
 
Discourses of the nation may be an example of this, although it is argued here that in 
the referendum debate issues of nationhood were largely ‘backgrounded’ in favour of 
discourses on ‘the economy’, which similarly rely upon the interpellation of subject 
identities. Intimately related to the politics of identity, therefore, are the politics of 
legitimacy, and this thesis is concerned with the looking at how independence is 
justified by the key protagonists within the public debate and, thereby, how the 
legitimacy of respective governing arrangements (either Union or Independence) and 
attributed bodies (either the UK or Scottish Government) is conveyed through 
discursive practice.  
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Chapter 4: The Imagined Economy and the Depoliticisation 
of Political Space 
 
Chapter 2 set out the research questions underpinning the thesis were set out. If the 
thesis as a whole aims to address the primary research question then this chapter and 
the next addresses the first two subsidiary questions respectively. The remaining 
three, more empirically focussed chapters, address the third. The focus of this chapter 
then is driven by the question, what is the (Scottish) economy? 
 
Chapter 2 explored a number of core concepts associated with the shifting of 
governance capacities within the plurinational (Keating 2004) UK state, and more 
specifically, towards an emergent Scottish polity. However, early analysis of 
empirical ‘texts’ (policy documents, speeches, news media) on this topic immediately 
revealed the almost exclusively economic focus of the referendum debate. Notably, 
whilst the resurgence of Scottish nationalism and associated commitments to a 
Scottish national identity have been crucial to the shifting of governance capacities in 
recent decades, they were (often deliberately) ‘backgrounded’ within public texts. 
Instead, economic rationalities were central to discourse on independence as a means 
of mobilising support both for and against independence.  
 
Within this context utterances of ‘the (Scottish) economy’ clearly assumed the 
existence of a concrete, or ‘real’ spatial-scalar entity (Rosamond 2002) to which that 
term referred, and within which a defined ‘community of fate’ (Williams 2003) is 
embodied. This chapter draws on literature from political economy and economic 
84 
 
sociology in order to better understand how and why the concept of ‘the economy’ 
became so central to the referendum debate, and what the implications might be for 
understanding how certain political spaces and associated polities become governable. 
Also, and in accordance with the poststructuralist commitments underpinning the 
analysis, it considers the potential implications for the effective ‘depoliticisation’ of 
debate.  
 
What is the economy? 
 
It can be helpful to distinguish between two separate, but nevertheless inseparable 
‘ideas’ of the economy: One as referring to a particular domain or sphere of activity 
that we can call ‘the economic’; The other as referring to a specific, geographically 
demarcated entity, such as the Scottish, UK or European economy. In either sense, the 
economy is imagined. This is not to say that the economy (in either sense) has no 
foundation in reality as might be suggested from colloquial use of the term 
‘imagined’. In fact, it is probably because such foundations exist that the economy 
seems more real than imagined. It is just that the extent to which the economy is ‘real’ 
is grossly exaggerated. 
 
What follows looks first look at the imagined nature of ‘the economic’, specifically 
with insights from political economy and economic sociology. It is most commonly 
with reference to the economic that scholars within these disciplines explore the 
significance of ideas, or discourse, for our understanding of political economy. As 
well exploring generally the extent to which it is imagined as ‘real’, this first part of 
the chapter discusses the extent to which we consequently feel it is possible to ‘know’ 
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the economic. This clearly has methodological implications for political economic 
analysis, but it also speaks to the validity of the sorts of economistic arguments 
typically used by politicians (and others) in order to mobilise public opinion. With 
regards to this thesis, there are clear implications for the validity of overtly 
economistic arguments for and against Scottish independence.        
 
Consonant with the insights of constructivist political economy that we cannot explain 
nor understand ‘the economic’ by reference to material considerations alone, we 
clearly cannot understand the basis for thinking about economies as discrete spatial-
scalar entities by reference to underlying material or structural conditions alone either. 
This is explored in the second part of the chapter, where it is shown that not only is 
‘the economic’ largely imagined, the idea of ‘the economy’ as a functioning totality is 
imagined too, and came about not through conceptual deliberation and advances, but 
merely as a ‘taken-for-granted’. And yet economies, like states, have to be continually 
‘sung into existence’ (Smith 2004) (even if only ‘discretely’) both quantitatively and 
qualitatively, in order to remain meaningful to those whose circumstances are 
apparently bound up within them. As will be addressed in the next chapter, one of the 
ways in which this is done, is through the constant articulation of economic 
(in)security. 
 
The economy clearly provides a spatial reference around (or within) which 
intersubjectivities can be formed and based on which governing rationalities can be 
legitimated. Crucially, and largely because of assumptions about the economic as 
something more real and less political than the social world generally, these 
intersubjectivities can be mobilised without explicit recourse to other more 
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controversial, or contestable foundations of group identity, like the ‘ethno-symbolism’ 
of national identity. This is addressed towards the end of the chapter with reference to 
the concept of ‘communities of fate’ (Williams 2003). Crucially, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 8, these communities of (economic) fate can serve to legitimise emerging of 
established governing rationalities with or without recourse to ethical or ‘political’ 
justification. In this sense it helps us to understand the constitution of ‘effective 
legitimacy’ and, building on the previous chapter, how legitimacy can be considered 
in both ‘descriptive’ and ‘normative’ terms.   
 
Ultimately, it will be argued, the ‘taken-for-granted’ nature of both the economic and 
the economy makes it possible for economistic arguments to be made both for and 
against independence, which effectively subvert political debate, and obscure the 
necessarily ‘political’ assumptions and implications underpinning the very idea of the 
economy.  
 
‘Knowing’ the economy 
 
To what extent can we know the economy? Despite various interventions stressing the 
importance of social or discursive factors for our understanding of economics, there is 
still a view that it is possible to know the economy in a similar way to that which we 
feel we can know the physical world, and in a way that differs to how we now 
generally accept it is possible to know the social world. Knowing the physical world 
requires the presentation of deterministic explanations for phenomena. In certain 
physical sciences we recognise that though in practice this may often be difficult (e.g. 
in meteorology or oceanography where you are dealing with open systems and 
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seemingly incomprehensible contingencies), in principle it seems as least possible 
(i.e. if we could only compute all those contingencies) (Williams & May 1996, see 
chapter 4 ‘Knowing the Social World’). However, the social world is fundamentally 
different as at its heart are humans who are thinking and feeling creatures who cannot 
be reduced to atomistic, rational actors. As such, our methodologies for understanding 
the social world must be different too. To a student of social sciences this seems 
obvious, but whilst the insights of various social constructionisms have taken a strong 
footing in many of the social sciences, including Politics and International Relations, 
they have come far later and remain less well rooted within political economy 
approaches, especially within the ‘American School’ of political economy (Cameron 
and Palan 2009). It remains the case that the common sense view of the economy is of 
a separate, almost objective material domain of activity that can be ‘known’. 
Neo/classical economics certainly encourages us to view the economy as operating in 
accordance with immutable dynamics, wherein actors (e.g. humans, firms, etc.) are 
conceived of in atomistic terms, driven by rational - and thus, in principle at least, 
predictable - material interests, despite the fact that we are dealing with the self-same 
units as other social sciences (i.e. people). 
 
We must view the economic (insofar as it meaningfully exists), as inextricably rooted 
in social, or discursive, practice.  One popularised term for this, a concept central to 
the discipline of economic sociology, is ‘embeddedness’ (Zukin & DiMaggio 
1990). Embeddedness owes its intellectual inheritance to Karl Polanyi, who first 
coined the term in his book, ‘The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic 
Origins of Our Time’ (Polanyi [1944]2001). The concept has since been further 
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developed to convey, in a more fundamental sense, the social constructedness of the 
market economy. But first, let us look specifically at Polanyi’s insights.      
 
Karl Polanyi ([1944]2001) attributes the major trends in the global political economy 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century to the inevitable failure of the 
utopian liberal project to ‘disembed’ the economy from society. Based on historical 
and anthropological research Polanyi shows how ‘man’s economy, as a rule, is 
submerged in his social relationships’ (2001, p. 48). He explains that during the 
‘mercantilist period’ despite markets becoming increasingly important, they remained 
tightly regulated; ‘Regulation and markets, in effect, grew up together’ (Polanyi 2001, 
p. 71). Defined simply, a market economy is basically a system controlled and 
regulated by the automatic adjustment of supply and demand through the price 
mechanism. Polanyi asserted that in order for the market economy to work it must 
comprise all elements of industry, including labour, land and money, which meant the 
subordination of society to the market mechanism. However, he explains that labour, 
land and money are in fact ‘fictitious commodities’ and ‘[t]o allow the market 
mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural 
environment indeed, even the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in 
the demolition of society’ (Polanyi 2001, p. 76). The result, therefore, was an 
inevitable and spontaneous countermovement by society to protect itself from the 
self-regulating market. Hence, Polanyi’s famous statement that ‘Laissez-faire was 
planned; planning was not’ (2001, p. 147). 
 
Polanyi therefore stresses how the infiltration of the market mechanism into 
previously social exchanges led to a conception of the economy as an almost 
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autonomous (and ‘knowable’) sphere of activity. The idea of the self-regulating 
market helps to convey the notion of the economy as some sort of discrete and 
autonomous ‘system’ - or at least that such is an achievable ideal – separate from 
human agency and social indeterminacies. Polanyi argued that previously, with 
primitive or archaic economies, the market had been at most an accessory to society, 
whereas now, in the modern industrialised capitalist economy, society was 
increasingly becoming an accessory to the market. This paved the way for the birth of 
economics (and concurrent decline of political economy) and a feeling that we can in 
fact ‘know’ the economic. 
 
What is not always clear from Polanyi’s observations is whether the economy could 
in principle be disembedded from society; despite in practice not proving possible. In 
any event, Polanyi’s insights have been massively influential, especially within the 
discipline of economic sociology, where others have built upon the concept of 
embeddedness by stressing the role of ideas. Doing so makes it possible to explain, 
for instance, why despite the futility of the aforementioned utopian liberal project to 
disembed the economy from society, the powerful logic upon which that project was 
based proved no less influential as an ideological regime, or discourse, that shaped the 
way in which we came to think about the economy (Block & Somers 2003); namely, 
as the aforementioned largely objective and material domain governed by market 
rationalism.  
 
Block and Somers (2003) demonstrate this with a focus on the same key period of 
English and Welsh history as did Polanyi, namely that leading up to the passing of the 
New Poor Law in 1834. The Old Poor Law (or Speenhamland System) provided the 
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poor with a specific quantity of income assistance based on the price of bread and the 
size of their family; more specifically, when the gap between the price of bread and 
wages widened the parish would allocate poor relief funds to those workers and their 
families (Block & Somers 2003, p. 286). However, this created controversy, with 
critics arguing that it discouraged employers from paying a suitable wage, assured in 
the knowledge that it would be supplemented by the state. Moreover, opponents 
argued that because it was available to able-bodied workers too, the inevitable result 
was dependency and idleness. In 1786 Joseph Townsend’s Dissertation on the Poor 
Law argued that without such state intervention the supply of food would eventually 
lead to the population of the poor reaching equilibrium (Block & Somers 2003, p. 
287). Then in 1798, following a very similar vein - though without any mention of 
Townsend’s pamphlet - Thomas Malthus published his Essay on the Principle of 
Population. Therein he argued that ‘the labor market depends on a delicate self-
regulating system in which a perfect equilibrium of supply and demand occurs only 
when it functions in its natural state of scarcity’ (Block & Somers 2003, p. 288). The 
argument goes that without the necessary condition of scarcity, population burgeons 
unchecked and the incentive to work is undermined. Polanyi explained that what 
liberals inexplicably omitted is the fact that in order for a labour market to work 
labourers not only needed the allure of higher wages, but also the prospect of 
starvation (2001, p. 172). Similarly, Mencher states ‘Poverty provided the incentive to 
work and restricted domestic consumption, thus encouraging production for foreign 
trade, and gave domestic industry a competitive advantage in foreign trade through 
low labour costs’ (1967, pp. 87-88). Polanyi asserted that in order to release ‘nature’s 
penalty’, hunger, ‘it was necessary to liquidate organic society, which refused to let 
the individual starve’ (2001, pp. 173). 
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Yet Block and Somers offer compelling evidence, based on recent scholarship, for an 
alternative account to the accepted Speenhamland narrative, or ‘perversity thesis’. 
They conclude that the success of the Speenhamland story (i.e. the aforementioned 
narrative created by the likes of Malthus) was its deflection of criticism away from 
other structural economic problems - including macroeconomic policy mistakes - 
which were the real causes of economic hardship among the poor. They state that ‘By 
shifting the blame for the problems on to Speenhamland and all its pernicious evils, 
the economic liberals successfully reframed the agricultural downturn into a problem 
of individual morality and an enduring parable of the dangers of government 
“interference” with the market’ (2003, p. 313). It is thus that Somers and Block 
(2005) state elsewhere that Malthus ideationally re-embeds the labour market.  
‘For 500 years the poor has been a sociological classification of the propertyless 
that carried no moral judgement…The ideational regime change from poverty to 
perversity was all but triumphant’ (Somers and Block 2005, p. 276). 
Essentially, by building on the intellectual insights of Polanyi, what the authors 
demonstrate is that ideas are vital contributing factors in shaping how the economic 
world is understood.  Somers and Block assert that economic sociologists have ‘too 
often confined their institutionalist imaginations to the standard legal, political, and 
organizational structures of embeddedness’ and propose ‘expanding market 
embeddedness to include the ideas, public narratives, and explanatory systems by 
which states, societies, and political cultures construct, transform, explain, and 
normalise market processes’ (2005, p. 264).  
 
Castree (2004) explains that there can be no conception of the economy divorced 
from the world of ideas. With reference to the ‘cultural turn’ in Human Geography, he 
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discusses debates between the sub-disciplines of Economic Geography and Cultural 
Geography
4
 over the so called ‘culture-economy nexus’. In his provocatively titled 
article ‘Economy and culture are dead! Long live economy and culture!’ Castree 
asserts: 
‘To put it bluntly, polemically, and- with my tongue only partly in my cheek, I 
want to suggest that there are no such things as 'economy' and 'culture' 
ontologically speaking (whether separately or together). Rather, they are two 
powerful ideas whose continued use or imminent demise (whether in the 
academic realms of geography or in non-academic settings) says something 
important about the agendas of those propounding these ideas. This is not to 
deny that those ideas refer to real things - of course they do. But it is to insist 
that reference is conventional and also to recall that ideas have a force in their 
own right, rather than being mirrors of supposed ontological givens’ (2004, p. 
206).  
Castree reiterates Don Mitchell’s argument that ‘culture is ultimately an ideology: an 
infinitely flexible concept that powerful groups can and do use to govern others’, and 
thus, ‘[r]ather than interrogating what culture is, Mitchell believes a more productive 
task is for [cultural geographers]…to examine who defines 'culture', how and with 
what effects’ (Castree 2004, pp. 210-211). By extension, Castree explains, ‘if we take 
seriously Mitchell's suggestion that 'culture' is a concept that is constructed (and 
deconstructed) by myriad knowledge-producers (including academics), then we also 
need to take seriously the possibility that this argument applies to the concept of 
'economy' too (Castree 2004, p. 212). Thus, Castree states that the economy is a 
‘performative signifier’. When we talk about the economic we rarely specify what we 
are referring to and largely take as given the idea that it constitutes some objective 
and essential domain in our lives. Castree states that ‘Likewise, terms such as 
'economic life', 'the national economy', 'economic activities' and so on routinely figure 
                                                          
4
 The ‘new cultural geography’ that emerged from the late 1980s onwards drew on 
poststructuralist insights, in particular those of Foucault, and emphasised the 
importance of discourse in the contingent construction of meaning, and the role 
played by power in said construction (Jones et al. 2004). 
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in everyday life yet are rarely reflected upon or unpacked (2004, p. 217, emphasis 
added). 
 
Within political economy approaches, the role of ideas has also been highlighted as 
important in shaping economic practices and structures. Mark Blyth has demonstrated 
the importance of ideas as determinants of institutional supply vis-à-vis purely 
structural theories of institutional supply (Blyth 1997; 2002). Considered in this way, 
Blyth (2002) explicates the ideational determinants for not just the institutionalisation 
of embedded liberalism as a reaction to the failures of classical liberalism after World 
War Two as Polanyi foresaw, but also the institutionalisation of neoliberalism, and 
thus the effective ‘disembedding’ of the economy again decades later as a reaction to 
the perceived failures of embedded liberalism. Mark Blyth is one of a number of 
scholars within the now growing sub-discipline of constructivist political economy, 
committed to demonstrating the role of ideas as determinants of political economy. 
 
In short, constructivist political economy argues against wholly materialist and 
rationalist conceptions of political economy (Abdelal et al. 2010a; Blyth 2003; 
Abdelal 2009). 
‘All political economy scholarship needs at least to consider, as a plausible 
hypothesis that economies might vary substantially for nonmaterial reasons. In 
other words, the field needs to engage more systematically with 
constructivism, a theoretical approach that emphasizes precisely those 
nonmaterial influences on both institutions and practices’ (Abdelal et 
al. 2010a, p. 2).  
Similarly, Herrera stresses that  
‘In addition to emphasizing the interaction between actors and institutional 
development, constructivist approaches to the economy consider the role of 
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norms, ideas, and ideology in shaping economic interests, rejecting the idea of 
economic interests as a direct reflection of economic conditions’ (2010, p. 
117; see also Herrera 2007).  
Whereas in International Relations more broadly constructivism has become 
practically mainstream (although arguably less the case of more ‘critical’ 
constructionisms like poststructuralism), Abdelal et al. (2010b) argue that this is 
certainly not the case in international political economy (IPE). The unfortunate truth 
perhaps for scholars of political economy is that the economic (as far as it can even be 
said to meaningfully exist) is fundamentally uncertain and, therefore, unknowable in 
any deterministic sense.   
 
Blyth (2002) argues that the economic world is inherently uncertain, given that it is a 
fundamentally human domain and a part of our social world. Herrera (2010) explains 
that according to rationalist-materialist accounts uncertainty comes only from a lack 
of information. She explains that the traditional cognitivist approach simply sees the 
mind as a calculator that computes objective material economic conditions. This 
underpins the concept of utility maximization ‘in which individuals make choices that 
maximize utility by calculating the value of alternatives based on information and an 
ordered set of preferences’ (Herrera 2010, p. 115). In contrast to this,  
‘constructivist approaches go further in that they reject the underlying objective 
economic reality in favor of the idea that economic reality is itself a social 
construction, that is, does not exist absent from human interaction, and the 
cognitive basis of constructivism departs significantly from the mind-as-
calculator model’ (Herrera 2010, p. 116).    
It is such rationalist-materialist assumptions that underpinned a distorted conception 
of economic risks in the lead up to the global financial crisis. For many years the 
world’s leading financial institutions sought to quantify risk and predict it accurately 
using complex modelling, and many actually thought that risk had been mastered and 
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finance enjoyed a ‘golden period’ of low interest rates, low volatility and high returns, 
but as financial institutions allowed themselves to become excessively leveraged, 
eventually ‘risk got ahead of the world’s ability to manage it’ (The Economist 2010, 
p. 3). Abdelal (et al. 2010b) point out how the ‘financial innovations of the past 
decades were based on the premise that risk was knowable, calculable, and possible to 
manipulate’.  
‘Whereas some scholars and practitioners had come to believe that we really did 
live in a world of risk, as opposed to the uncertainty theorized by Frank Knight 
and John Maynard Keynes the crisis of 2008-2009 clarifies once again that we 
do not have the “scientific basis,” in Keynes’s words, “to form a calculable 
probability”’ (Abdelal et al. 2010b). 
It is rationalist-materialist conceptions of the economic that underpin the sorts of 
utilitarian arguments proffered in support of and against Scottish independence in the 
referendum debate. As explored in Chapter 6, it was conveyed to voters that it was 
possible, in principle at least, to calculate the value of either continued union or 
independence on a utility maximising basis (i.e. that they could ‘know’ whether they 
support independence or not), which aided the ‘depoliticisation’ of the debate.  
 
It is worth noting at this juncture, however, that explanations, generalisations and 
predictions are not meaningless in economics, for the social world very clearly 
displays regularities. Humans and other ‘economic actors’ often do behave in rational 
and fairly predictable ways. Any conception of ‘the social world’ without the 
existence of such regularities (i.e. one in which there is continuous ‘flux’) would be 
impossible. It is just that those explanations, generalisations and predictions can never 
be posited in a causally deterministic fashion, neither in practice, nor in principle (see 
‘Capacity for External Validity’ in Chapter 2-Methodology). Moreover, to stress the 
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necessary contingency of the ‘economic world’ is not to make an argument against 
empiricism in political economy approaches as is often inferred, but just a moderated 
form of empiricism (see Cameron & Palan 2009).  
 
Imagining ‘The Economy’: A Coherent Spatial-Scalar Entity? 
 
Not only is ‘the economic’ imagined as a largely objective and material domain of 
activity, but ‘the economy’ and economies, with regards really existing, concrete 
spatial-scalar entities are also imagined. In Jessop’s elaboration of a cultural political 
economy (CPE) based on critical semiotic analysis he outlines the following with 
regards the imagined nature of economies:  
‘Substantively, at what orthodox economics misleadingly describes as the macro 
level, CPE distinguishes the “actually existing economy” as the chaotic sum of 
all economic activities (broadly defined as concerned with the social 
appropriation and transformation of nature for the purposes of material 
provisioning) from the economy (or, better, economies in the plural) as an 
imaginatively narrated, more or less coherent subset of these activities. The 
totality of economic activities is so unstructured and complex that it cannot be 
an object of calculation, management, governance, or guidance. Instead such 
practices are always oriented to subsets of economic relations (economic 
systems or subsystems) that have been discursively and, perhaps, 
organizationally and institutionally fixed as objects of intervention. This 
involves “economic imaginaries” that rely on semiosis to constitute these 
subsets. Moreover, if they are to prove more than “arbitrary, rationalistic, and 
willed” (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 376–377), these imaginaries must have some 
significant, albeit necessarily partial, correspondence to real material 
interdependencies in the actually existing economy and/or in relations between 
economic and extra-economic activities’ (Jessop 2004, p. 162).  
As well as usefully illustrating the imagined nature of economies, the above quote 
reiterates the point that to talk of the imagined economy (either in terms of ‘the 
economic’ or ‘the economy’) is not suggest it has no foundation in reality. 
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However, consonant with the above insights of constructivist political economy that 
we cannot explain the economic by reference to material considerations alone, neither 
can we understand the basis for thinking about economies as discrete spatial-scalar 
entities by reference to underlying material or structural considerations alone. Such 
economic ‘realities’ exist, but they are often grossly overstated as well as discursively 
mediated. For instance, material factors such as physical geography, climate, natural 
resources, etc., may all play a part in shaping the geographical incidence of certain 
economic activities, whilst infrastructures of political and economic governance 
comprising currency arrangements, tax regimes, public expenditures, legal 
infrastructures, educational provisions, etc., can all play a part in demarcating 
economic activity into more or less coherent spaces or functional economic areas. In 
the case of a ‘European economy’, for instance, such factors as the single-market, the 
Schengen agreement, the single-currency, the common agricultural policy, 
etc., are all clearly important in shaping the geographical incidence of economic 
activity in EUrope, as is their intention, but these governance practices/institutional 
infrastructures are the result of political decisions and are not merely reflective of an 
ontologically given economic space or entity any more than the institutions of the 
state are brought about to enable the governance of a pre-given political space. And 
yet, the idea of ‘the economy’ is important insofar as it has a performative 
significance in encouraging us to imagine a ‘real’ and governable space; in fact, it is 
more meaningful to view the idea and materiality of an economy as mutually 
constitutive.  
 
Interestingly, ‘the economy’, as referring to a totality of economic relations (of 
production, circulation, exchange and consumption) within a given geographical area, 
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is actually a very modern invention and one that has come to pass not as a result of 
conceptual deliberation and advancement, but simply as a taken-for-granted (Mitchell 
1998; see also Foucault 1978). Concepts such as the state and the nation (themselves 
intimately tied to imaginations of the economy) once occupied a similarly privileged 
and uncontested position, but whose ‘contestedness’ seems almost clichéd now within 
academic circles if not public discourse. The same cannot be said however for the 
concept of the economy, which remains very much uncontested, a seemingly 
apolitical expression of an actually existing ‘reality’ or ontological given. Mitchell 
suggests that,  
‘the term seems more basic because it is still thought to refer to a material 
substrate, a realm with an existence prior to and separate from its 
representations, and thus to stand in opposition to the more discursive constructs 
of social theory’ (Mitchell 1998, p. 84)  
Mitchell (1998) explains how the economy used only to refer to the notion of the 
good management (often in terms of frugality) of one’s money, an equivocal meaning 
that it carries to this day. 
‘Between the 1920s and the 1950s, “the economy” came to refer to the structure 
or totality of relations of production, circulation and consumption within a given 
geographical space’ (Mitchell 2006, p. 183).   
By way of illustration of this point, one can conduct a simple search of The Times 
electronic newspaper archives for reference to the economy over the last 100 years or 
so.  
 
Before the late 1940s there is very scant mention of a ‘British economy’. Between 
1785 and 1940 there are just seven mentions in total. Moreover, it only ever refers to 
the aforementioned antiquated meaning highlighted by Mitchell (1998). For example, 
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on Tuesday 2
nd
 March 1947 a Mr John Bull writes; ‘true to the first maxim of British 
economy, “Take care of the pence and the pounds will take care of themselves”’ (The 
Times 1947, Issue 19486; col. D). However, between 1941 and 1950 there are a 
further 82 mentions of ‘British economy’, between 1951 and 1960 there are 285, and 
between 1961 and 1970 there are 1283 (see Chapter 6 for a similar illustration using a 
search for ‘Scottish economy’). Mitchell posits that in addition to the influence of 
ideas of macroeconomics (and associated developments in statistics) and 
econometrics, the emergence of this new concept of the economy was concurrent with 
a revival of nationalist ‘imaginations’ in that era. In any event, the result was the now 
common-sense notion of a national economy as a coherent totality of economic 
relations within a given space. 
 
Foucault’s work on ‘governmentality’ has interesting insights on the emergent 
concept of the economy too and helps to explain its significance for establishing 
governance capacities. Foucault argues that literature on the ‘art of government’ 
(including Rousseau’s work on political economy) is essentially concerned with how 
to introduce ‘economy’ into the management of the state. This is, however, drawing 
on an earlier use of the term economy within the family unit by the head (father) of 
the household; ‘the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within 
the family…and of making the family fortunes prosper’ (Foucault 1978, p. 92). This 
is essentially the earlier conception of ‘economy’ as highlighted by Mitchell as 
referring to the ‘management’ of money. 
‘To govern a state will therefore mean to apply economy, to set up an 
economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising towards its 
inhabitants, and the wealth and behaviour of each and all, a form of 
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surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his 
household and his goods’ (Foucault 1978, p. 92). 
However, Foucault goes on to stress that the word ‘economy’ has come to take on a 
new meaning. Whereas in the sixteenth century it signified purely a form of 
government, during the eighteenth century it comes to ‘designate a level of reality, a 
field of intervention through a series of complex processes that I regard as absolutely 
fundamental to our history’ (Foucault 1978, p. 93).  
 
He goes on to explain that this is made possible due to the emergent concept of 
‘population’ because ‘prior to the emergence of population, it was impossible to 
conceive the art of government except on the model of the family’ (Foucault 1978, p. 
93). The idea of population, accorded a reality through phenomena identifiable by 
statistics (e.g. birth and death rates, diseases, cycles of scarcity, wealth, etc.) - many 
of which are irreducible to the level of the family or household - supplanted the 
family as the model of government. It was now possible to imagine a coherent body 
of people within a given geographical space, which was thitherto unimaginable. No 
longer did government have as its purpose the act of government itself, but the 
welfare and improvement of the population. What makes this possible is the modern 
concept of the economy, as it requires one to comprehend not just the people, but also 
material things, as well as interactions between peoples and things and all that can 
influence those interactions (e.g. climatic events, war, foreign trade, etc.). This last 
rather confusing sentence can be explained by using the analogy that Foucault uses 
when discussing the government of the family (and its application as the model of 
governance for the state); that is the analogy of a ship:  
‘What does it mean to govern a ship? It means clearly to take charge of the 
sailors, but also the boat and its cargo; to take care of a ship also means to 
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reckon with winds, rocks and storms; and it consists in that activity of 
establishing a relation between the sailors who are taken care of and the ship 
which is to be taken care of, and the cargo which is to be brought safely to 
port, and all those eventualities like winds, rocks, storms and so on; this is 
what characterises the government of a ship’ (Foucault 1978, pp. 93-94). 
Whilst here Foucault is talking of the family and its use as the model for government, 
the same can of course be said of the economy writ large, as a ‘complex of men and 
things’ that is (albeit with significant challenges) governable. He states: 
‘The new science called political economy arises out of the perception of new 
networks of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory 
and wealth; and this is accompanied by the formation of a type of intervention 
characteristic of government, namely intervention in the field of economy and 
population’ (Foucault 1978, p. 101). 
This latterly mentioned notion of government intervention highlights a curious 
observation in the development of the ‘the economy’ as an entity deemed to spatially 
corresponded with the nation-state, while also being apart from it, with the state 
conveyed as a body that ‘intervened’ in it (Mitchell 2006, pp. 183-184). This helped 
to afford a frame of reference for ‘the economy’ and required governance solutions by 
governments.  
 
However, this notion of ‘intervention’ is of course built on the aforementioned 
fallacious assumption that the economy refers to some sort of objective reality into 
which the state intervenes. The concept of interventionism relies on a state/market 
dichotomy that grossly simplifies ‘reality’ (See Bruff 2011). Moreover, insofar as 
geographically specific economies (e.g. national economies) can be said to 
meaningfully exist at all, they do so largely not in spite of, but because of these so 
called ‘interventions’ which shape and demarcate the incidence of economic activities 
within a given geographical space. In Chapter 3 it was stressed that the state ‘has no 
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ontological status apart from the practices that constitute its reality’ (Kuus & Agnew 
2008, p. 98) and neither does the economy.  
 
Singing the Economy into Existence 
 
In order to render a political space governable one must also, to borrow a phrase from 
Smith (2004), sing it into existence. Tooze argues that, 
‘[T]he economy is not pre-existing reality, an object which we simply observe 
and theorise about. Our understanding of the ‘‘economy’’ as a distinct entity, a 
distinct social ‘‘sphere’’ or social ‘‘system’’, is the product of a dramatic 
process of imaginative abstraction and representational labour’ (1998, pp. 213-
214)   
Mitchell (1998) shows us that the state played the critical role in the development of 
the idea of the (national) economy by being the authoritative actor providing 
representations of it as a discrete and knowable object by, among other things, 
producing (or sanctioning the production of) national economic statistics like gross 
national product.  
‘The emergence of macroeconomics, as the new science of this object was 
called, coincided with developments in statistics that made it possible to imagine 
the enumeration of what came to be known as the gross national product of an 
economy and with the invention of econometrics, the attempt to represent the 
entire working of an economy as a single mathematical model’ (Mitchell 2006, 
p. 183) 
Tomlinson too explains the role of national accounts - largely a response to the Great 
Depression - in the imagination of ‘economic nationhood’ (2014, p. 170). 
Incidentally, he also stresses that:  
‘Torn from their original context as a way of understanding and measuring 
business cycles, national account measures have shown extraordinary 
persistence as measures of national economic performance and welfare 
103 
 
(despite being grossly ill-suited for this purpose, about which their originator, 
Simon Kuznets, was clear from the very beginning)’ (Tomlinson 2014, p. 170) 
Similarly, with the European economy, while other actors besides EU actors, such as 
national governments and national media, offer significant (probably more 
significant) ‘voices’ on the European economy, actors like the Commission play a 
crucial role in singing that space into existence.   
‘In the EU case, the emergence of an imagined spatial scalar order and its 
governing rationalities are co-constitutive, so that the emergent space of 
governance is constructed discursively, statistically and normatively in ways 
that enable the governance of that space to be undertaken by a particular (also) 
emergent agent’ (Rosamond 2012, p. 2). 
Rosamond’s explains that not until the mid-1980s did ‘the European economy’ 
feature heavily in policy discourse from the Commission. At around this point the 
idea of an actual European economic space went from representing a future ideal, 
further down the line of integration, to being an ontological claim about the existence 
of an actual spatial/scalar entity.  
 
Interestingly, devolution in the UK has brought with it more prominent territorial 
‘voices’ for the regions, along with a new institutional architecture, which among 
other things is likely to have conferred a more authoritative voice to regional 
governance actors with regards to their respective ‘economies’. It might be expected 
that there is a greater capacity for regional actors to sing their ‘economies’ into 
existence. Not that there is a deliberate policy of deception on the part of such actors 
in articulating a distinct corresponding economy, for it is merely reflective of the 
conferred responsibility of governments, politicians, media, chambers of commerce, 
and others, to speak and act on behalf of the space over which they are deemed to 
preside. It is simply the case that naturalised assumptions about ‘the economy’ and 
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attendant governing legitimacies provide an ‘accepted’ frame of reference (or 
discursive context) within which said actors must ‘speak’. Nevertheless, in doing so 
they help to sing ‘the economy’ into existence; they make it ‘real’ in the everyday 
lives of people, and help to obscure the fact that it is otherwise a largely imaginative 
abstraction.  
 
Both the quantification and qualification of ‘the economy’ are important for its 
imagination. Quantification is crucial in taking an economic space that is ‘nameable’ 
and conveying it as ‘knowable’ and contributing towards its ‘naturalization’ 
(Rosamond 2012). We have already seen the importance of the production of national 
statistics (Mitchell 2006, p. 183), which are the result of statistical abstractions that 
nevertheless appear to speak to a largely discrete population and an homogenous 
context. A good example of this is nationally reported statistics on inward investment. 
UK Trade and Investment (now the Department for International Trade) reported 
better than ever figures for foreign direct investment (FDI) into the UK for 2014-
2015, making it the number one destination for FDI in Europe, and this despite an 
11% fall in global FDI stock (UKTI 2015). Putting aside the matter of the state often 
appropriating inward investment as something largely effected and owned by it - 
regardless of whether the state was actually instrumental in bringing the investment or 
not - what these aggregated figures are clearly intended to convey is the vitality 
(through ‘investability’) of the UK economy. There is nothing wrong with that per se, 
but it clearly exaggerates the extent to which the UK is a bordered space, exhibiting 
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some sort of homogeneity of context vis-à-vis its ‘outside’ in terms of both 
opportunities and challenges for inward investment
5
.  
 
The statistical representation of the economy at the supranational level is similarly 
telling. Shore notes how ‘invented’ ‘Euro-statistics’ such as Eurobarometer and 
Eurostat are ‘powerful political instruments for creating a knowable, quantifiable and 
hence more tangible and governable ‘European population’ and ‘European space’ 
(Shore 2000 cited in Rosamond 2002, p. 164). Elsewhere, Rosamond (2012) points 
this out where he demonstrates the coming to pass of articulations of ‘the European 
economy’ in (the Commission’s) formal policy discourse. He cites, among other 
examples, the importance of Eurostat in 1992 reclassifying intra-EU trade as ‘internal 
market’ rather than transactions between member-states, while trade between EU 
states and external parties became ‘foreign trade’ (Rosamond 2012, p. 15).  
  
In addition to quantification, an economy’s qualification can be important too; it helps 
to render it ‘known as’ (Rosamond 2012). As elaborated upon above, it is the general 
recognition of constructivist political economy and economic sociology alike, that 
ideas about ‘the economic’ are crucial to its governability. Particular ideas, or sets of 
ideas (or discourses) are crucial to the ‘interpellation’ of economic identities and, 
related to which, the determination of economic interests. However, such ideas, or 
discourses, can easily be ascribed a geographical quality. For example, whilst the 
economy may indeed be thought of as a material and largely non-political entity, it 
can still be thought of as something to be governed in accordance with certain, 
                                                          
5
 It is worth noting that the language of investment too (e.g. foreign, domestic, 
inward), is itself culpable for conveying a bordered national space. 
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shared ethical commitments. The concept of ‘communities of shared fate’ is very 
useful in helping to explain how the economy is imagined and will be briefly explored 
below. This concept can help us better understand how through the economy’s 
assumed materiality we can imagine our fates as materially bound up with those of 
fellow citizens. Crucially, shared ideas about how the economy should be governed 
(including accordance with ethical or normative concerns we may have) are not 
strictly necessary in its imagination, but may well be of significance. 
 
A Shared Economic Fate: 
 
Entitativity, a psychological term coined by Campbell (1958), illustrates how 
individuals might perceive themselves as a part of a group that is ’real’, as opposed to 
merely an aggregate of individuals (see also Risse 2003). Willett (2016, p. 440) 
explains how in the development of narratives about place, assemblages of signs, 
symbols, practices and institutions are important for their construction. In many ways 
this explains how ‘the economy’ is successfully imagined as a spatial-scalar entity 
through the associated myriad of objects, symbols, institutions, networks, practices 
etc., all of which are given to shape our lived experiences of ‘the economy’ and 
reinforce it as ‘real’. As Risse explains, these things ‘have to be constantly reified in 
order to become meaningful objects of identification (2003, p. 489-490). It is such 
that the ‘fact’ of ‘the economy’ is naturalised as an objective truth. Essentially, we 
must be mindful of the ‘banal’ (Billig 1995) in imaginations of the economy, in much 
the same way as it has been shown to be crucial in imaginations of the nation 
(Anderson 2006). An illustrative example of how entitativity with the economy is 
fostered related to the adoption of national currencies. Given the importance of 
107 
 
articulations of economic insecurities pertaining to currency within the referendum 
debate (see Chapters 7 & 8), it is worth briefly discussing this matter.  
 
To an extent, the money in our pockets is an everyday reminder that we are part of a 
shared territorial community. As a common means of exchange, territorial currencies 
encourage us to imagine an aggregated totality of economic relations, a 
coherent system of economic activity (i.e. ‘the economy’). Eric Helleiner 
(1997) shows how territorial currencies arrived in the 19
th
 century - long after 
the Westphalian state - in Britain, then other West European countries, the US and 
Japan, before spreading to Latin America and Eastern Europe, and finally Africa and 
the newly independent countries following the end of formal colonialism. Before 
territorial currencies, many different forms of ‘money’ existed alongside one another; 
foreign and domestic currency, local currencies, as well as of course – especially for 
much the poor - traditional bartering. Eventually territorial currencies were 
authoritatively established and widely circulated (no longer as weighted coins seen to 
have intrinsic value but as standardised coins with ‘token value’) and ‘local 
currencies’ were outlawed. The establishment of territorial currencies presented a 
standardised means of exchange, unit of account and store of value, as the general 
definition goes. Moreover, they helped citizens to imagine a distinct territorial 
economic entity; and more generally served ‘as a constant everyday reminder to 
people of the fact that they were members of what nationalists considered to be a 
common, homogenous community’ (Helleiner 1997). Reciprocally, Helleiner argues 
that faith in territorial currencies was likely underpinned by the attachment to 
imagined national communities. 
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‘[A] territorial currency was homogenous and was used by everyone in the 
nation on a daily basis. It thus acted as a constant everyday reminder to people 
of the fact that they were members of what nationalists considered to be a 
common, homogenous community’ (Helleiner 1997). 
Likewise, Hymans (2004) points out that money plays a part in what Billig (1995) 
refers to as ‘banal nationalism’, and discusses at length patterns in the changing 
iconography found on territorial currencies, and how the analysis of which can help us 
to understand the changing content of national and EU identities. Interestingly, 
Scotland has a tradition of printing its own Scottish bank notes with their own 
Scottish iconography and it would be interesting to see research done on what 
significance, if any, this might have for the imagination of a distinct Scottish 
economy, despite not actually representing a separate currency from that used in the 
rest of the UK (Pound Sterling). It is likely not a coincidence that threats to Scottish 
banknotes featured (marginally) debates over independence (See for example The 
Guardian 2013, ‘Scottish banknotes: the Treasury's symbolic hostage in the 
independence debate’). 
 
Campbell (1958) highlighted a ‘common fate’ as one of three cues by which 
individuals might perceive the entitativity of a group. This is congruent with 
Williams’ (2003) concept of a ‘community of shared fate’, a term used consistently 
throughout this thesis. A ‘community of shared fate’ helps to usefully describes how 
the taken-for-granted idea of the economy might serve to unite people under the 
assumption that their lives are bound up along a shared trajectory, irrespective of 
whether they see themselves as sharing an especially close sense of political identity. 
‘Like national identity, a conception of citizenship as shared fate requires that 
individuals be able to imagine themselves in a network of relationships with 
other human beings, some of whom they may never meet face-to-face. But in 
contrast to national identity, there is nothing in the idea of shared fate to require 
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that it is a shared cultural identity or heritage that links human beings in bonds 
of interdependence and mutual accountability. Although shared cultural identity 
may be one source of a subjective sense of shared fate, it is not the only source’ 
(Williams 2003, p. 102). 
Thus, whilst it is reasonable to assume that in some sense a Scottish national or 
cultural identity is an important pre-cursor for the idea of a Scottish economy (at the 
very least the idea of ‘Scotland’ is needed for the idea of a ‘Scottish economy’), it is 
not clear that the idea of the economy necessarily requires strong identification with a 
Scottish nation. Rosamond stresses in the case of the ‘European economy’: 
‘Affinities to ‘heroic’ ideas of ‘Europe’ may indeed form the basis for the sorts 
of loyalty transference that would enable millions of consumers and other 
economic agents to consider themselves European. However, this would not 
negate the existence of limited, but nevertheless 
significant, intersubjectivities around the idea of Europe as a bounded economic 
area populated by European actors’ (2002, p. 162).  
Crucially, subjects need not necessarily associate normatively with the entities in 
question for them to seem real.  
‘A community of shared fate is not an ethical community as such. Its members 
are not bound to each other by shared values or moral commitments, but by 
relations of interdependence, which may or may not be positively valued by its 
members. Our futures are bound to each other, whether we like it or not. There 
is no plausible alternative to living-together. In this way, a community of shared 
fate is a descriptive rather than a normative category’ (Williams 2003, p. 
101).     
One example Williams gives is of institutional interdependence, but she points out 
that ‘Material linkages are also important sources of shared fate, whether in the form 
of economic interdependence, environmental impact, or natural resource access and 
use’ (2003, p. 102 emphasis added). This thesis is obviously interested in how people 
imagine their ‘economic interdependence’. Indeed, for the vast majority of us our 
economic prospects are indeed bound up with those of others to some extent, for we 
are not self-sufficient for our wants and needs. In that respect our fates are bound up 
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with those of others through ‘material linkages’. However, the extent to which our 
fates are bound up with our fellow national citizens is exaggerated.  
 
Whilst a common political identity, or shared norms, may not be essential to the idea 
of a shared economic fate, such things can be important. Williams argues that a shared 
community of fate is a generally a descriptive rather than normative category, but she 
also stresses that said communities may be more or less legitimate in the minds-eye of 
its constituents; ‘legitimacy consists in the ability to justify actions to those who are 
affected by them according to reasons they can accept’ (2003, p. 101), or 
reiterating Rawls’, a well-ordered society exists where people ‘agree to share one 
another’s fate’ (Rawls 1971 cited in Williams 2003, p. 102). It is here that an ‘ethical 
community’ may also be important in legitimating governance capacities pertaining to 
‘the economy’. For people in Scotland who do have strong cultural affinities to 
the Scottish nation, it may help legitimise a corresponding economic community of 
fate in their eyes. Moreover, as highlighted in Chapter 3, economic rationalities and 
expressions of national identity, far from being mutually exclusive, may often be 
reinforcing where discursive practices effectively appropriate national identity in 
legitimating economic rationalities (Willett 2013; Willett & Tredinnick-Rowe 2016; 
Bond et al. 2003).  
 
Incidentally, such national, cultural affinities cannot furnish economic subjects with 
ideas specifically about ‘the economy’ and how it ought to be governed. In fact, they 
do not tell us how governance ought to be conducted at all. Essentially, the 
significance of national identity is limited and specific by virtue of the fact that it 
addresses a limited and specific set of questions. Freeden (1998) argues 
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that nationalism ought not to be viewed as a distinct ideology for this very reason, 
arguing instead that it should be seen as either a ‘thin-centred’ ideology (an example 
of which he gives is feminism), or, alternatively, not as a coherent ideology at all. In 
the case of the latter we would expect to see it instead ‘as a component of other, 
already existing, ideologies’ (Freeden 1998, p. 751). Instead, another means of 
fostering a shared ‘ethical community’ might be through the articulation of a sense of 
shared normative ideals pertaining to how ‘the economy’ should be governed. As 
explained in Chapter 3 with regards the rise of Scottish nationalism, and as elaborated 
upon further in Chapter 8 with regards articulations of economic (in)security, 
there have clearly been concerted efforts by Scottish nationalists to foster a distinct 
‘ethical community’ around shared values of social democracy. Of course there is 
nothing necessarily Scottish about social democracy, and yet it is often articulated as 
being an important component of a Scottish civic identity that is more egalitarian than 
its English neighbour. This could be viewed as an example of Freeden’s observation 
above, namely that nationalism is often ‘a component of other, already existing, 
ideologies’ (Freeden 1998, p. 751).  
 
Another way to conceptualise the role of an ethical community of fate for the idea of 
the economy (aside from the widely held view of a shared material community of 
fate) is as ascribing a ‘personality’ to the economy. Rosamond (2012) posits a three-
stage model for understanding how economic spaces are discursively constructed: 1) 
The naming of a space that is potentially knowable; 2) The point at which that space 
becomes legible or known (e.g. it is statistically representable); and 3) Where the 
space is invested with a ‘personality’ and becomes known as. In the previous section 
of this chapter we saw the importance of statistics in the quantification of the 
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economy. If this is dealt with in the second stage of Rosamond’s model, where an 
economy becomes ‘known’, then the conveyance of a shared ethical community is 
represented by the third and final stage, the attribution of a ‘personality’ representing 
shared ideas about how it should be governed (see also Fetzer and Gilgrist 
forthcoming
6
). Whether conceived of in terms of ‘ethical communities’, 
‘personalities’, or even ‘economic cultures’, it is the case that intersubjectively shared 
norms pertaining to the ‘rightful’ governance of an economic space may also be 
important in its imagination and in the establishment of governing legitimacies.  
 
Conclusion: Post Structuralism and Challenging the Taken-for-Granted Economy 
 
We have seen in this chapter that the economy is largely imagined, both as a taken-
for-granted material domain (the economic) and as something that tends to be more or 
less geographically discrete and a contextual determinant of a shared community of 
fate. But what does it matter if the economy is imagined? More specifically with 
regards the empirical focus of this thesis, what does it matter with regards the 
referendum on Scottish independence?  
  
Taken-for-granted assumptions of traditional IPE approaches about the economic, 
such that it is re/presented as an objective, material domain of activity, populated by 
rational actors, have the capacity to effectively de-politicise arguments wherein it is 
used to mobilise public opinion. As de Goede stresses:  
                                                          
6 This article looks at the importance of discourses pertaining to a European Social 
Model for investing the European Economy with a ‘personality’. 
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‘Poststructuralism offers the possibility to open up the domain of economic 
and financial reality to political questioning, a possibility denied by the 
prepolitical nature of a realm of hard facts or a refractory reality. Moving 
beyond economism requires the recognition that neither the politics/economics 
distinction, nor the idealism/realism distinction, exist beyond their historical 
articulation’ (de Goede 2003, p. 91).  
De Goede explains that conventional approaches to political economy, and even more  
progressive, critical approaches to IPE, ‘rest upon a prior conceptual separation 
between the material sphere of the economic and the ideational sphere of the political, 
which is precisely being questioned within poststructuralist work’ (de Goede 2003, 
pp. 90-91). It is these assumptions of political economy, of rationalism and 
materialism, which make arguments such as those articulated by nationalists and 
unionists (based on purported factual analyses of the economy), appear meaningful 
and apolitical when they are not. It is argued in Chapter 6 that economistic arguments 
for and against Scottish independence were misleading and unsatisfactory, built on 
taken-for-granted rationalist accounts of political economy, and taken-for-granted 
assumptions about ‘the (Scottish) economy’ as a functioning totality. It was suggested 
that voters in Scotland could (and should) objectively calculate whether or not 
independence was in their best material interests. As will be shown, this was never 
realistic, and the result was an inevitably sterile and ‘de-politicized’ debate on 
independence. 
 
Crucially, poststructuralism asks: ‘how does power operate…within specific contexts 
to stabilize – with a tendency to normalize and depoliticize – particular discourses and 
their effects’ (Peterson 2006, p. 6). As outlined in the methodology, poststructuralism 
is essentially interested in interrogating the importance of discourse and 
representation. Unlike the (rationalist) mainstream of international political economy, 
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poststructuralism is not interested in the ‘objective pursuit of cumulative knowledge’ 
(de Goede 2006, p. 21).  
 
‘It should be clear that the agenda of the study of world politics shifts under 
the recognition of the politics of representation: from the (objective) study of 
material capabilities, national interests, and economic power, to the study of, 
for example, the practices of representation of danger, security and violence 
(Campbell 1998, Coward 2002; Weldes 1999; Luoma-aho 2004), to a critical 
assessment of the rationalist myths of political projects (Hansen & Williams 
1999)’ (de Goede 2006, p.6).  
 
Rather than busy itself with the (objective) study of material economic considerations 
deemed pertinent to the independence referendum debate then, this research is instead 
interested in the discursive or representative significance of articulations of those 
supposedly objective material considerations - with specific regard to representations 
of security and threat - and with challenging the rationalist myths that make such 
articulations possible. Griffin (2011) comments that within IPE the term ‘critical’ is 
widely interpreted, but, that it can be usefully described as ‘a willingness to challenge 
the taken-for-granted’ and conduct ‘research that resists closure, [in favour 
of]…proliferating possibilities’ (Shephard 2010 cited in Griffin 2011, p. 43). 
Poststructuralism reminds us that all meaning is constantly re/constructed or 
re/articulated, and whilst in some circumstances, certain ideas, or discourses, become 
so naturalised, or taken-for-granted, that they appear a-political, objectivity can 
always be challenged and established ideas can once more re-enter the ‘play of 
practice’(see Methodology). It is the aim of critical investigation to highlight such 
taken-for-granted truths and reveal their contingency.   
 
‘The economy’ is essentially a discourse insofar as it is represents a complex system 
of signification which imparts meaning upon what is in fact a largely disparate and 
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amorphous set of social activities. As a discourse which shapes how we view of 
‘realities’ it is enormously powerful. So much so that it cannot even be viewed as a 
‘hegemonic discourse’ because it falls beyond that and into the realm of ‘objectivity’ 
in the language of discourse theory (see Chapter 2-Methodology). To all intents and 
purposes ‘the economy’ is real. Though we might dispute the extent to which the 
spatial integrity of given economies is preserved or challenged (e.g. through 
‘globalisation’) there is an unquestioned agreement that these things exist as a real 
systems shaping our economic circumstances. To speak of the Cornish, Scottish, UK 
or European economy is implicitly to speak, to some extent at least, of the prospects 
for people living there, even though we know this to be largely an abstraction of 
economic 'realities'. It is through a myriad of discursive practices economies are 
imaginatively consolidated so as to appear ‘real’, and crucially, those imaginations are 
inevitably ‘political’ and require continuous discursive ‘effort’. One of the ways in 
which these discursive efforts can be evidenced is through an analysis of utterances of 
economic (in)security. This is the topic of the next chapter, wherein it will be argued 
that economic (in)security and the idea of ‘the economy’ are inextricably linked. 
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Chapter 5: Economism and the Scottish Independence 
Referendum 
 
On September 18
th
 2014 voters in a Scottish independence referendum were asked the 
yes/no question: "Should Scotland be an independent country?" Scotland voted ‘no’ 
to independence from the United Kingdom by a margin of 55% to 45%. 
Unsurprisingly, the referendum generated huge interest given the prospect of a 300 
year old political union being dissolved. Some commentators argued that the 
referendum debate was a boon for democracy (see Mullen 2016, pp. 23-25). At the 
time, the First Minister for Scotland and leader of the SNP, Alex Salmond, spoke of a 
“democratic sensation” (BBC 2014a) in Scotland. However, whilst it may have 
generated greater civic engagement in Scotland, far from being a boon for 
democracy, this chapter argues that by focusing so heavily on the economics of 
independence the debate was de-politicised and the electorate ultimately misinformed, 
thereby limiting the transparency and accountability one might expect from a 
democratic exercise. Crucially, this particular constitutional debate is by no means 
exceptional in this regard. Not only were the economic implications of independence 
the main consideration, but the key protagonists among both nationalists and unionists 
made explicit cases for or against independence on almost exclusively economic 
lines.  
 
Making an almost exclusively economic case for or against independence is 
unfortunate in principle because it suggests that voters should have made their 
decision through rational, unemotional calculation, when in fact it is unavoidably 
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political. MacPhee (2014) asks ‘if we, the voters, simply cast our votes on the basis of 
how our markets and economies function, where is the real democracy?’ Moreover, it 
is highly misleading, as it suggests voters could have known what the right decision 
was on a utility-maximising basis in the first place, based on the assumption that the 
outcomes of independence could be rationally and objectively calculated. This was 
always impossible in practical terms given the indeterminacies involved (see Chapter 
4, ‘’Knowing’ the economy’), but also misleading insofar as it relies upon the 
assumption that people in Scotland live out their lives within a significantly 
agglomerated economic system, or shared material community of fate (see Chapter 4). 
 
To all intents and purposes the claims and counter-claims of nationalists and unionists 
regarding the economic prospects of an independent Scotland could be seen as 
struggles by each to assert their claim to the truth about independence, a truth 
presumably un-muddied by politics and emotional sentiment. Postructuralism reminds 
us to be wary of apparent truths and to remember that truths are always conditioned 
by politics and power (Torfing 2005; see Methodology). In this instance the ‘hidden’ 
politics of the referendum campaign pertain to taken-for-granted truths regarding the 
separation of the economic and the political (de Goede 2003; Bruff 2011; Griffin 
2011) and the associated notion that voters could know the economic outcomes of 
independence and ought to cast their vote on that basis. They also pertain the taken-
for-granted truths about the existence of ‘the (Scottish or UK) economy’ as an 
aggregated spatial-scalar entity (Rosamond 2002; Mitchell 1998 & 2006) and 
encompassed populace over which governance can be exercised and authority 
legitimised.  
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These truths make it such that it was possible for protagonists to articulate arguments 
for or against independence that seem ‘a-political’ and divorced from the apparently 
less measured and unemotional considerations of nationalism, whilst conveying that 
voters in Scotland ought consider themselves as largely bound up in a shared material 
community of economic fate within which they have an especially shared experience 
of the opportunities and/or vulnerabilities of independence. As has been shown, the 
dichotomy between the political and the economic is false, and the extent to which it 
is meaningful to talk about ‘the economy’, it can only be as a fundamentally political 
space. 
 
The Independence Debate and the Imagined Economy 
 
The independence debate massively exaggerated the extent to which one can usefully 
talk about ‘the (Scottish) economy’ as a discrete, aggregated spatial-scalar 
entity. It served as a taken-for-granted in both unionist and nationalist arguments; 
as an organising referent, or trope, around which economic arguments for 
independence were made possible, based on the assumption of collective economic 
(in)security. Using evidence from nationalist and unionist ‘texts’, this proposition will 
be developed fully in Chapters 7 & 8. But taking as given this core assumption of 
economistic arguments for and against independence obscures the fact that the 
economy is a largely imaginative, political abstraction.  
 
It was stressed in Chapter 4 how in the 1930s and 1940s the advent of the concept of 
the economy as referring to a ‘structure or totality of relations of production, 
circulation and consumption within a given geographical space’ (Mitchell 2006, p. 
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183) made it possible for nation-states to re-imagine themselves with reference to a 
‘natural’ and bounded entity.  
‘the development of the economy as a discursive object between the 1930s and 
the 1950s provided a new language in which the nation-state could speak for 
itself and imagine its existence as something natural, bounded and subject to 
political management’ (Mitchell 1998, p. 90).  
In exactly the same way, Scottish nationalists were able to articulate arguments for 
self-governance on the basis of a naturally existing Scottish economy, populated by 
Scottish economic actors/subjects, bound together in a material economic community 
of fate. In other words it is conveyed as the important context for, and determinant of, 
the economic circumstances, (in)security and life-chances of people living in 
Scotland. But just as Bristow (2005) stresses how regional competitiveness discourses 
exaggerate the extent to which we can usefully talk about the regional economy as the 
determining context shaping the circumstances – either favourably or unfavourably – 
of economic actors who happen to be located within said region, so do protagonists in 
the independence debate where they talk about the economic prospects and security of 
Scots; arguably even more so. Insofar as it is meaningful talk about a ‘Scottish 
economy’, it can only be with reference to a political space (i.e. insofar as it 
corresponds with an already existing and accepted political community of some sort). 
 
For example, whilst it seems largely justifiable that voters in Scotland might vote for 
independence if they could be convinced they would be better off, the notion of 
Londoners voting for an independent London on the same grounds seems almost 
absurd, despite the fact that one could easily argue that in aggregate terms a London 
city-state would be fiscally better off. London greatly outperforms the rest of the UK 
on almost all indicators of prosperity (see Dunnell 2009) and in many respects is 
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economically far more different or distinct from the rest of the UK than can be said to 
be true of Scotland (BBC 2013a; McCann 2016). Ironically, it has been argued that 
the uneven spatial development of London vis-à-vis the rest of the UK is in part to 
blame for demands for greater devolution in UK regions: ‘Irrespective of the result of 
the Scottish independence referendum, the UK faces a deepening political crisis 
stemming from the growing economic chasm between London and the rest of the 
country’ (Cumbers 2014, p. 34).     
 
In chapter 4 it was stressed how previously ‘economy’ referred only to the notion of 
financial prudence - an equivocal meaning that it still carries. In Chapter 4, 
searches of The Times electronic archive were used to illustrate this point in the case 
of the British economy. Similarly, in the case of Scotland, between 1785 and 1948 
there are eight mentions of ‘Scottish economy’. Where uttered it only refers to it in 
the more antiquated sense. Only from 1949 do articles start referring to a totality of 
economic activity in Scotland as the ‘Scottish economy’. As with the British 
economy, there seems to have be an exponential growth in its mention from this point 
onwards. A search for ‘Scottish economy’ between 1949 and 1986 produces 411 
citations. Noteworthy perhaps is the fact that there are only 38 citations before 1960. 
Thereafter Scottish nationalism started to make significant advances. Just as it would 
have made little sense previously to talk of the British economy as distinct from the 
British Empire, it is perhaps no coincidence that the idea of a discrete Scottish 
economy was more widely imagined, or at the very least uttered, beyond the point at 
which the Scottish benefits of empire seemingly dissipated, and Scottish nationalism 
found increasing favour (see Chapter 3. One early mention of the Scottish economy is 
particularly interesting: 
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‘The Border is no economic barrier: England and Scotland are part of one 
economic system. Nevertheless, the segment to the north “is a distinct society 
with a unity and cohesion of its own.” It is natural to study it therefore by 
comparing its features with those of the unity south of the Border. The result is 
to show an “industrial economy lagging behind the rest of the country”’ (The 
Times 1954).  
What we see here is a rather awkward juxtaposition at play between two seemingly 
inextricable yet distinctive economic spaces; the article argues that there is a distinct 
Scottish economy, which nevertheless is part of the same economic system as 
England/UK. This slightly awkward proposition, as will be seen in the next chapter, is 
also evident in articulations of the Scottish economy throughout the independence 
debate. As we have seen, the economy is to all intents imagined and not real.  
 
It is therefore unsurprising that there will be inconsistencies like this in how 
economies are imagined spatially. However, one could argue that whilst both the 
Scottish and UK economies are imagined insofar as they are not ‘natural’ entities, it 
might be said that there are material or structural justifications for their imagination, 
as material economic flows of goods, capital and people can be spatially determined 
through forms of institutionalisation (e.g. currencies, regulations, tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers, public investment, etc.). Given the unions history and the heavily integrated 
nature of economic activity within the UK one could argue that the Scottish economy 
is perhaps especially imagined insofar as there is little, if any, material or structural 
justification for talking about it as a discrete spatial-scalar entity in spite of the 
continued existence of institutional independence in such matters as law and 
education in Scotland under union.  
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An important observation is that if there were such a thing as a Scottish economy 
functionally speaking, and indeed a Welsh economy, then presumably it would be 
meaningful to talk about an English economy too, as the bit that is left of the British 
economy, excluding Northern Ireland of course. However, searches of The Times 
online newspaper archive suggests that seemingly one does not really speak of the 
English economy. Moreover, where one does, it is in relation to the other regions, 
principally Scotland. The ‘English economy’ is mentioned just 8 times in all between 
1785 and 1985, the first of which being in 1953 and the last in 1981.  In only one 
instance it is referred to without mention of either Wales or Scotland (it talks about 
16
th
 Century English inns and public houses), but in all others it is mentioned in 
relation to sub-state nationalist questions in either Wales or Scotland. Compare this 
with mentions of the Welsh economy, where from 1947 it is mentioned in 71 different 
articles, or mentions of the Scottish economy, which as stated above featured 411 
times in all. The English economy is probably taken to be synonymous with the UK 
economy, but in any event there is clearly far less discursive effort to encourage the 
imagination of an English economy. The English economy is not any less real. This is 
just symptomatic of the fact that articulations of the economy are politically 
motivated, intended to speak to the (legitimate) governance of a given space.  
 
The Economics of Independence: ‘Knowing’ the economic 
 
The idea of a ‘Scottish economy’ may be a relatively modern one, but as elaborated 
upon in Chapter 3, economic issues have always been central to the Union both in 
terms of its legitimation and de-legitimation. In the lead up to the independence 
referendum, it was clear that the economic implications of independence would be 
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central to the debate. Dekavalla’s (2016) longitudinal study of media (newspaper) 
commentary on the referendum found that the economic consequences of Scottish 
independence dominated content. Moreover, a BBC documentary on July 7
th
 2014, 
presented by Robert Peston, entitled ‘Scotland: For Richer For Poorer’ (BBC 2014c) 
conveyed that the independence debate was fundamentally characterised by 
economics and aimed to gage how Scotland’s economy will be affected by 
independence, asking the question of whether Scotland would be richer or poorer. In 
May 2014, a study of business attitudes to constitutional change was published by the 
Scottish Chambers of Commerce and the Economic and Social Research Council 
(Bell & McGoldrick 2014). From a survey of 759 businesses in Scotland it reported 
that the majority of business saw economic considerations such as taxes, business 
regulation and currency as significantly important to their views on independence. 
Moreover, it showed that the importance of those issues in the constitutional debate 
had significantly increased between 2013 and 2014. Incidentally, it reported that 
‘SCC members see more business risks than business opportunities being associated 
with independence’ (Bell & McGoldrick 2014).  
 
For the SNP’s part, it not only stressed from the outset the importance of considering 
the possible economic implications of independence, but made an explicit 
economic case for independence. This was clearly evident from Scottish Government 
publications like ‘Scotland’s Economy: The Case for Independence’ 
(2013a), ‘Building Security and Creating Opportunity: Economic Policy Choices in 
an Independent Scotland’ (2013b), and the White Paper on independence: ‘Scotland’s 
Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland’ (2013c).  Each of these documents 
cites Scotland’s many economic successes and its viability as an autonomous 
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economic unit, whilst also urging that the union (or the policies of ‘Westminster’ 
governments) strongly hamper the Scottish economy. Talking a day in advance of the 
publication of the White Paper on independence, Salmond (2013) emphasised what he 
and the Scottish government saw as the most important issues for Scots in the debate: 
“jobs, economic growth and security”. It is worth noting that one must assume 
‘security’ in this instance to pertain to economic security given the focus on economic 
concerns to the virtual exclusion of what one might consider more ‘conventional’ 
security considerations (See Chapter 7). Unionists were equally focussed on the 
economics of independence, albeit of course stressing the negative economic 
implications of independence vis-à-vis the security afforded by union. The details of 
these opposing arguments are elaborated upon in Chapter 7 and 8, with supporting 
empirical evidence. 
 
It is argued here that these economic arguments are essentially arguments of 
economic (in)security, and that the fundamental consideration for people in Scotland 
to consider is how independence will impact upon their (collective) economic 
(in)security. This argument is developed fully in subsequent chapters. Chapters 7 & 8 
will elaborate upon the numerous, yet often related, economic insecurities articulated 
by unionists and nationalists in support of their respective positions, drawing evidence 
specifically from an analysis of ‘texts’ from the official unionist and nationalist 
campaigns respectively. One of the key insecurities for both, one which remained 
central to the debate throughout, pertains to the perceived strength of an independent 
Scotland’s public finances. In many ways this was the core focus of the economic 
debate, with many of the other articulated insecurities stemming from this one or 
being directly related to it. Where the economics of independence have been 
126 
 
important with regards secessionist movements elsewhere in the world (e.g. Catalonia 
and Quebec) it is this aspect of ‘economics’ that perhaps unsurprisingly has tended to 
dominate debate. 
 
Unsurprisingly, unionists argued that Scotland’s finances would be worse off and 
nationalists argued that they would be better off under independence. Without going 
into the finer details of these arguments, it is fair to say that it was never clear which 
side was correct. In Chapter 3 the importance of the discovery of oil in the North Sea 
in the 1970s is thought to have had significant implications for the subsequent rise of 
SNP support, as it was suddenly possible to see Scottish independence as fiscally 
viable. This was important since Scotland has typically been regarded as dependent 
upon the UK for fiscal transfers. In many respects the ‘disputedness’ of figures 
regarding the economics of independence is the result of the increasing recognition 
that Scotland is now far better placed vis-à-vis the rest of the UK in terms of its 
balance of revenue and expenditure, in contrast to what had been a long-standing 
discourse of Scottish dependency (Brown et al. 1996); a marked difference, for 
example, to the economic case for Welsh independence where financial dependencies 
on Westminster more greatly undermine the case for secession (See Keating & 
Loughlin 1997; for a Welsh nationalist perspective on Welsh economic dependency 
see Price 2011).    
 
The significant focus of both unionist and nationalist arguments on the fiscal viability 
of an independent Scottish state is not surprising. In fact, a failure to so by either side 
would have almost certainly have been portrayed as irresponsible, since it pertains to 
the capacity to deliver the key functions of the state. In one respect, arguments over 
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fiscal viability of an independent Scotland do speak to a shared Scottish circumstance 
in a way that other arguments pertaining to the general health of ‘the economy’ writ 
broadly do not, given that the latter is largely an imaginative abstraction, whilst the 
former pertains (albeit marginally) more truthfully to the economic ‘realities’ of 
Scottish people.  And yet, such arguments are typically built upon, and help to further 
perpetuate, a fundamental conflation between the ‘public purse’ and ‘the (imagined) 
economy’ writ broadly, which exaggerates the extent to which the health of public 
finances speak especially to the wider ‘economic realities’ in Scotland and the shared 
economic prospects of actors/subjects therein. Obviously, the two are related to an 
extent, but they are not the same thing. There are likely many reasons for this 
conflation, not least the fact that the territorial state is assumed to be synonymous 
with the territorial economy and governments are taken to be both the authoritative 
voices on the economy and almost solely responsible for steering them (see Chapter 
4) – an exaggeration that generally serves to their advantage when the economy is 
considered buoyant, but which is frequently denied when things look bleak. This 
conflation between the public purse and the (imagined) ‘economy’ writ broadly is not 
made clear in the arguments of either nationalists or unionists for the most part, the 
result being the same; they appear to speak to a broad Scottish community of fate with 
an especially shared economic (in)security.  
 
Regardless of this conflation, there would always have been significant difficulties 
with estimating the public financial implications of independence. For, example, one 
could not be sure of an independent Scotland’s capacity to borrow money at 
favourable rates, Scotland’s inherited debt and the interest it would pay on that debt, 
the future price of North Sea oil and gas, growth projections and changing 
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demographics (e.g. immigration rates and population ageing), nor the infinitude of 
other unknowns, including economic forces or trends beyond Scotland’s ‘borders’, 
and outwith an independent Scottish government’s control (McLean et al. 2014, see 
also HM Government 2014b). Even excluding all contextual influencing factors, one 
could not second-guess the economic and fiscal policy choices of future Scottish 
governments. As one prominent supporter of union stressed, ‘Economic success or 
failure of an independent state depends on the policies it follows, and indeed, the 
range of economic choices it could in principle make…is remarkably wide’ 
(Gallagher 2014). Indeed, it was always impossible to ‘know’ what the financial 
implications of independence might be, due in principle to the inherent uncertainty of 
‘the economic’ (see Chapter 4) and in practice to the disputedness of estimated figures 
on aspects like public finances.  
 
With regard the latter one need only look at the disputed figures being reported by 
each side in same month of May 2014. In terms of the main governmental 
stakeholders we see the UK Government stating each person in Scotland will remain 
£1400 per year better off under union (HM Government 2014a) whilst the Scottish 
Government (2014a) claimed that each person in Scotland would be £1000 per year 
better off under independence. Likewise Business for Scotland (2014) argued in no 
uncertain terms that Scotland will be better off if independent. One interview 
respondent, a Labour MSP who was strongly in favour of union, 
was unusually candid about the impossibility of giving economic certainties.   
“It used to be the case that a lot of the arguments against Scottish independence 
were that Scotland would be worse off, that we would certainly be worse off and 
that we wouldn’t survive. It was talking Scotland down. And I think most of us 
have moved away from even referring to this argument, because it’s not a 
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healthy argument to have. But on the other side there is not an absolute, [that]it 
would survive or it wouldn’t survive. Scotland will be what it is. I think we will 
be far better in a union with others, but I can’t say for sure…So therefore what 
are you left with? If you can’t say absolutely for sure then you are left with 
making a judgement on loads of other things” (Respondent A) 
Far from wishing to focus on the relative merits of the economic arguments for and 
against independence, the intention here conversely is to posit the futility of doing so. 
The same has been said of the annually produced, and annually disputed, Government 
Expenditure and Revenue in Scotland (GERS) figures, which Cuthbert & Cuthbert 
(2011) stress began as ‘an essentially political document’, but is now ‘the focus of an 
inherently sterile annual debate’, wherein figures can easily be used to support either 
union or independence. Focusing on the disputed figures of independence in the lead 
up to the referendum served to de-politicise and sterilise political debate too. 
 
Whilst it would have always been impossible in practice to reliably calculate what the 
public finances of an independent Scotland would be, almost irrespective of that fact, 
neither unionists or nationalists were ever going to concede their position. However, 
whilst unclear, it is probably fair to say that the weight of independent opinion 
favoured the unionist position. The Institute for Fiscal Studies’ report ‘Financial 
Sustainability of an Independent Scotland’, (Amior et al. 2013) funded by the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), an independent think 
tank, bolstered the unionist position.  
‘Despite the considerable uncertainty surrounding the future path of borrowing 
and debt in Scotland, the main conclusion of our analysis is that a significant 
further fiscal tightening would be required in Scotland, on top of that already 
announced by the UK government, in order to put Scotland’s long-term public 
finances onto a sustainable footing’ (Amior et al. 2013, p. 1). 
One of the report’s authors, Gemma Tetlow, was reported by the BBC summarising 
succinctly that to ensure long-run fiscal sustainability, an independent Scotland would 
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need to cut public spending and/or increase other tax revenues, meaning it would face 
"even tougher choices" than the UK as a whole over the long term (BBC 2013b). 
David Phillips of the Institute for Fiscal Studies said: 
“Increasing benefit spending would make this task harder and it would not be 
surprising if the government of an independent Scotland felt the need to cut 
rather than increase the generosity of at least some benefits to help balance its 
books” (Phillips 2013). 
Former Chancellor Alistair Darling, leader of the pro-Union Better Together 
campaign, said:  
"This sober and impartial analysis by the IFS leaves the SNP's economic case 
for independence in tatters. SNP ministers pretend that in an independent 
Scotland there would be more money to spend, but that notion has been 
comprehensively demolished by the analysis from this respected institution. 
Today's report is clear that an independent Scotland would need big cuts to 
things like pensions, benefits and the NHS or a big increase in tax. This report 
sets a major test for the SNP's White Paper. If the White Paper does not face 
up to the long-term consequences of leaving the UK, then it won't be worth the 
paper it is written on” (BBC 2013b). 
Also drawing on these IFS figures, Gallagher stresses that Scotland would soon run 
into unmanageable levels of deficit and debt and contrary to the SNP claim that ‘it 
would be possible not only to maintain present or better public services and lower 
levels of taxation but also to put some of the oil revenues into an oil fund’ that the 
result would have to be ‘either higher taxation, perhaps with negative effects on 
economic growth, or very big cuts in public services’ (Gallagher 2014, p. 77).  
 
In spite of the difficulties in doing so, it was always far more meaningful to debate 
Scotland’s projected public finances than the future trajectory of the ‘Scottish 
economy’ in its entirety, given that the latter is largely an imaginative abstraction. In 
terms of the perceived wider economic implications of independence beyond those 
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purely pertaining to public finances, it was also impossible to ‘know’ the realities. As 
shown above, the independent body, the Institute for Fiscal Studies, produced some of 
the most damning estimated figures for independence (Johnson & Phillips 2012), and 
yet the Director, Paul Johnson, spoke of the inherent difficulties with really knowing 
what the economic consequences might be, and how, by and large, inconsequential 
those consequences might in fact prove: 
“I wouldn’t expect it [independence] to make a great big difference. It 
[Scotland] is not going to end up in twenty years’ time as a basket case, 
probably; it’s not going to end up in twenty years’ time as massively richer than 
the rest of the UK, the best place to start is: at the moment the Scots are about as 
well off as the rest of us, in twenty years’ time, in or out, I expect they’ll still be 
just about as well off as the rest of us” (BBC 2014c).  
When asked if Johnson personally would make the decision on the basis of 
economics – if indeed he had a vote to cast –his response was:  
“To be honest I wouldn’t make the judgement on the basis of economics. You 
can’t vote on the basis you’ll be five hundred pounds a year better off for sure, 
or five hundred pounds a year worse off for sure, you’re probably not going to 
end up terribly differently off” (BBC 2014c).  
Moreover, to the extent that it is even meaningful to talk about the wider economic 
implications of independence for Scots as a whole, it greatly exaggerates the idea of a 
coherent Scottish economy and community of fate, wherein economic circumstances 
are especially shared.  
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Economic rationalities and motivations for independence 
 
To reiterate a key argument of this chapter, the Scottish independence referendum 
debate revolved largely around economistic arguments for and against independence
7
, 
whilst matters of national identity were largely ‘backgrounded’. Mullen makes this 
observation where he states: 
‘One of the interesting features of both the official Yes and No campaigns was 
the extent to which they concentrated on the practical consequences of 
independence rather than identity politics. Perceptions of identity undoubtedly 
influenced voters’ views on independence, but the campaign was not fought 
principally on that terrain’ (Mullen 2016, p. 20). 
But is it possible to ascertain the extent to which national identity and/or economic 
motivations were actual determinants of voting behaviour in the referendum? 
Drawing on the results of the 2013 Scotland Social Attitudes Survey one year before 
the referendum, Professor John Curtice (2013) asserted that, generally speaking, polls 
suggest convictions either for or against independence had changed very little in the 
preceding year (up to September 2013), which he attributes to the fact that a crucially 
decisive factor, identity, while fluid, has a tendency to be rather ‘sticky’.  
‘We perhaps should not be surprised that it is proving difficult for both sides to 
secure a decisive change in the balance of opinion. For in part people's views are 
a reflection of their sense of identity, that is whether they feel Scottish or British 
- and people do not change their sense of identity very easily’ (Curtice 2013). 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, however, national identity is not so easily correlated with 
secessionism, not least because a commitment to national identity need not 
necessarily translate into support for independence (Keating 2004). The vast majority 
                                                          
7
 For academic arguments for and against independence based on economics, see 
Scott (2016) and Gallagher (2014; 2016) respectively. 
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of people in Scotland consider themselves Scottish, and the majority of those who 
also consider themselves British, consider themselves to be more Scottish than 
British, and yet there is not majority support for independence (see annual Scottish 
Social Attitudes Surveys - www.ssa.natcen.ac.uk). Indeed, it quite possible to talk of 
‘unionist-nationalists’ (Morton 1999; see also Ichijo 2012). This will have been 
recognised by nationalists, as indeed it was recognised that support for independence 
cannot be significantly correlated with their electoral successes in the past (see 
Chapter 3). Whilst it is perhaps surprising that relatively little is being said about 
culture and identity in debates on Scottish independence, this is in no small part ‘a 
purposeful act by those who are trying to secure independence’ (Wood 2014, p. 40). 
One would imagine that for some voters who have strong prior preferences for 
independence, that even if it were possible to know how independence would impact 
upon their finances in advance, it would not be of consequence to their decision - 
providing, one would imagine, they thought their finances would not be severely 
worsened. Nevertheless, for many others, economics may well have been a key 
consideration; certainly this had to have been the driving assumption behind largely 
economic cases being made both for and against independence.   
  
It is difficult to know for sure the extent to which economic motivations determined 
the decision voters made, although preliminary results from the Economic and Social 
Research Council’s (ESRC) referendum study concluded that whilst ‘identity 
provided core support for both camps…economic risk decided the outcome’ (ESRC 
2014). It certainly seemed from prior polling results that individual perceptions of 
personal finances were likely to influence how people would be inclined to vote. 
Commonly cited polls suggested, for instance, that if voters could be assured that in 
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an independent Scotland their annual household budget would increase or decrease by 
just £500 it would have a decisive influence on their decision. 
‘The referendum argument’s will likely be won and lost on perceptions for 
Scotland’s future economic performance, and impact on household budgets. If 
people could be convinced that an independent Scotland could thrive – in doing 
so making people £500 a year better off as a result – support for independence 
leaps to a victorious 56% yes, 44% for no. Even if people thought their finances 
would be unaltered it would be all to play for (yes 47%, no 53%), but given a 
household deficit of £500 the yes camp could forget it (yes 22%, no 78%)’ (ICM 
Research 2013). 
Commenting on this same poll, Professor John Curtice explained how this poll 
demonstrates how important individual finances are in decision forming. Speaking 
hypothetically from the point of view of a prospective voter he says: 
“I might be willing to leave my Britishness aside if I think I am going to be 
better off, but equally, conversely, a lot of people who feel strongly Scottish 
say, look I'm not going to do it unless you can convince me I am going to be 
better off…So, that in the end is why this issue of economy kicks in. Voters 
need more than just their sense of identity to decide how they are going to 
vote” (BBC 2014d). 
Indeed, one might be forgiven for thinking that the aforementioned £500 poll suggests 
that Scottish people, for the most part, are largely indifferent to Scottish 
independence. John Kay states “it seems to me that if this debate is to be serious then 
people should be voting about identity rather than about how much cash is in their 
pockets’ (BBC 2014c). Not to deny that £500 is for many a significant sum of money, 
but it hardly speaks of impassioned nationalism wherein self-determination is seen as 
an end in itself. Moreover, in practice voters could not possibly have known how their 
finances would actually be affected; or for that matter, what the wider economic 
implications might be. 
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Comparing figures across the 2012, 2013 and 2014 Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys, 
ScotCen states that ‘having fallen from 34% to 30% between 2012 and 2013, the 
proportion that think Scotland’s economy would be better under independence has 
now dropped further to 25%’ (ScotCen 2014, p. 10). Whilst ultimately it is impossible 
to say for sure on what basis people actually casted their votes in September 2014, 
these survey results may reveal a tentative correlation between the relative success of 
nationalists and unionists in making their economic cases for and against 
independence and support for independence. Curtice (2014, p. 150) reported that 2014 
Scottish Social Attitudes Survey results reveal 92% of those who thought the 
economy would be better under independence said  they intended to vote Yes rather 
than No, whilst just 6% of  those who thought the economy would be worse stated 
they would vote in favour of leaving the UK. He argues, ‘Voters’ propensities to vote 
Yes or No varied according to their social and economic circumstances. Not least of 
the reasons is that those circumstances affected their perceptions of the economic 
consequences of independence’ (Curtice 2014, p. 147).  
 
However, just as it is difficult to correlate national identity with support for 
independence, it is also difficult to discern where economic motivations feature too. 
Whilst there may be a discernible correlation between perceptions of economic 
outcomes and support for independence, causality is not so easily determined between 
these two variables, or the direction of causality. Causality is not so easily determined 
given numerous other underlying factors (Duch et al. 2000), not least differences in 
extant economic circumstances among citizens (Duchesne et al. 2003), and the 
direction of causality cannot be easily determined for it is possible that economic 
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perceptions themselves might vary on the basis of prior-preferences regarding 
independence (Howe 2009).  
 
Whilst not in the context of an imminent referendum on actual independence, in the 
case of survey data pertaining to secessionism in Catalonia, Muñoz & Tormos have 
highlighted how support for secessionism has grown significantly in less than ten 
years, but Catalan national identification has remained largely unchanged, suggesting 
other motivations; ‘many have pointed to the effect of utilitarian motivations, linked 
to expected economic gains from secession’ (2015a, p. 316). Similarly, in the case of 
Quebec, research has been done that looks at the relationship between perceptions of 
economic risk and nationalist support there (Duchesne et al. 2003). Interestingly, 
whilst Muñoz & Tormos argue that economic considerations are important, partly, the 
‘perception that an independent Catalonia would perform better economically, based 
on the idea that the current fiscal relationship is detrimental to Catalonia’s interests’, 
they also stress ‘the possibility that economic expectations are mere rationalizations 
of prior preferences’ (Muñoz & Tormos 2015a, p. 316). Indeed, literature on Quebec 
has argued the very same thing with regards support for secessionism there. 
‘Recent research has identified three factors as significant determinants of 
sovereignty support in Quebec: national identity, assessments of the likely 
impact of sovereignty on Quebec's economy and perceptions of the impact of 
sovereignty on the French language in Quebec. Drawing on data from the 
1992–1993 Canadian Referendum and Election Survey, the article suggests 
that the latter two factors may not be genuine causes of sovereignty support, 
but rather rationalizations of other, deeply embedded sentiments. National 
identity and sovereignty support itself, it is argued, are important determinants 
of people's expectations concerning the economic and linguistic impacts of 
sovereignty’ (Howe 2009, p. 31). 
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Put simply, it is possible that ‘citizens that have pro independence attitudes tend to 
look on the bright side when inquired about the economic implications of secession 
while those that oppose it tend to rationalize their opposition by underlining its 
negative consequences’ (Muñoz and Tormos 2015b). Of relevance here is work 
within economics on so called ‘economic voting’, whereby electorates are thought to 
vote on perception of national economic conditions. Duch et al. stress that ‘On the 
basis of the macro-level evidence alone one would have little reason to doubt that the 
economy matters’ (2000, p. 635). However, they also stress that we must be mindful 
of the heterogeneity of individual level factors (including personal financial 
circumstances, as well as prior political preferences and political awareness) which 
likely affect perceptions of macro-economic conditions (see Duch et al. 2000). 
Essentially, whilst economics may be a key motivation, the relationship is far from 
straightforward, and almost certainly influenced by other pre-existing factors, not 
least in the case of independence, pre-existing views regarding independence.  
 
Based on the result of their research, Muñoz and Tormos maintain that economics is 
likely a key motivation for some, and perhaps especially so for those citizens with 
‘ambivalent identity positions’ (Muñoz & Tormos 2015a, p. 315). Thus, economic 
motivations may have been a greater consideration for some than others, and 
‘undecided voters’ in particular may have attempted ‘rational’ calculation on the basis 
of perceived economic implications. This was certainly what voters were encouraged 
to do by the terms of the debate. The following response from one SNP MSP is 
revealing in this regard. 
“…in terms of the voters, most people vote on economic issues, not exclusively 
of course, but if people think they will be better off in an independent Scotland 
they’ll vote for it, if they don’t, they won’t. A lot of people will vote for an 
independent Scotland because they believe Scotland, per se, should be 
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independent because we’ve got our own national identity, but, for many people 
the economy will be the deciding factor one way or the other…” (Respondent B) 
It is perhaps interesting to note, however, that after asserting at great length this belief 
that people will vote on economic considerations, the same respondent closed the 
interview with the statement that “If Scotland is a distinct nation, which I believe it is, 
then we should make our own way in the world, good or bad” (Respondent B), 
revealing a prior-preference for secessionism as an end it itself.  
 
The importance of economics for elections is well recognised. According to the 
‘economic voting’ hypothesis the perceived state of the economy can be important to 
the re-election of a government (Sheafer 2008). One SNP interview respondent stated 
that “economics is always the key in any election at any time” (Respondent 
C; emphasis added). Indeed, a focus on the economy was clear in the SNPs 2011 
election manifesto where, in the words of Alex Salmond, ‘the economy would be the 
top priority’ (Salmond 2012; See also SNP 2011). Leaving aside the question of how 
meaningful such projections of ‘the economy’ can and should be in such cases, 
elections and referendums are different political events. Dekavalla stressed that 
referendums are not meant to be competitions between political parties or groupings 
seeking power, but ‘consultations of the electorate on a divisive issue that goes 
beyond the lifespan of individual governments’ (2016, p. 1). This definition is 
insightful given that the main protagonists in the Scottish independence referendum 
often focused on matters of policy - mainly economic policy it is argued here - that 
could not be assured indefinitely. Moreover, this was not a ‘normal’ referendum, but 
an independence referendum. The implications differ in one crucial regard. In an 
election the polity and its territoriality are not contested, and thus whilst ‘the 
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economy’ is first and foremost a largely imagined political space, providing that 
that political space itself is not under question (as in an election) then it is less 
controversial (although equally misleading) to formulate a platform on the basis of 
assertions about an apparently less political, or given, economic spatial-scalar 
entity. The outcome of a national election is not the re-writing of that political 
territory. In an independence referendum, however, that is exactly what is at stake. 
 
Moreover, whilst one would expect to consider the economic implications of 
independence and recognise that governments and political parties will attempt to 
speak and act on behalf of the economic interests of those within their administrative 
purview, it is another thing entirely for protagonists to argue an economic case for 
independence, which is precisely what nationalists attempted to do, explicitly stated 
for example, in the aforementioned Scottish Government document (2013a) 
‘Scotland’s Economy: The Case for Independence’. Something consistently reiterated 
by nationalists is how such an argument affords a rational, less emotional, and 
essentially less political case for independence: 
“The central debate we are having is a very practical debate. A utilitarian
8
 
debate… It is about the economy… And whether with independence Scotland 
would be better off or not” (Sturgeon 2014). 
“There is little doubt that emotion will play a part in the independence debate. 
For most of us this will be a decision that engages the head and the heart. But I 
am going to talk to you today about the rational, reasonable and responsible 
case for independence” (Sturgeon 2013).  
“But for me the fact of nationhood or Scottish identity is not the motive force 
for independence. Nor do I believe that independence, however desirable, is 
essential for the preservation of our distinctive Scottish identity. And I don’t 
agree at all that feeling British – with all of the shared social, family and 
                                                          
8
 Within this same speech Sturgeon explains the difference between this ‘utilitarian 
nationalism’ and ‘exisitential nationalism’, which supports ‘independence for its own 
sake’ (Sturgeon 2014). 
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cultural heritage that makes up such an identity – is in any way inconsistent 
with a pragmatic, utilitarian support for political independence” (Sturgeon 
2012a, emphasis added). 
“There can be no more important time for dispassionate discussion and debate 
on the future of our country” (Swinney 2013). 
Another SNP MSP articulated this argument when interviewed. 
“I think we have moved beyond the cultural arguments in regards to 
independence, I think identity is still really important, but it is more of an 
identity of all being in this together and we can do something, than it is about 
the whole cultural thing of we are different, I think we have got beyond that. 
There are still those who believe in it of course, but I do think it is much more 
now about straight politics and straight economy...I think people, for all that 
there is a care about community and wider society, I think at the end of the day 
what most people think of in their day-to-day life is how does this affect me and 
my family and those that I care about. And so I think any argument has to be on 
the economy” (Respondent D). 
This desire to deflect the focus of the debate away from the more traditional, 
qualitative aspects of national identity is unusual when compared to independence 
debates elsewhere in Europe, such as Brittany and the Basque country, where despite 
perceptions of national economic conditions being important, there are more explicit 
efforts to protect national languages, traditions and other cultural items. 
 
This is in no small part due to the fact that Scottish national identity, traditionally 
conceived of at least
9
, is well assured and accepted and not existentially threatened by 
the union. In one interview, for example, Sturgeon stated: 
“For me, this [independence] debate isn't about identity, ” […] “I don't feel we 
need to be independent for me to feel confident in my Scottish identity. I think 
Scotland is pretty comfortable in its identity. We won't need independence to 
preserve it … if we don't become independent it won't disappear, it isn't under 
existential threat” (Jack, 2013). 
                                                          
9
 As already discussed in Chapter 3, many consider social democratic values to be an 
important aspect of “Scottishness” and insofar as these are thought to be threatened by 
union, Scottish identity could be seen to be under threat. 
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It is also based on recognition that, as we have seen, voters typically express 
commitments to both Scottish and British identity, and among those exhibiting dual 
identities there is often still support for independence. In the case of Catalonia, 
Serrano states that the latter point ‘has generated the opportunity to appeal to the 
electorate not only in terms of the ethnocultural preservation of the nation but also on 
the potential benefits of secession, which seems to have expanded the traditional 
scope of the pro-independence discourse’ (Serrano 2013, p. 542). However, another 
significance of speaking to voters as economic (rather than political) subjects is the 
implication of rationalism and ‘apoliticism’. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
conventional, rationalist accounts of political economy encourage us to view the 
economic in this way (see Griffin 2011). Voters are positioned as rational actors 
encouraged into believing that they can and ought to make their decision on the bases 
of utilitarian calculation, divorced from presumably less valuable emotive sentiments. 
It may be symptomatic of the nature of national (political) identity as something 
deeply felt but almost impossible to articulate in concrete terms that make such 
supposedly more practical, utilitarian arguments appear to proffer more tactile and 
meaningful justification for independence. In the event, and irrespective of the 
motivations, the focus on economistic arguments by key protagonists enabled them to 
speak to Scottish people as predominantly economic actors/subjects, separate from 
other (perhaps more ‘politicised’) aspects of identity.  
 
At this juncture it should be stressed that it was never a stated aim of this thesis to 
posit, or prove or disprove, any sort of correlation between perceptions of national 
economic conditions and support for independence, and whilst this chapter clearly 
assumes that the perception of such a correlation likely underpinned the way in which 
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the debate was framed around almost exclusively ‘economic’ matters, it was never a 
stated aim to prove this either. Instead, the aim is to point out that almost irrespective 
of the motivations and implications, the very fact that the debate was framed in this 
way has separate ‘political’ implications, namely, it pedals the misleading assumption 
that Scots can ‘know’ what the right decision would be, as well as the misleading 
assumption that ‘the economy’ is ‘real’ and speaks especially to the economic realities 
of the Scottish electorate. It subsumes the electorate under one supposedly shared 
imperative of economic betterment to the exclusion of other considerations, and in 
doing so subsumes their otherwise multifarious identities under one largely shared 
(inter)subjectivity of the Scottish economic subject.  
 
A de-politicised independence debate 
 
The Scottish independence referendum debate was dominated throughout by 
economistic arguments both for and against. Interestingly, in the last few days before 
the referendum, emotive cases for union were made by some of the key protagonists. 
The Conservative Leader and Prime Minister David Cameron stated, to paraphrase, 
that people have heard a lot about arguments of the head, but those of the heart are 
just as important. In response to questions about why he as leader of a Conservative 
party with only one seat in Scotland - and which would be more likely to secure a 
majority in Westminster if Scotland left the UK – wished for continued union he said 
“I love my country more than I love my party” (BBC 2014d). On the same day, 
Ed Miliband asked all labour councils across the UK to erect the Saltire (The Scottish 
flag). Meanwhile, the Saltire also flew over the UK houses of parliament. All 
emotive, symbolic stuff that is hard to rationalise, and yet is the nub of nationalism. It 
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is in the place of such arguments as these that more ‘rational’, economistic arguments 
for and against independence seem more appealing. 
 
In an effort to have a ‘rational’, less emotional debate, it proved sterile. The inevitable 
result was frustration for voters who were led to believe they could ‘know’ what the 
correct decision was if only they were informed of all of the facts. In a survey 
conducted on behalf of the Scottish Chambers of Commerce, the opinions of Scottish 
business regarding the quality of the independence debate was low, with the majority 
of respondents regarding it as either ‘poor’ or ‘dismal’ (Bell & McGoldrick 2014, p. 
3). A subsequent press release by the SCC stated that ‘Scottish businesses demand 
more from the referendum campaigns’ (Scottish Chambers of Commerce 2014). 
Anecdotally, frustration among voters was evident in media reports and a recurrent 
theme in television and radio debates on the independence referendum (see for 
example BBC 2013d; BBC 2013e). Ultimately, by framing the debate in almost 
exclusively economistic terms, it was ‘depoliticised’. Whether or not it is useful to 
look at this as a deliberate choice on the part of key protagonists in the debate, it can 
be seen as symptomatic of the wider discursive context defining the limits of what is 
possible and meaningful for protagonists to say.  
 
In Chapter 4 it was explained that taken-for-granted assumptions of traditional IPE 
approaches about the economic, such that it is re/presented as an objective, material 
domain of activity, populated by rational actors, have the capacity to effectively de-
politicise it. It was also stressed how postructuralism provides the means with which 
to challenge such a view. As de Goede stresses, ‘Moving beyond economism requires 
the recognition that neither the politics/economics distinction, nor the 
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idealism/realism distinction, exist beyond their historical articulation’ (de Goede 
2003, p. 91). It is the assumptions of conventional accounts of political economy, of 
rationalism and materialism, which make arguments such as those articulated by 
nationalists and unionists (based on purported factual analyses of the economy), 
appear meaningful and apolitical when they are not. It was also explained in Chapter 
4 that we take for granted the existence of the economy as a spatial-scalar entity 
determining to a greater or lesser extent the economic circumstances of economic 
subjects therein. Economic arguments for and against independence presuppose the 
existence of a material Scottish economy or UK economy that especially defines the 
opportunities and challenges of independence/union. However, designations of ‘the 
economy’ are fundamentally political insofar as they serve, deliberately or not, to 
convey a space (and populace) as governable, and insofar as it is only really 
meaningful to talk of ‘the economy’ in correspondence with a political space.   
 
Postructuralism reminds us that all ideas, or discourses, are fundamentally ‘political’, 
insofar as their meanings are not naturally occurring. It also reminds us that all 
meaning is constantly re/constructed or re/articulated. However, in some 
circumstances, certain ideas, or discourses, become so naturalised, or taken-for-
granted, that they appear a-political. The aforementioned taken-for-granted 
assumptions about ‘the economic’ and ‘the economy’ are prime examples. Yet 
poststructuralism also reminds us that objectivity can be challenged at any time and 
established ideas can once more re-enter the ‘play of practice’ as their meaning is 
renegotiated. It is the aim of critical investigation to highlight such taken-for-granted 
truths and reveal their contingency. The aim here is to challenge the taken-for-
grantedness of the economy. Clearly the idea of ‘the economy’ is deeply entrenched 
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in popular consciousness, a full appreciation of which is well beyond the means of 
this thesis. However, it is possible here to challenge the taken-for-granted manner in 
which the economy featured in the Scottish independence debate and how this 
effectively served to de-politicise said debate by appearing to offer rational, 
reasonable and non-political justifications for and against independence. More 
specifically, building on the conceptual insights from Chapter 4, this thesis will look 
at the way in which articulations of economic (in)security have been used both by 
unionists and nationalists in support of their arguments either for or against 
independence, and the manner in which those articulations draw upon, and help to 
cement, the very idea of ‘the economy’. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Introducing the Scottish independence referendum of September 2014, this chapter 
has looked at the significance of what was termed ‘the economics of independence’ in 
the preceding debate. More specifically, it has shown that much of the debate, on both 
nationalist and unionist sides, was focussed on making explicit economic cases either 
for or against independence, almost to the absolute exclusion of other considerations. 
It has been argued in this chapter that this served to de-politicise the debate (not 
unintentionally for some) and mislead voters. Drawing on the conceptual insights 
from the previous chapter, along with the methodological insights of postructuralism, 
this chapter has attempted to demonstrate the ontological assumptions that made this 
possible.  
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Firstly, taken-for-granted assumptions about the existence of an economic sphere of 
activity, separate from the social and political contexts in which we live our lives, 
makes it possible to articulate largely economistic (de Goede 2003) justifications for 
or against independence. Whilst it is certainly meaningful to talk of ‘economic 
realities’ influencing our lives (as discussed in the previous chapter) those realities do 
not exist separately from our ideas about them. This assumption is central to 
constructivist and postructuralist accounts of political economy. In any event, it was 
argued here that really ‘knowing’ the economic realities of independence was always 
impossible with any surety and the inevitable claims and counter claims of key 
protagonists were only ever going to lead to a sterile and uninformative debate.  
 
Furthermore, with respect to one crucial ‘economic reality’ – incidentally, one largely 
agreed upon by both unionists and nationalists - the debate was highly misleading to 
voters, namely, the extent to which it is meaningful to consider economic subjects 
within a given territorial space to have an especially shared economic fate. As 
explored in the previous chapter, the notion that we live our lives within a shared 
material community of economic fate (largely) coterminous with our political 
community is, at best, grossly exaggerated. Nevertheless, the assumption makes it 
possible to articulate governing rationalities over subjects within that space. In the 
context of the Scottish independence referendum debate it will have made it possible 
for key protagonists to articulate arguments either for or against independence on the 
basis that voters in Scotland would have an especially shared experience of both the 
opportunities and the challenges of independence.  
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In the final part of this chapter it was stressed how these aforementioned taken-for-
granted truths about a largely a-political economic domain and an actually existing 
Scottish (or UK) economy served to effectively de-politicise the debate. The oft 
assumed dichotomy between the economic and the political is fallacious, and the 
extent to which one can meaningfully talk about ‘the Scottish (or UK) economy’ it is 
only with regards to a fundamentally political space. Applying a poststructuralist 
methodology, this thesis challenges such taken-for-granted (or naturalised) truths, and 
reveals that there are always hidden political implications of their unchallenged 
acceptance.  
 
A key term that has only been uttered in passing in this chapter is that of economic 
(in)security. The next chapter looks at the implications of taken-for-granted 
assumption about the economy - both with regards the supposed domain of activity 
and the spatial-scalar entity – for the conceptualisation of economic (in)security. Put 
very simply, it will be argued that insecurity is a fundamental feature of life in the 
modern world, wherein we are necessarily dependent on circumstances beyond our 
purview (i.e. our ‘economic’ lives are bound up with those of others), but those 
insecurities are both real and imagined. The idea of the economy as an aggregated 
spatial-scalar entity encourages, or in fact relies upon, the very notion that economic 
actors or subjects within it have - to a greater or lesser extent - a shared material 
circumstance with respect to their economic (in)security. As such, it will be argued 
that the articulation of economic (in)security is inextricably bound up with the very 
idea of the economy. In the context of the Scottish independence referendum, we can 
conceptualise arguments for and against independence as articulations of economic 
(in)security.  
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Chapter 6: Conceptualising (Economic) (In)Security - The 
Implications of an Imagined Economy 
 
In order to answer the second of the three subsidiary research questions, What role do 
articulations of economic security play in the imagination of ‘the (Scottish) 
economy’?, it is necessary to gain a better understanding of what economic security 
is. The initial stimulus for this research was in part the aim to better understand what 
economic security means. This chapter, therefore, pursues a better understanding of 
‘security’, and by building on the conceptual insights of the last chapter, brings the 
two concepts together to try and better understand what economic security means.  
What is proffered is a critical, reflexive conceptualisation of economic (in)security
10
 
based on the poststructuralist assumptions underpinning this thesis.  
 
It is argued here that we perceive economic (in)security to be a fundamental feature of 
modern economic life, wherein our economic circumstances are necessarily bound up 
with those of others and dependent on determinants that may be largely beyond our 
purview. We are very much aware of this, and yet our perception of those 
determinants of often muddied. ‘The economy’, for instance, is largely an imaginative 
abstraction. The extent to which it really exists is commonly exaggerated, and is the 
result, in any event, of political practice. Yet this idea of ‘the economy’ as an 
                                                          
10 Security is something that has to be maintained (or at least thought to be 
maintained), but which is never fully attainable, and therefore any given utterance of 
security is simultaneously one of insecurity, hence the use of parentheses in 
‘(in)security’.   
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aggregated spatial-scalar entity encourages and also relies upon the very notion that 
the economic actors (or subjects) of which it is deemed to be comprised have (to a 
greater or lesser extent) a shared material context and fate. Within this supposedly 
shared context, or community of fate (Williams 2003), people are thought to share (to 
a greater or lesser extent) both economic opportunities and vulnerabilities, despite the 
fact our economic circumstances and life-chances are vastly heterogeneous, shaped by 
a myriad of both social and material factors including privilege, class, gender, 
geology, climate, geography, not to mention pure happenstance. Yet we are led to 
believe that our membership of a shared community largely transcends these other 
factors. 
 
We can think of the articulation of economic (in)security as inextricably bound up 
with the very idea of the economy. The two are mutually constitutive in the same way 
that authors have argued that the idea of the state and articulations national security 
are mutually constitutive (Kuus & Agnew 2008; Campbell 1998). In the context of the 
Scottish independence referendum debate, it is possible to conceptualise economic 
arguments for and against independence as articulations of a shared economic 
(in)security. These articulations both rely upon and potentially serve to further 
sediment the idea of a really existing economy built upon a shared material 
community of fate. 
 
Consonant with the ontological and methodological assumptions of this thesis, it is 
assumed that the meaning of (economic) security can be best understood through an 
analysis of discursive practice. Within the broad school of Security Studies, the 
‘securitisation thesis’ is famously built on the same assumption (Buzan et al. 1998). 
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Indeed this ‘thesis’ is highly insightful and furnishes us with a grammar of helpful 
terms (‘securitisation’, ‘securitising actor’, ‘securitising move’, etc.). However, it also 
argues security issues are characterised by their ‘exceptionality’, which potentially 
precludes consideration of issues that, for whatever reason, are not deemed 
‘exceptional’ enough to become ‘securitised’. Given the ‘routineness’ of many 
economic insecurities in modern economic life, it may be that they often lack the 
‘exceptionality’ required to satisfy the criteria of securitisation. Thus, within this 
chapter a critique of securitisation is proffered, which tends towards a broader, more 
poststructuralist, and critical understanding of the ‘constructedness’ of security. 
 
As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the articulation of economic threats, 
vulnerabilities and insecurities were central to the referendum debate in arguments 
both for and against independence. Given the potential implications of that debate for 
the (re)territorialisation of political space, one can argue that to disregard articulations 
of economic (in)security on the grounds that they lack sufficient ‘exceptionality’ is 
potentially to ignore their significance - vis-à-vis articulations of conventional 
security threats - as determinants of territorialisation. It is specifically this latter point 
that the chapter subsequently addresses, where the importance of articulations of 
economic (in)security for the territorialisation of political and economic space is 
considered. This effectively sets the scene for the remaining chapters of the thesis, 
wherein arguments of unionists for independence, and those of nationalists against, 
are revealed to hinge largely on the articulation of economic (in)security.  
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Openings in Security Discourse? 
 
Security is a concept that is central to the discipline of International Relations, and 
more specifically, to ‘Security Studies’. Therefore, despite its colloquial use in 
everyday language, it is heavily ‘loaded’ with conceptual baggage (Huysmans 1998; 
Rothschild 1995; Smith 2005). It has conventionally been conceived of in militaristic 
terms with scholars of security studies traditionally occupying themselves with ‘the 
study of the threat, use and control of military force’ (Walt 1991, p. 212). With the 
end of the Cold War came a makeover for the discipline of Security Studies, 
traditionally concerned with the ‘high politics’ of nations, and preoccupied by the 
overarching military and ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union, the latter’s 
demise and the threat it represented left theoretical and policy openings in security 
understanding in to which economics, along with other ‘new’ considerations such as 
the environment supposedly permeated (Baldwin 1997; Buzan et al. 1998; Krause & 
Williams 1996; Buzan & Hansen 2009), accompanied by a focus on alternative 
‘referents’ of security besides the state, as with Human Security (UNDP 1993; 1994) 
and Societal Security (Buzan 1991; Roe 2007).  
 
Traditional security scholars remained critical of such attempts to broaden the remit of 
‘security’ and feared for the ‘intellectual coherence’ of the discipline (Walt 1991). 
Indeed, despite an open and informed conversation being unlikely to render 
‘conventional’ threats (where genuine and convincingly articulated) less potent or 
meaningful, security discourse has remained stubbornly preoccupied with 
conventional security concerns (see Ullman 1983). As Dalby puts it, ‘it might be 
argued that the dilemma of academic security discourse after the Cold War is 
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precisely that its conceptual infrastructure has long outlived any usefulness it might 
have once had’ (1997, pp. 4-5). The contention is not that traditional accounts of 
security are no longer meaningful, or insightful, it is simply that they tend to reaffirm 
themselves in a manner that ignores potential openings in security discourse. As 
Walker puts it, they potentially contribute towards ‘a discourse of excluded 
subjectivities’ like race, class, gender and humanity (1997, p. 73; see Peoples & 
Vaughan-Williams 2010; Wyn Jones 1999).  
 
Moreover, whilst one might have expected the shift from traditional government to 
multi-level governance in the UK (see Chapter 3) to have opened up a space for the 
devolved administrations and other sub-state actors to articulate the specificities of 
their own national security - despite the fact that under extant constitutional 
arrangements foreign policy and national defence remain the preserve of the UK 
Government - it will be argued below that for various reasons conventional security 
threats were more or less absent from the Scottish independence referendum debate. 
Yet the re-writing of political geographies, something the invocation of (in)security is 
thought to be a determinant of (Kuus & Agnew 2008; Campbell 1998), was very 
clearly at stake in that debate. Which begs the question, what role did security play, if 
any? In order to answer this question it is necessary to employ a broader 
conceptualisation of (economic) (in)security sympathetic to the critical, 
poststructuralist assumptions underpinning the thesis. 
 
Dent asserts that ‘’economic security’ is an increasingly used phrase but also a 
relatively under-theorised concept in the political economy literature’ (2007, p. 204). 
The concept of environmental security meanwhile, despite being controversial among 
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both traditional security scholars and environmentalists and green theorists alike, has 
received quite a lot of attention by comparison (see Barnett 2001 & 2007; Brauch et 
al. 2008). One reason for economic security receiving so little attention within 
security studies is purportedly the aforementioned resilience of traditional security 
discourse to the broadening and deepening of security (Dent 2007; Nesadurai 2004). 
Unsurprisingly then, where it is addressed, it is often with regards matters of defence, 
statecraft and/or ‘conventional’, militaristic security concerns. Nesadurai (2004, p. 
463) explains, for example, that proponents tend look at how economic performance 
relates to military spending, how resource scarcity can lead to inter-state conflict and 
how economic instruments like trade and aid can be used to advance foreign policy 
objectives. The latter is commonly known as ‘economic statecraft’ and basically 
refers to ‘the use of economic tools and relationships to achieve foreign policy 
objectives’ (Mastanduno 2008, p. 172). The link between economics and military 
statecraft has long been recognised. In ‘Perpetual Peace’, Kant spoke of armies being 
both prohibitively expensive and a threat and cause of war in themselves, but also that 
the alternative of accumulating wealth is no less risky. 
‘But it would be just the same if wealth rather than soldiers were accumulated, 
for it would be seen by other states as a military threat; it might compel them 
to mount preventative attacks, for of the three powers within a state – the 
power of the army, the power of alliance and the power of money – the third is 
probably the most reliable instrument of war. It would lead more often to wars 
if it were not so difficult to discover the amount of wealth which another state 
possesses’ (Kant 1795 cited in Reiss 1991, p. 95) 
Dent argues that such formulations do not, however, deal with economic security per 
se, but with what can more appropriately be called the ‘economics-security nexus’, 
since they focus more on ‘linkages between economic policy and traditional or 
politico-military security policy’ (Dent 2007, p. 209; see, for example, Goodwin 
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1991; Kapstein 1992; Kirshner 1998). For instance, in Cable’s (1995) article, ‘What is 
International Economic Security’, he proposes four definitions of economic security, 
three of which pertain to the economics-security nexus
11
.  
 
Other contributors have argued that economic insecurities ought to be considered in 
their own right as matters of security concern (Dent 2007). Cable had suggested that 
‘to stretch the [economic security] definition to world poverty, population growth, 
global warming and the stability of the international banking system, as do some 
contributions, is perhaps to make the concept so wide as to be unmanageable’ (1995, 
p. 308). However, more recent contributors (Kahler 2004; Nesadurai 2006) take the 
normative position that just such a more ambitious move is necessary in order to 
address the many threats precipitated within the global political economy, often over 
and above the militaristic concerns of states. Roesad suggests that in ‘a world 
characterised by economic globalisation, economic security may be seen as a function 
of the state’s capacity to pursue policies that maximise the benefits and minimise the 
risks of liberalising economic systems’ (Roesad 2006, p. 108). In essence, it is argued 
that security analyses should consider the economic threats supposedly attributable to 
greater economic openness in a ‘shrinking world’. 
 
Correspondingly, it has been argued that security analyses ought to consider referents 
of security besides the state, for as stressed in Chapter 3, there is nothing strictly 
necessary about the state as the principal unit of political organisation. Some have 
                                                          
11
 Incidentally, it will be argued that the economics-security nexus is more meaningful 
when reversed in the case of arguments for and against Scottish independence in the 
referendum debate, since where militaristic concerns are voiced they are done so more 
to speak to their economic implications rather than the converse. 
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argued in favour of a more human-centred approach to security. Hough states, 
‘Security is a human condition. To define it purely  in terms of state bodies whose aim 
it is to help secure their state and people in a certain dimension, rather than the 
peoples whose security is as stake, is both odd and nonsensical’ (2008, p. 9). 
Similarly, Ken Booth stated that the promising developments in security studies are 
‘those struggling to develop, at the end of a century of violence and change, a 
postrealist, postpositivist conception of security that offers some promise of 
maximizing the security and improving the lives of the whole of humankind – the 
security studies of inclusion rather than exclusion, of possibility rather than necessity, 
and of becoming rather than being’ (1997, p. 105). A very prominent attempt to shift 
the focus of security away from purely states, and purely military security, towards 
humans is the UNDP’s conception of Human Security (UNDP 1993). Similarly, the 
International Labour Office’s (ILO) 2004 report ‘Economic Security for a Better 
World’, proffers a human-centred approach to understanding economic security and 
focuses on the importance of socio-economic security and equality in the face of 
heightened global economic insecurity (e.g. volatile financial markets, capital 
liberalisation and associated volatility of capital flows, shifting patterns of trade, 
growing competition and deregulation of labour markets, as well as the general 
reorientation of fiscal policy away from raising taxes for public service provision and 
social security), urging that ‘basic economic security is a human right, one that 
assures a level of distributive justice and the attainment of basic needs (ILO 2004, p. 
15). Despite efforts such as these, as the key actor in domestic and international 
politics, it remains the case that security is largely perceived to be the preserve of the 
state and the state continues to be regarded as the legitimate ‘voice’ on security.  
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Moreover, where security is articulated by the state (at least in the case of the UK) it 
is rarely with regards economic insecurities in their own right. In recent UK 
government security strategies, despite them typically referring to the wider economic 
context within which they sit (especially given the contemporary backdrop of a recent 
financial crisis and recession) no effort is made to ‘securitise’ economic risks per se. 
Instead, we are reminded of how our economic openness creates other types of 
vulnerabilities that others may take advantage of through international terrorism, 
transnational crime and cyber-attacks (HM Government 2010) or how economic 
investment, innovation and growth will better afford the wherewithal to satisfy our 
continued material defence needs (HM Government 2015). Rather than moves to 
‘securitise’ the economic risks inherent within liberal capitalism, the concern instead 
is with ensuring a continued commitment to that economic model vis-à-vis the 
dangers of protectionism. This highlights an important paradox at the core of 
economic security which is dealt with later in this chapter, namely that economic 
insecurity is considered part and parcel of a market driven economy.    
 
Indeed, in addition to the reported reticence within mainstream security studies to 
‘open up’ it is likely that economic security simply evades straightforward 
theorisation as a consequence of how we perceive economic threat within a capitalist 
economy. Unlike in the case of environmental security, for instance, it is almost 
impossible to conduct any sort of meaningful literature review on the topic of 
economic security, either because existing literature claiming to explicitly deal with 
‘economic security’ is so sparse (and revealing largely of dissensus), or because a 
consideration of all literature dealing ostensibly but implicitly with economic security 
(i.e. anything dealing with economic vulnerability) would be nothing like a coherent 
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body of literature as a consequence of economic (in)security being a fundamental and 
pervasive feature of economic life.  
 
But this recognition does not furnish one with the tools to better understanding the 
Scottish independence referendum debate, which as we shall see, revolved almost 
exclusively around the articulation of economic threats. With this in mind, and 
building on a ‘critical’ appraisal of the securitisation thesis, this chapter develops a 
case for considering the contextual and contingent meaning of economic (in)security 
through an analysis of discursive practice, recognising both that the term has no real 
‘essence’, but also that it cannot in practice mean anything, even if in principle it can.  
 
 
Securitisation and the Constructedness of (Economic) (In)Security: A Critique 
 
The Copenhagen School’s securitization framework, as laid out in ‘Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis’, was explicitly formulated as an attempt to resolve debates 
(and appease concerns) about the broadening of security discourse. The securitisation 
framework offers a useful starting point for conceptualising (economic) security 
since, like poststructuralism, it highlights the performative role of language (through 
‘speech acts’) in constructing in/security. It recognises that security is socially 
constructed; ‘Threats…are fundamentally interpretative, not objectively given facts’ 
(Shephard & Weldes 2008, p. 532); and highlights the futility of attempts to 
understand security divorced from empirical practice. However, it does not follow 
through to its logical conclusion the assumption that security is fundamentally 
constructed. Whilst highly insightful, the securitisation thesis exhibits analytical and 
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normative constraints that preclude a capacity for sufficiently ‘critical’ theorising 
about security and, put simply, to understand why some issues become securitised 
whilst others do not.  
 
The oft quoted definition of securitisation argues that security issues must be ‘staged 
as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates 
endorsement of emergency measures’ (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 5). At the heart of this 
concept then is the assumption that the meaning of security is to be found in its usage; 
through an analysis of discursive practice. Emmers argues that the approach, however, 
remains fairly new and underworked, and that important questions remain as to ‘why 
some moves of securitization succeed in convincing an audience while others fail to 
do so’ (Emmers 2007, p. 116). It is precisely such questions that McDonald (2008) 
poses to highlight the normative and analytical constraints of the securitisation 
framework.  
‘How do some articulations of security and threat come to resonate with 
particular constituencies, and how do we know when they do? Through what 
processes are some actors empowered to ‘speak’ security on behalf of 
particular communities? And to what extent are there alternative articulations 
of security, and how have these voices been silenced or delegitimized? …the 
securitization framework (while useful) is narrow in ways that are both 
analytically and normatively problematic, providing a partial account of the 
construction of security and potentially reifying traditional security discourses 
and practices in the process’ (McDonald 2008, p. 568). 
Put simply, whilst the securitization framework is a potentially useful analytical tool, 
it also potentially forecloses broader questions about the ‘constructedness’ of 
(economic) (in)security. 
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McDonald explains that to an extent the School’s ‘facilitating conditions’ 
acknowledge the importance of contextual determinants of securitization, as they refer 
to the ‘dynamics, developments and institutional contexts that enable ‘securitizing 
moves’ to become successful’ (2008, p. 571). Yet the problem is that such contextual 
factors are not specifically incorporated into the analytical framework, wherein the 
performative nature of the speech act is over-emphasised. While recognising the 
contextual importance of ‘the audience’, it is not sufficiently theorised; ‘While 
recognizing that security is inter-subjectively constructed, the focus on the speech act 
as performing security arguably paints security less as a site of negotiation than one of 
articulation
12
’ (McDonald 2008, p. 572). Drawing on Balzacq (2005), McDonald 
suggests that the reason for the lack of theorising about the role played by the 
audience is that ‘the power of the speech act would appear to be undermined by the 
full incorporation of the idea that the act itself is only one part of the securitizing 
process: that it relies upon the acquiescence, consent or support of particular 
constituencies’ (2008, p. 572).  
 
Moreover, over-emphasising the importance of the speech act vis-à-vis context has 
both analytical and normative implications, not least through the marginalisation of 
‘other’ voices. Hough notes,  
‘[T]his approach still leaves the act of securing threatened people to the state. 
This can result in life-threatening issues being excluded from consideration 
because the government still chooses not to prioritise them or because the 
voices speaking for securitization are insufficiently loud’ (Hough 2008, p. 18). 
                                                          
12 Note the difference in meaning of the word ‘articulation’ here vis-à-vis its use in 
discourse theory (see Methodology) wherein discursive situatedness is integral to its 
meaning.  
161 
 
For instance, Lene Hansen argues that it subjugates the voices of women, for ‘[i]f 
security is a speech act… then it is simultaneously deeply implicated in the 
production of silence’ (Hansen 2000, p. 306). It may be important to look at the 
articulations or ‘securitizing moves’ that are not successful, or are subjugated, since 
presumably the same discursive context that makes successful articulations successful 
simultaneously makes the latter unsuccessful.  
 
Essentially, in answer to the perennial question, ‘What is security?’, securitization 
theory states that ‘security is what actors make of it’. However, it does not remain 
sufficiently faithful to the notion that ‘what security is’, is constructed. Rather, it 
offers a framework that allows us (based on its strict criteria) to determine ‘when’ and 
‘where’ a security issue is. But, as shown above, even then it fails to tell us why or 
how such a construction of security is possible due to its lack of emphasis on 
contextual determinants. Consequently, Ciuta (2009) argues that despite rightly 
refuting that there is a real ‘essence’ to security that needs to be found, the analytical 
framework it proffers suggests an ‘essence’ exogenous to articulations of it. 
‘Securitisation theory urges the analyst not to engage in the evaluation of 
security issues qua security issues (either ‘real’ or ‘unreal’), since this is 
decided by the actors who decide to securitise or not these issues. At the same 
time however, securitisation theory provides a yardstick for estimating 
whether given policies are about security or not, since ‘security’ is what fulfils 
the criteria of securitisation, and nothing else. As a result, securitisation theory 
is torn between its aim to establish the ‘essence’ of security, and its claim that 
security is what actors make of it’ (Ciuta 2009, p. 303). 
Ciuta shows how two separate definitions of security are presented by the 
securitisation framework; the first discursive definition rests on the assumption that 
security is the product of a speech act, while the second, exhibiting a congruency with 
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traditional understandings, defines security as being about survival in the face of 
existential threats (2009, p. 306).  
 
Furthermore, these two definitions, besides being contradictory, are actually ‘bound 
up in a hierarchy that privileges the traditional definition over its discursive 
counterpart… [which] performs a key function for securitisation theory: it locks-in the 
meaning of security and insulates it from conceptual variation or practical 
reformulation’ (Ciuta 2009, p. 307). Furthermore, it ‘isolates the concept of security 
from its actors and politics’ whilst privileging the analyst; ‘conjuring something 
uncomfortably close to objectivism for an approach built on a notion of 
intersubjectivity, it is contradictory in securitisation theory’s own terms’ (Ciuta 2009, 
p. 315). Whilst offering a seemingly harsh appraisal of securitisation’s analytical and 
normative implications, Ciuta is keen not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, 
arguing that securitisation offers the best starting point for analyses, but, ‘that in order 
to fulfil its significant analytical potential, securitisation theory must have a thicker 
and more consistent understanding of its key argument that ‘security is constructed’’ 
(2009, p. 317).  
 
An approach that in principle argues security can mean anything raises concerns that 
we might end up in a situation whereby security really means nothing (i.e. it becomes 
diluted). However, even if security could mean anything in principle, the fact is that 
its meaning is contextually legitimated. As Ciuta puts it, ‘To argue hermeneutically 
for the significance of context is therefore not to argue for the boundless meaning of 
security: on the contrary, it is to highlight its boundedness – or in Gadamerian terms, 
to explore the ‘horizons’ within which actors and security analysts alike come to 
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understand what security means as well as what it means to practice security’ (2009, 
p. 321). A similar misunderstanding is made of poststructuralism with regards 
concerns that meaning is in constant ‘chaotic flux’ (Torfing 1999, p. 95). However, 
asserting that the meaning of security is discursively constituted, and that like those 
wider discourses, articulations of security are political and contingent, does not point 
to unhelpful and nihilistic relativism such that anything can in practice be successfully 
articulated as a security issue (see Methodology). Rather the point is to assert that we 
need to understand the discursive constitutiveness of security, how certain 
articulations are made possible, whilst others are not. What is more, given the 
mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice (see Zalewski 1996) to 
the extent that theory is practice, we must recognise the normative function of security 
theorising. From a ‘critical’ perspective we must bear in mind how securitisation, 
narrowly applied, has the potential to foreclose wider conceptualisations of security.  
 
The above critique of Copenhagen School’s securitisation framework is not meant to 
detract in any way from what is a highly insightful contribution to understanding 
security. It is likely because of that contribution that wider debates regarding the 
social constructedness of security were made possible. What the above critique does, 
however, is highlight why it might be that economic insecurities are rarely deemed 
sufficiently ‘exceptional’ to represent security concerns per se. With that in mind, the 
next section of the chapter draws on conceptual and empirical insights from the 
previous chapter, namely those pertaining to taken-for-granted assumptions about the 
economy, to explain how important articulations of economic (in)security could be 
missed using the securitisation framework, articulations which potentially serve an 
important role in the legitimation of governance capacities.  
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Difficulties with ‘Securitising’ Economic (In)Security 
 
If the securitisation framework can be used as analytical tool to discern when and 
where given insecurities are ‘securitised’, why might it be that economic insecurities 
rarely fulfil the criteria of securitisation in practice? Arguably, the naturalised quality 
of economic insecurities, such that they are considered part and parcel of economic 
life, make it such that where they are articulated they are rarely thought of in security 
terms. Securitisation theory tells us that it is the ‘exceptionality’ of security threats 
that see them raised above the level of politics (‘politicisation’) to that of security 
(‘securitisation’). Yet, whilst exceptional circumstances may occur and a ‘securitising 
actor’ may leverage ‘extraordinary measures’ (e.g. public bailouts of commercial 
banks in a financial crisis), these are rare, and to focus only on these, it is argued here, 
is to miss much of what economic security is about and the significance that 
articulations of economic vulnerabilities might have regarding the consolidation of 
governance capacities.  
 
In very ‘real’ terms, economic insecurities are a fundamental feature of modern 
economic life within a capitalist mode of production, whereby we are ‘forced’ to 
engage in wage labour for our subsistence, and wherein those wages and that labour 
are largely determined by the actions of others and the pursuit of profit. Unlike within 
pre-modern, subsistence societies, our livelihoods rely on a multitude of (largely 
imperceptible – and not always ‘real’) economic forces beyond our control, and this is 
something that most of us are acutely aware of. Polanyi’s work looking at more 
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‘primitive’ societies where the individual’s security from starvation is assured as far 
as possible by the collective, illustrates the aforementioned point.  
‘As a rule, the individual in primitive society is not threatened by starvation 
unless the community as a whole is in a like predicament. It is the absence of 
the threat of individual starvation which makes primitive society, in a sense, 
more humane than nineteenth century society, and at the same time less 
economic’ (Polanyi 1947, p. 99). 
Indeed, in ‘ideational’ terms, liberal economic doctrine tells us that ‘the economic’ is 
underpinned by threat, and that vulnerabilities are largely necessary. Economic actors 
are supposed to feel insecure since this fuels competition and overall efficiencies. As 
Nesadurai (2006, p. 10) notes, economic insecurities are the natural consequence of 
the ‘creative destruction’ at the heart of capitalist progress. With insecurity a 
necessary corollary of the market ‘it is difficult for liberals to speak of economic 
security without becoming intellectually incoherent’ (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 106). 
Thus, economic insecurity appears not only ubiquitous, but largely ‘accepted’; if not 
necessarily by individuals, then by society broadly writ.  
 
That said, views diverge regarding the extent to which certain insecurities are 
societally acceptable. As stressed in Chapter 4, Polanyi (2001) argued that the ideal of 
a purely self-regulating market was always practicably untenable, hence the inevitable 
counter-movement by society to protect itself. Besides perhaps being slightly too 
economically deterministic in its reasoning, and recognising the importance of 
‘ideational embeddedness’ too (Granovetter 1985; Block & Somers 2003; Somers & 
Block 2005), this argument does reveal a propensity for societal arrangements to 
better protect citizens from the perceived insensitivities of the market throughout the 
20
th
 century. The (neo)liberal view is that the unfettered market is a positive-sum 
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game in which all eventually benefit, that it generates optimal efficiencies if only 
transient vulnerabilities can be borne out. In recent decades the only viable alternative 
to this dominant order, we are told, is social-democracy. It will be shown in Chapter 8 
that social democracy was often important in nationalist articulations of the economic 
insecurities of union, and for better legitimising governance provisions to mitigate 
them. In many respects, economic security is precisely what social democracy is 
designed to better assure, as Elliott & Atkinson suggest here.  
‘The central struggle of our time is that between laissez-faire capitalism, 
which represents the financial interest, and social democracy, which represents 
democratic control of the economy in the interests of ordinary people. These 
ideologies are incompatible, in that at the heart of social democracy is the one 
economic feature specifically and unashamedly ruled out by the resurgent free 
market: security. Social democracy offers nothing if it does not offer security; 
the free market cannot offer security (to the many at least) without ceasing to 
be itself’ (Elliott & Atkinson 1998, p. vii).  
As such, Buzan highlights the liberal trade-off between vulnerability and efficiency
13
 
that ‘occurs again and again at almost all levels of economic security, from the 
individual, through firm, class and state to the system level as a whole’ (1991, p. 237). 
Similarly, Kahler (2004, p. 492) argues that it is important to weigh our judgement of 
economic insecurities, such as financial volatility, with the perceived benefits to be 
accrued over time, whilst Roesad argues that in ‘a world characterised by economic 
globalisation, economic security may be seen as a function of the state’s capacity to 
pursue policies that maximise the benefits and minimise the risks of liberalising 
economic systems’ (Roesad 2006, p. 108). Incidentally, Cohen stresses that this ideal 
of optimal interventionism - ‘For every possible form of market failure, there can be a 
corresponding form of optimal intervention’ (2000, p. 176) – is as unrealizable as the 
                                                          
13
 What is actually meant here is that there is a trade-off between vulnerability and 
inefficiency.  That is, one the one hand you have efficiency at the cost of 
vulnerability, and on the other you have security (however short-lived and ill-advised 
that may be) coupled with inefficiency. 
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ideal of a perfect, free market (Chang 2011). Moreover, this very discourse of 
interventionism is built upon the false assumption of a state/market dichotomy (Bruff 
2011) that simply does not exist (See Chapter 4). ‘Intervention’ is in fact a misnomer 
insofar as it suggests the possibility of an otherwise unfettered market. Yet this idea of 
optimal interventionism remains compelling, and resides beneath many articulations 
of economic (in)security.  
 
The same taken-for-grantedness of economic insecurity in economic life can be seen 
in the all-pervasive discourse of competitiveness wherein threats provide the 
necessary dynamic at the heart of capitalist accumulation. Schoenberger (1998, p. 6) 
stresses how ‘the discourse [of competitiveness] has been successfully naturalized’. 
‘‘competitiveness' seems to me a term that has become truly hegemonic in the 
Gramscian sense. It is a culturally and socially sanctioned category that, when 
invoked, can completely halt public discussion of public or private activities. 
There is virtually no counterargument available to the simple claim that `doing 
X will make us uncompetitive,' whatever X and whomever `us' might be’ 
(Schoenberger 1998, p. 3).  
Schoenberger argues that competitiveness is the discourse of the economics 
profession, which sees it as an inevitable dynamic of the market. He explains that,  
‘the close identification of marginalist economics with evolutionary theory has 
unavoidably imbued the concept with the sense of a life or death struggle (cf. 
Niehans, 1990). As Krugman (1994: 31) defines it:`. . . when we say that a 
corporation is uncompetitive, we mean that its market position 
is…unsustainable - that unless it improves its performance it will cease to 
exist' (Schoenberger 1998, pp. 3-4).  
In other words, competitiveness threats are conveyed as existential. However, 
securitisation also tells us that for a threat to qualify as a matter of security, it needs to 
represent exceptional circumstances requiring extraordinary measures, which given 
the general ‘acceptance’ of such threats is rare.  
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As with economic insecurities generally, such competitiveness threats ‘must be seen 
as real forces shaping real outcomes in society…[and] not just intellectual constructs 
that lend a false sense of order to a messy world’ (Schoenberger 1998, p. 3). 
Nevertheless, the extent to which they correspond with neat geographical referents is 
often grossly exaggerated. This has been demonstrated by authors who have looked at 
the role of proposed ‘competitiveness threats’ for consolidating governance capacities 
at various geographical scales, for example, Bristow (2005) in the case of regional 
competiveness, and Rosamond (2002; 2012) in the case or European competitiveness. 
Indeed the articulation of economic insecurities, it is argued here, are crucial 
considerations in the Scottish independence referendum debate (and the 
territorialisation of political space more generally), despite, due to their naturalisation, 
being partially complicit in the ‘depoliticisation’ of that debate.  
 
 
Economic (In)Security and the Territorialisation of Political Space 
 
In Chapter 4 is was shown that we are encouraged to believe the economic is 
apportioned spatially into a ‘real’ aggregated systems of economic activity (‘the 
economy’) that to a greater or lesser extent (given hegemonic narratives of 
globalisation, economic ‘spillover’, the integratedness and interdependency of 
economic spaces, etc.) determines the economic life-chances of those located there. 
Put differently, the imagined economy encourages us to imagine ourselves as bound 
up in a shared material economic community of fate (Williams 2003) wherein we 
share both economic opportunities and vulnerabilities with fellow citizens. An 
example of this is the Scottish economy. Yet the ‘reality’ is that the range of potential 
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factors influencing the life-chances of people within the ‘Scottish economy’ are 
infinite and unknowable (see ‘Knowing the economy’ in Chapter 4) and the idea of an 
especially ‘Scottish circumstance’ is grossly exaggerated. Nevertheless, one can argue 
that the articulation of shared economic (in)security is crucial for the imagination of 
‘the economy’.  
 
Though not iterated as such in these precise terms, Crane (1999) illustrates how 
collective insecurity is vital to the imagination of ‘the economy’. Crane highlights 
three different ways in which the ‘economic nation’ is imagined: ‘economic historical 
experiences of suffering that are made into powerful signs of collective identity; 
economic accomplishments that can serve as emblems of shared glory; and assertions 
of an organic societal unity rooted in a common economic life’ (Crane 1999, p. 216). 
We see each of these at play in the imagination of the Scottish economy, or Scottish 
economic nation, as discussed in Chapter 3. We see narratives of ‘historical 
experiences of suffering’ through Scottish de-industrialisation and the perceived 
damages of Thatcherism (Cumbers 2014; Dardinelli & Mitchell 2014; McCrone 2012; 
Soule et al. 2012), ‘shared glory’ in the (contested) realisation of Scottish economic 
resurgence and resilience vis-à-vis the rest of the UK (Fitjar 2010), and ‘societal 
unity’ through expressions of communal solidarity and social democracy (Keating 
2007; Lynch 2009). Anderson’s ‘imagined community’ endures ‘regardless of the 
actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, [for] the nation is always 
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship' (2006, p. 7). Crane notes how ‘The 
same can be said for the economy. Whatever the actual experience, narratives of 
economic life as something that the community shares are widely asserted; 'We' are 
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united because we toil together in the same field, even if we are doing different jobs 
and earning different wages’ (Crane 1999, p. 217).  
 
Incidentally, one of the examples Crane gives of ‘shared suffering’ is that of the Great 
Depression in the US, which Neocleous shows was a key historical determinant in the 
development of the concept of economic security, which itself, deployed through the 
concept of social security, was an ideational forerunner to latterly incepted concept of 
national security. 
‘If the key idea animating the Depression was fear, the New Deal was driven 
by the idea of security. On 8 June 1934, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
announced that, among the objectives of his administration, ‘I place the 
security of the men, women and children of the Nation first’ (Neocleous 2006, 
p. 367). 
Crucial to the conveyance of the economic insecurities of the nation at that time, was 
positing the apparent vagaries of capitalism. 
‘Security was now at the heart of political debate. One of the key problems of 
capital – the everlasting uncertainty generated by the market system – was 
becoming ‘securitized’ (Neocleous 2006, p. 369). 
Thus we see how in this case certain economic insecurities were securitised through 
changing ideas and norms about societal tolerance of those insecurities. A similar re-
framing or re-articulation of economic threats was evident in post-war Britain with, 
among other things, the institution of the welfare state and ‘cradle to grave’ societal 
insurance. It is likely no coincidence that during this time the very idea of the national 
economy as a distinct spatial-scalar entity was becoming increasingly popularised. 
Though, as argued in Chapter 4, it is likely that the idea of the economy was 
popularised through a myriad of discursive practices at that time. One such practice, 
which explicitly portrayed individual economic security as intimately tied to the 
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collective economic security of the nation, may have been the development of popular 
finance in the US (Aitken 2006). Aitken (2006, p. 81) points out how ‘experts and 
institutions keen to foster popular finance, begin also to diagram a connection 
between individual financial security and the integrity or security of national space’. 
What each of these contributions highlights, is the importance of a perceived 
‘community of fate’ (Williams 2003) among the national citizens.  
 
It is argued here that articulations of ‘the economy’ are necessarily bound up with the 
articulation of economic (in)security, insofar as they speak, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to a shared vulnerability among economic actors/subjects within that space. 
Crucially, through the articulation of economic (in)security by authorised actors, the 
consolidation of governance capacities at given spatial-scalar levels is legitimised in 
much the same way as conventional military based (in)securities are thought to have 
been crucial in consolidating the legitimacy and territoriality of the state (Campbell 
1998: Kuus & Agnew 2008). In fact, the independence referendum debate offered an 
opportunity to assess the significance of articulations of economic (in)security vis-à-
vis conventional security in disputes over territoriality.  
 
Given shifting governance capacities within the plurinational UK state (Keating 2004; 
see Chapter 3), one might expect ‘emergent’ polities to be regarded as referents in 
their own right, or devolved governments to speak security more often, not least given 
the recognised importance of security discourse in the legitimation of governance 
capacities (Kuus & Agnew 2008; Campbell 1998). Yet for various reasons utterances 
of more ‘conventional’ security considerations, or indeed supposedly new threats like 
international terrorism and crime (HM Government 2010; HM Government 2015), 
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remained almost absent. Such things continue to be regarded as the preserve of the 
UK state. Moreover, where conventional concerns were ostensibly addressed (e.g. 
military provisions and security services of an independent Scotland), they often 
spoke more of economic concerns than conventional ones in actuality. Thus, we see 
what is essentially the reverse of the ‘economic-security nexus’ argument above (Dent 
2006). In the case of the Scottish independence referendum debate, articulations of 
economic (in)security were seemingly central to the arguments of both nationalists 
and unionists.  
 
As discussed above, ‘conventional’ security concerns remain largely the preserve of 
the state, and as much as Scotland increasingly might look like a state with devolved 
powers and institutions, including a parliament (see Chapter 3), it remains the case 
that under extant constitutional arrangements it is not within the official remit of the 
Scottish Government to make provisions for its own defence. It might therefore lack 
the institutional infrastructure and authority to meaningfully ‘speak’ security in more 
conventional terms, where this is considered to be the preserve of the UK 
Government. That said, there was and is nothing in principle preventing the Scottish 
Government or others talking about conventional security concerns, or indeed 
articulating ‘conventional’ security threats in support of independence, not least given 
that an independent Scotland would inherit the responsibility of affording for its own 
defence. Thus, either nationalist or unionists might have focussed on how an 
independent Scotland would provide for its defence in the event of independence. Yet, 
in practice utterances of more conventional (in)security were largely absent from the 
debate.  
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Of course, it may have been difficult to speak conventional (in)security with reference 
to a defined Scottish space, or territory, because there is an ‘objective’ lack of such 
insecurities. For example, one could assume that Scottish conventional security 
threats could be articulated by nationalists if they argued that the (rest of the) UK, or 
England, or Westminster, etc., is in fact the source of these threats, thereby uniting the 
Scottish people through a shared security imperative in the face of a threatening 
‘other’. Whilst this was possible in the case of economic insecurities (see Chapter 8), 
it is virtually unthinkable in the clear absence of such conventional threats. But even 
if it were the case that Scotland cannot be thought to face uniquely Scottish threats 
(i.e. ones the UK state does not), it is quite possible to assume that an independent 
Scotland would face the same threats that it is thought to currently face as a part of the 
UK, for threats need not be unique to a given territory or populace in order to be 
meaningfully articulated. 
 
In the UK Government National Security Strategy at the time of the independence 
debate, threats such as international terrorism, cyber-crime, natural hazards, 
international military crises requiring UK involvement, 
chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear (CBRN) were all addressed (HM 
Government 2010, p. 27). For the sake of argument, if one assumes that these threats 
are real, unionists might therefore have argued that security from these threats would 
not be adequately provided for under independence, whilst nationalists might argue 
that they are not sufficiently provided for under union. As will be revealed in 
subsequent chapters, both parties did so, but only very rarely. One such rare example 
from the unionist side is evidenced in a Better Together article published on 31
st
 
October 2013, entitled ‘Stronger, safer & more secure together’ (see Table 1.0), 
174 
 
which argued that Scotland is more secure under existing UK security arrangements. 
Conversely, a rare example from Yes Scotland just a day earlier argued: 
‘Our strength and safety as an independent country will rely on collective 
defence and cooperation with our neighbours…But both deliberate UK policy 
decisions and the incompetence of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has left 
Scotland less safe than it would be if Scotland’s defence and foreign policy were 
left for Scotland to decide’ (Yes Scotland 2013). 
This latter article stressed how Scottish military personnel will be better provided for 
under independence, for Scotland will have ‘tailor-made’ defences better suited to its 
own security needs (See Appendix 4.0).  
 
Despite invariably having some basis in ‘reality’, insecurities are fundamentally 
constructed insofar as there interpretation is discursively mediated. In the case of 
conventional threats to an existing Scottish polity or notional Scottish state, it is likely 
less meaningful to talk about Scottish conventional security threats more so as 
consequence of them not having been framed, or constructed as such. This may or 
may not be due to the fact that national security (i.e. defence) remains largely the 
preserve of the state (in the language of discourse theory, it remained largely outwith 
the discursive ‘limits of possibility’), but in any event across arguments both for and 
against independence there was very little discursive ‘effort’ to articulate conventional 
insecurities.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Here it is suggested that we can think of utterances of economic (in)security in the 
referendum debate as ‘designed’ to provoke notions of economic vulnerabilities or 
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threats associated with independence. In doing so, however, the author is mindful of 
the ‘performative’ nature of this formulation and his potential complicity in defining 
economic (in)security in a set way. However, as stressed in the methodology (see ‘A 
Capacity for Critique’), postructuralism recognises that it is not possible to ‘say 
nothing at all’ about the world. Rather, the key point is to remain mindful of what one 
is saying, and to be ‘critically reflexive’ in one’s approach. What is argued here is that 
understanding the mutual constitution of utterances of economic vulnerabilities and 
the idea of ‘the economy’ as a defined spatial-scalar entity is revealing of important 
insights regarding how arguments for and against independence were framed and 
governing legitimacies consolidated.   
 
Whilst recognising the futility of a search for the ‘essence’ of economic security, it is 
perhaps surprising that in light of the so called broadening and deepening of security 
understanding that there have been so few attempts to conceptualise economic 
security compared to other ‘types’ of security. Based upon this, and the 
poststructuralist assumptions underpinning the thesis, it was suggested that we might 
look at articulations of economic (in)security to better understand what it ‘means’ in 
political practice. One very influential body of work within security studies literature 
that advocates precisely this is the Copenhagen School and the concept of 
securitisation. It was stressed that whilst the securitisation thesis is highly illuminating 
in many regards, the conceptual framework provided for its application has analytical 
and normative deficiencies. Whilst crucially underlining the constitutive role of 
language in understanding how security is intersubjectively constructed through 
speech-acts, it leaves little room for recognition of either the broader contextual 
determinants of those speech acts, the inevitable subjugation of other ‘voices’ in their 
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utterance, or indeed the constitutive role of theorising in the construction of security’s 
meaning. Consequently, a more open, reflexive and critical commitment to the 
‘constructedness’ of security is advocated. Crucially, doing so may help us to 
understand why economic risks are rarely deemed as sufficiently ‘exceptional’ to 
satisfy the criteria of securitisation. 
 
It was argued that economic insecurities are assumed to be a fundamental feature of 
modern economic life, and inextricably bound up with the imagination of ‘the 
economy’. Economic (in)security is constantly articulated by, among others, 
governments on an ‘everyday’ basis. Whilst exceptional economic circumstances 
occur, requiring exceptional measures, the ‘everyday’ nature of the articulation of 
economic (in)security, coupled with the normalisation of threat, makes a literal 
application of the securitisation framework unsatisfactory. Yet to ignore articulations 
of economic threats, vulnerabilities or insecurities, precludes an understanding of just 
how significant they might be shaping political geographies. As revealed in 
subsequent chapters, there was significant discursive effort devoted by both unionists 
and nationalists to articulate the economic insecurities of either independence, or 
continued union. Put simply, in unionist arguments, independence is portrayed as the 
harbinger of economic insecurity, whilst in nationalist arguments independence is 
seen as the means for assuring security as well as the solution to the current and 
projected insecurities of union.  
 
Probably the most significant protagonist in the unionist camp was the leader of the 
Better Together campaign and Scottish Labour MP (and former Chancellor to the UK 
Exchequer), Alistair Darling. In his opening statement of a prominent televised head-
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to-head to debate with Scotland’s then First Minister, Alex Salmond, on 5
th
 August 
2014, the theme of uncertainty and insecurity was clear.  
“I want to see Scotland prosper. I don’t want to see new barriers, new borders, 
new boundaries where none exist. I don’t want to see anything get in the way of 
the jobs and security that we need in this country” (BBC 2014b). 
Elsewhere, in a speech at the University of Glasgow in 2013: 
“People are worried about economic security: their jobs, and the future for their 
families and children, at a time of great economic uncertainty. So, let’s begin 
with the issue that’s been central to the debate: the economy. The essence of the 
case for economic union is that it brings certainty at a time of insecurity and 
opportunity both for Scottish businesses and for individual Scots. Being part of 
an integrated UK economy helps us deal with risks, and share opportunities in a 
home market inside one of the world’s largest economies” (Darling 2013, p. 6).  
Similarly, in an article for the Scotsman newspaper entitled ‘Referendum Comes 
Down to Money’, Professor Jim Gallagher (supporter of the Better Together 
campaign) asserted ‘The essence of the case for economic union is not only does it 
bring opportunity for individual Scots and Scottish businesses, but also it’s a way of 
providing stability and security’ (Gallagher 2013).  Conversely, the Scottish First 
Minister and leader of the Scottish National Party stated on the day before the 
publication of the White Paper on independence (Scottish Government 2013d) what 
he saw as the most important issues for Scots in the debate: “jobs, economic growth 
and security”. 
 
Whilst poststructuralism denies the existence of a foundational reality separate from 
our experiences of it, it clearly still makes sense to talk of economic realities. As 
Foucault’s critique of ideology stresses, ‘there is no reality (perceivable) outside of 
techniques of truth, and that techniques of truth are both less ideological and more 
political than assumed’ (de Goede 2003, pp. 6-7). The result is that ‘rather than 
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distracting from the study of material reality, [poststructuralism] enables it to be seen 
as profoundly political’ (Goede 2003, p. 7). Thus the poststructuralist approach here 
simultaneously refutes the existence of a foundational reality behind discourse, whilst 
highlighting how accepted narratives or discourses can obscure economic ‘realities’ 
(however contingent and temporary they might be). As Peterson notes in his support 
of Critical Poststructuralism in Global Political Economy, ‘uncritical adherence to 
particular stabilizations frustrates attempts to adequately understand ‘reality’’ (2006, 
p. 121). The role of poststructuralism then is to ‘critically evaluate – to politicize – the 
specific effects and trade-offs of stabilizations, dominant orderings, and especially, 
what becomes normalized (depoliticized) as ‘common sense’’ (Peterson 2006, p. 121, 
emphasis in original).  
 
Providing a political-economic appraisal of the claims made in unionist and 
nationalist arguments in order to ascertain their truth, to reveal the economic 
‘realities’ behind the political rhetoric as it were - as far as it would have been 
possible or meaningful to do so anyway - is not the intention here. For the purpose of 
this thesis the latter is of less importance than the simple fact itself that articulations 
of economic (in)security were used, as this in itself reveals an accepted ‘truth’, 
namely, the purported ‘truth’ of ‘the economy’. As we will see, whilst nationalists and 
unionists disagreed on the economic implications of independence – ultimately, 
whether Scots would be more or less economically secure in an independent Scotland 
– the fundamental assumption underpinning those arguments (i.e. the economy) 
remained unchallenged. This in itself is revealing of the way in which governing 
legitimacies are forged through elite discursive practices.  
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Chapter 7: Articulating (Economic) (In)Security: The 
Unionist Case Against Independence 
 
Chapter 5 explained that economic considerations were at the heart of the referendum 
debate, with the proposed economic consequences of independence used to support 
justifications both for and against separation from the rest of the UK. It is proposed 
here that these can be thought of as arguments of economic (in)security. This chapter 
is concerned with evidencing articulations of (economic) (in)security in unionist 
arguments against independence in the referendum debate, whilst the next chapter will 
do the same with nationalist arguments for independence. Both chapters draw upon 
key government documents and speeches, but focus in particular on materials 
published on the websites of the opposing unionist (Better Together) and nationalist 
(Yes Scotland) campaigns. As stated in the methodology, these materials are felt to be 
a particularly useful gauge of the terms of the debate as they represent managed 
collections of articles including text from key speeches, documents and reports, along 
with editorials, blogs, etc. In total, approximately 1,200 such texts were ‘read’ for the 
purposes of this analysis
14
 with coding of data clearly revealing key themes in the 
arguments of both unionists and nationalists with regards to independence. Using 
basic quantitative and qualitative content analysis, the extent to which the Better 
Together and Yes Scotland campaigns were built on articulations of (economic) 
(in)security will be revealed, as well as the specific ways in which economic 
(in)security was articulated. The first part of each chapter looks at the significance of 
                                                          
14
 Full lists of titles and information on accessing full articles can be found in the 
appendices. Full articles were not inserted in the appendices as they would have run to 
several thousand pages. 
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utterances of ‘conventional’ (in)security in unionist texts, whilst the remainder of the 
chapter reveals the far greater significance of utterances of economic (in)security, the 
specific ‘types’ of economic threats uttered, as well as the ultimate narrative, or 
discourse, that unionists are attempting to construct with regards to independence. 
 
Conventional Versus Economic (In)Security: Revisiting the ‘Economic-Security 
Nexus’ 
 
Chapter 6 explained that economic (in)security has all too often been conceptualised 
as an adjunct to conventional security, specifically the capacity of the state to finance 
its defence needs. Rather than explaining economic security per se, this regards what 
has been referred to as the ‘economic-security nexus’ (Dent 2006). We can see this, 
for instance, in the UK Government security strategy where it states ‘[a] strong 
economy is a vital basis for our security’ (HM Government 2010, p. 21), or in the 
Prime Minister’s Foreword to the subsequent (and current) 2015 national security 
strategy which urged:  
‘Our national security depends on our economic security, and vice versa. So the 
first step in our National Security Strategy is to ensure our economy is, and 
remains, strong’ (HM Government 2015, p. 5).   
This latter strategy document draws a strong correlation between the need to ensure 
the UK economy’s continued recovery in the aftermath of a global financial crisis and 
subsequent recession, and the continued physical security of the nation. 
‘Our strong economy provides the foundation to invest in our security and 
global influence, which in turn provides more opportunities at home and 
overseas for us to increase our prosperity. A growing global economy helps to 
reduce poverty and build security for all’ (HM Government 2015, p. 69). 
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Although less a feature of the Scottish independence debate, there were rare instances 
where this same argument was made, as in UK Government’s ‘Scotland Analysis: 
Defence’ paper (HM Government 2013). 
‘Various proposals or options have been put forward by the Scottish National 
Party (SNP) and others regarding the possible defence posture and capabilities 
of an independent Scottish state, with estimated costs ranging from £1.6 billion 
to £2.5 billion to cover defence, intelligence and cyber capabilities. Even the 
highest of these estimates is only about 7 per cent of the combined UK budgets 
for defence, intelligence and cyber, and less than countries such as Denmark and 
Norway spend on defence alone. It is not clear what level of security and 
protection the proposals would provide for Scotland; but it is clear that it would 
be much less than that provided to Scotland as part of the UK’ (HM 
Government 2013, p. 10).  
Here there is the implication, if not the explicit assertion, that Scotland will be less 
secure if independent. Incidentally, the publication of this particular document 
represented an important stimulus for the limited number of outputs by both Better 
Together and Yes Scotland that addressed considerations of defence.  
 
Incidentally, it is arguably by reversing the ‘economic-security nexus’ argument that 
we find a better descriptor of utterances of conventional (in)security in the referendum 
debate. Seemingly the unionist’ emphasis was less on Scotland’s capacity to protect 
itself with a lessened defence capacity under independence, but on the likely impact 
of reduced defence spending and hefty defence restructuring costs on Scottish 
economic activity and livelihoods (i.e. the security of defence based jobs in Scotland). 
For instance, in the aforementioned Scotland Analysis document it states:  
‘The Ministry of Defence spent over £20 billion with UK industry in 2011/12, 
just under half of which was with the manufacturing sector, providing 
significant employment opportunities and contributions to national and local 
economies’ (HM Government 2013, p. 67). 
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‘The defence sector is an important part of Scotland’s industry, employing over 
12,600 people, but is highly dependent upon domestic defence spending, 
particularly in the maritime sector’ (HM Government 2013, p. 67). 
‘An independent Scottish state would certainly see lower domestic demand for 
defence goods due to a much smaller budget. It would also lose the support to 
exports provided by the UK’s international defence engagement and facilitated 
by the UK’s global reputation’ (HM Government 2013, p. 67). 
The report stressed the enormous amount of public money dedicated to defence 
spending and how even more will be spent in Scotland in the coming years 
(disproportionately, incidentally, vis-à-vis other parts of the UK), with even more jobs 
being created. This was juxtaposed with the significant costs involved in establishing 
independent defence capabilities should Scotland choose to leave the union. 
 
It is possible to simply quantify the significance of utterances of more ‘conventional’ 
security concerns in Better Together outputs by ascertaining the proportion of titles of 
published content that refer to matters of defence. Therefore, across 532 publications 
from the Better Together campaign (see Appendix 1.0 for full list of article dates and 
titles), just 9 articles (or 1.7%) exhibited titles which dealt ostensibly with such 
security concerns (see Table 1.0). These pertained almost entirely to the likely 
reconfiguration of national security infrastructures, and largely that of militaristic 
defence arrangements. It is worth noting that four of these (those published between 
8
th
 October and 8
th
 November 2013) all pertained explicitly to the publication of the 
aforementioned ‘Scotland Analysis: Defence’ document (UK Government 2013a).  
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Table 1.0: Better Together – Threats to Existing Security Infrastructure 
 
Article 
Date 
Article Title Indicative Quotes 
24/06/13 The UK Armed Forces are 
the best in the world. Let’s 
keep it that way 
‘The damning report published today by the 
Scotland Institute, an independent think-tank, issued 
a stark warning about the impact of going it alone 
on our defence industry and the ability of a separate 
Scotland to defend itself. It concludes that we are 
stronger and safer as part of the UK. Why put this at 
risk and undermine the Scottish national interest?’ 
08/10/13 Defending Scotland: 
stronger together 
‘The Scotland Analysis paper highlights that for 
more than 300 years Scotland has played an integral 
part in the defence of the UK – safeguarding our 
national security, protecting our people, economy 
and interests from threats’ 
19/10/13 The UK Armed Forces are 
the best in the world. Let’s 
keep it that way 
‘The first priority of any responsible government is 
the security of its people. As part of the UK, we 
enjoy a high level of security in a dangerous world.’  
 
‘Our UK defence industry sustains thousands of jobs 
in Scotland – from those who serve on the front line 
to those in our shipyard workers on the Clyde and at 
Rosyth.’ 
31/10/13 Stronger, safer & more 
secure together 
‘Be it international or home-grown threats; cyber-
attack; major accident or natural hazard; an 
increase in the levels of organised crime; or 
unconventional attacks using chemical, nuclear or 
biological weaponry, we are better protected as part 
of the bigger United Kingdom.’ 
08/11/13 Scotland’s security ‘Scotland's security is best served by being part of 
the UK’ 
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20/03/14 Being part of the UK is 
good for defence jobs, say 
shipyard workers and 
employers 
‘Thousands of jobs in Scotland rely on shipbuilding. 
Not just in our yards but also in the vast supply 
chain that supports jobs in businesses across the 
country.’ 
14/04/14 Staying in the UK is best 
for defence and jobs in 
Scotland – Coaker 
‘Thousands of Scots employed in our defence 
industry make the equipment and develop the 
technology necessary to make sure we have the best 
Armed Forces in the world.’ 
15/04/14 Defence industry jobs are 
best protected by 
remaining in the UK 
‘There was real concern over the future of these jobs 
if Scotland votes to leave the UK in September.’ 
05/07/14 Carrier naming shows 
why we are Better 
Together 
‘The construction of the 65,000 tonne aircraft 
carrier supports up to 2,000 jobs in the Rosyth area 
and a further 2,000 on the Clyde. The economy has 
been boosted by over £300 million of sub contracts 
being placed with Scottish companies by the 
consortium that built the carrier.’ 
 
Upon deeper reading of each of the articles in Table 1.0, just three could be 
considered to have dealt almost exclusively with conventional security matters; the 
first was on the 24
th
 June 2013 (‘The UK Armed Forces are the best in the world. 
Let’s keep it that way’), another on the 31
st
 October 2013 (‘Stronger, safer & more 
secure together’), and the last on the 8
th
 November 2013 (‘Scotland’s security’). The 
indicative quotes in Table 1.0 help to illustrate this.  
 
A further three of the articles in Table 1.0 revealed some level of balance between 
economic concerns and conventional security concerns, albeit economic concerns 
directly associated with the security/defence industry and its significance to the 
‘Scottish economy’ and ‘Scottish jobs’. The first, on the 8
th
 October 2013 (‘Defending 
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Scotland: stronger together’), opens with discussion of conventional security, but 
then the majority of its content addressed economic concerns. The second, on the 19
th
 
October 2013 (‘The UK Armed Forces are the best in the world. Let’s keep it that 
way’
15
), also comprised both economic and conventional security concerns, as 
illustrated by the two indicative quotes from this article in Table 1.0. The third article 
on the 14
th
 April 2014 (‘Staying in the UK is best for defence and jobs in Scotland – 
Coaker’) is in fact a re-publication of a speech given by the Shadow Secretary of 
State for Defence. It also deals with both economic and defence concerns. The 
remaining three articles, despite appearing from their titles to pertain to conventional 
security concerns dealt entirely with economic implications and revealed no attempt 
to speak to conventional security fears at all. 
 
As evident from the article in Table 1.0 from the 19
th
 October 2013, the potential loss 
of jobs in the shipbuilding industry as a result of reconfigured defence arrangements 
in an independent Scotland was a stated concern of unionists. In fact, there were ten 
further articles (whose titles did not appear to pertain ostensibly to ‘defence’) that 
dealt with this topic specifically across the campaign period (See Table 1.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Note the use of the same title as that used for the article published on the 24th June 
2013 and previously discussed. Although the titles were the same, the content of the 
articles was not. 
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Table 1.1: Better Together - Threats to the Shipbuilding Industry 
 
Article 
Date 
Article Title Indicative Quotes 
05/07/14 A Future for Scottish 
Shipbuilding on the Clyde 
‘Scotland has a long and enduring relationship 
with shipbuilding and engineering. So much so, 
that the shipbuilding industry is synonymous the 
Clyde. Our industry has been key to the economy 
and to working class communities’ 
11/11/13 The future of shipbuilding 
on the Clyde 
‘It is a fact that, as part of the UK Scotland benefits 
from the sheer scale of the UK’s defence budget 
and ambitions. This not only provides us with a 
level of security that it would be difficult to 
replicate in a separate Scotland, but it sustains 
thousands of highly-skilled jobs throughout the 
country.’ 
01/06/14 BAE Chief Exec warns a 
vote for separation is a vote 
to put Scottish shipbuilding 
jobs at risk 
‘With around 3,500 employees in Scotland, this is a 
very important intervention from BAE. It’s clear 
that if we leave the UK then it would cost defence 
jobs in Scotland. This isn’t a risk worth taking.’ 
23/06/14 Jobs and opportunities in 
Scottish shipyards secured 
by being part of the UK 
‘Being part of the UK secures the future of the 
Scottish shipyards and thousands of jobs - that's 
why we should say No Thanks to separation.’ 
24/06/14 Being part of the UK secures 
the best future for Scotland’s 
shipyards 
‘Around 4,000 jobs in Scotland rely directly on our 
shipbuilding industry. If we leave the UK then these 
jobs would put at risk. Scotland’s shipbuilding 
industry is one of the most advanced and vital parts 
of our economy.’ 
07/07/14 Separation would put 
shipyard jobs at risk, 
confirms BAE boss 
‘The chairman of the UK’s largest defence 
contractor, BAE systems, has said that he doesn’t 
believe the UK government would commission 
warships to be built in an independent Scotland.’ 
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09/07/14 Say No Thanks to secure the 
future of shipbuilding in 
Scotland 
‘Senior trade unionists have said that separation 
will risk thousands of shipyard jobs...The economy 
has been boosted by over £300 million of sub 
contracts being placed with Scottish companies.’ 
15/07/14 Being Part of the UK is the 
best way to secure shipyard 
jobs 
‘Two of the biggest employers in Scotland's defence 
industry have given their strongest warning yet 
over the threat that separation poses to jobs in 
Scotland.’ 
12/08/14 UK shipyard deal protects 
800 jobs in Scotland 
‘The UK Ministry of Defence today confirmed a 
lucrative deal worth £385 million to shipyards in 
Scotland. The construction of three Royal Navy 
patrol vessels on the Clyde will secure 800 jobs for 
years to come. Scotland’s shipbuilding industry is 
one of the most advanced and important parts of 
our economy. The support of the UK Government is 
vital for the long term health of the industry. 
Separation would see the end of this support and 
put Scotland’s shipyards at risk.’ 
16/09/14 A letter to the Scottish 
Government and Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders work-in 
veterans 
‘Shipbuilding on the upper Clyde remains 
Glasgow’s single largest manufacturing industry 
and it forms the largest defence manufacturing 
centre in Scotland. It sustains 8,000 direct and 
indirect jobs, £324 million worth of Gross Value 
Added per annum, and the largest private sector 
apprenticeship programme in Scotland.’ 
 
What is clear from unionist texts is a situation where despite matters of conventional 
security occasionally featuring in the debate, where they did so they very often 
pertained to the economic implications of defence arrangements. Indeed, the same 
situation was evident in nationalist texts too, as will be revealed in the following 
chapter. Far more common again, however, were utterances of economic concerns in 
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their own right. The unionist argument was essentially built on discrediting the 
economic case for independence being proposed by nationalists. Unionists argued that 
under union people in Scotland, and the Scottish economy, benefit from the stability 
and security afforded by being part of a larger and stronger UK economy. Conversely, 
they argued that independence would create numerous economic insecurities for 
people living in Scotland.  
 
The Better Together Campaign: The Insecurities of Independence versus the 
Security of Union 
 
As explained in Chapter 6, in the context of arguments for and against independence 
we can define utterances of economic (in)security as any utterance that speaks to the 
economic livelihoods of people in Scotland, either conveyed as threats, or as 
assurances given regarding the protection from such threats. Based on this broad 
definition, it is possible, as in the case of conventional threats, to assess the extent to 
which the Better Together campaign was underpinned by articulations of the 
economic insecurities of independence through a basic content analysis of their 
outputs. Three measures were used to assess the proportion of Better Together articles 
dealing with economic (in)security, each of which can be regarded as revealing 
utterances of economic (in)security. It ought to be stressed that this is not intended to 
be a precise science, for it clearly relies upon assumptions the author made about: 1) 
What constitutes an utterance of economic (in)security (as stated above), and; 2) The 
audience’s understanding of economic matters and/or the broader terms of the 
independence debate. The latter pertains of course to how the audience will have 
likely ‘read’ the texts published. 
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The first and second measures involved looking just at the titles of articles, as was 
done for conventional security utterances above (See Appendix 1.0
16
). In the case of 
the first, the intention was to illustrate the proportion of article titles which most 
clearly uttered economic insecurities. Examples are given in Table 1.2 
 
Table 1.2: Better Together- Examples of Titles Uttering Economic (In)Security 
 
Article Date Article Title 
04/09/2013 Our economic future: greater opportunity and protection as part of the UK 
family 
29/10/2013 Experts say big cuts or tax rises if Scotland leaves the UK 
07/11/2013 Leading experts warn that the cost of mortgages could rise if Scotland 
separates from the UK 
 
This measure was deemed important, firstly from a consideration of the potential 
audience, since people will have been more likely to have read the titles of articles 
than full articles themselves (perhaps when ‘skimming’ to another article), but 
secondly, given that the titles obviously reveal the core topic and purpose of the 
content (i.e. they reveal what the publications are most trying to say to the reader).  
 
In the case of the second measure the purpose was to illustrate the proportion of 
articles that could be assumed to be about economic insecurity from their titles alone. 
Examples are given in Table 1.3. 
 
                                                          
16
 A number of articles were removed; a series of articles entitled ‘Why I’m Saying 
No Thanks’ ran throughout the debate period, which were removed from the analysis 
as their titles were not topic specific and it was felt that they would dilute the findings. 
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Table 1.3: Better Together – Examples of Titles Assumed to be Uttering 
Economic (In)Security 
 
Article Date Article Title 
17/06/2013 Unanswered questions about how separation would affect our pensions 
01/05/2013 New report reveals true cost of Independence 
22/06/2014 Employers back Scotland’s place in the UK - new survey 
 
None of the three article titles above explicitly articulate a threat, but one can assume 
that their content might reveal as much. For example, one might assume that the first 
will tell us pensions will be negatively affected, the second will refer to the negative 
economic costs of independence, whilst the third will reveal the negative implications 
for employment opportunities in an independent Scotland. Incidentally, an in-depth 
reading proved this to be true in each of the three cases. The reason for including this 
second measure is that those reading the titles alone might equally have assumed them 
to be essentially articulations of economic (in)security, based upon fairly straight-
forward assumptions about their likely content.  
 
The third and final measure used was an in-depth reading of every article in the 
collection, based upon which it was possible to discern the proportion of articles that 
actually dealt with the topic of economic (in)security somewhere within their content.  
What was not considered within this third measure was the extent to which any given 
article was concerned with articulating economic (in)security, as doing so would have 
taken enormous effort and would have not have been terribly meaningful anyway. 
The results of the content analysis based on these three measures were as follows. 
 
191 
 
Table 1.4 Better Together – Proportion of Articles Dealing with Economic 
(In)Security 
 
 Clearly about 
economic 
(in)security in 
title 
Could be assumed to 
be about economic 
(in)security from title 
About 
economic 
(in)security 
in article 
Total 
Number of 
articles 
78 205 337 532 
% of 
articles 
14.7% 38.6% 63.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 1.4 reveals the significance of articulations of economic (in)security across the 
published content of the Better Together campaign. More than one third of all 532 
titles could have been assumed to pertain to the economic insecurities of 
independence, with nearly two thirds actually comprising content that did so.  
 
Incidentally, from reading these materials one notes an escalation across the campaign 
period that was not evident with utterances of economic (in)security throughout the 
Yes Scotland campaign. Between 1
st
 February 2013 and 1
st
 February 2014 there were 
208 articles posted, of which only 12 (or 5.8%) titles could be regarded as explicit 
utterances of economic (in)security, as per the first of the three measures outlined 
above. Between then and the day of the referendum on the 16
th
 September, a shorter 
period of just over 7 months, 324 articles were published, and of these, 66 (20.4%) 
titles could be regarded as utterances of economic (in)security. Furthermore, in terms 
of the main content of the articles, as per the third measure outlined above, 101 of 208 
articles (or 48.6%) comprised utterances of economic (in)security between 1
st
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February 2013 and 1
st
 February 2014, whilst 236 out of 324 (or 72.8%) did so across 
the remaining campaign period. The following charts help to illustrate the observation 
of the escalation in utterances of economic (in)security in Better Together materials. 
Figure 1.0 reveals the proportion of article titles which could be regarded as 
utterances of economic (in)security, whilst Figure 1.1 reveals the proportion of 
articles whose content revealed utterances of economic (in)security.  
 
Figure 1.0: % of Better Together Article Titles about Economic (In)Security 
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Figure 1.1: % of Better Together Articles about Economic (In)Security 
 
 
 
There was also a notable increase in both published content and the focus on 
economic (in)security in the first two weeks of September 2014 (i.e. immediately 
prior the referendum). There were 46 articles posted on the website, of which 37 (or 
80%) pertained to the economic insecurities of independence. Furthermore, the 
language used in the materials at that time appears to reveal a greater sense of 
urgency.  A selection of 8 titles from this two week period (see Table 1.5) reveal this 
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This can be seen, for example, when these titles are compared with those published at 
the same time the previous September (see Table 1.6). 
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Table 1.5: Better Together – Utterances of Economic (In)Security in September 
2014  
      
Article Date Article Title 
03/09/14 Currency chaos would mean painful cuts to public spending, say experts  
04/09/14 Independence wouldn’t put an end to austerity, it would make it worse  
05/09/14 Independence would cost families in Scotland dear, says expert  
08/09/14 The [economic] risks of leaving the UK are “huge” says Nobel prize 
winner (Paul Krugman)  
10/09/14 Black Wednesday: The day the economic case for separation crumbled  
12/09/14 The costs of separation laid bare  
13/09/14 Leaving the UK would bring “severe austerity”  
15/09/14 The poorest would be the hardest hit by separation, says top economist  
 
Table 1.6: Better Together - Utterances of Economic (In)Security in September 
2013  
 
 
To summarise, articulations of the economic (in)securities of independence were 
central to the unionist argument – insofar as can be revealed by the materials 
published by the official unionist ‘Better Together’ campaign. Moreover, there 
appeared to be some level of ‘ramping up’ of said articulations, both quantitatively 
Article Date Article Title 
01/09/13 Alex Salmond’s currency plan “fundamentally flawed”  
03/09/13 Being part of the UK allows us to maximise the North Sea’s potential  
04/09/13 Our economic future: greater opportunity and protection as part of the UK 
family  
12/09/13 The currency question: A roundup of what the experts say 
17/09/13 What would independence mean for our currency and mortgage rates?  
18/09/13 We’re not asking for the shirt off your back  
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and qualitatively throughout the campaign period. More important than this for my 
analyses, however, is what the Better Together campaign materials reveal about the 
way in which economic (in)security was articulated by unionists, specifically the 
different types or topics of economic insecurity uttered. Among other things, this 
revealed notable differences between the unionist and nationalist campaigns. 
 
Table 1.7 presents the key topics of economic (in)security articulated across the 
campaign period by Yes Scotland. These were revealed by a detailed reading of the 
337 Better Together articles (or 63%) considered to have dealt with matters of 
economic (in)security. Essentially, the majority of these 337 articles will have dealt 
with one or more of the insecurities listed in the table below. For the purposes of 
illustration a small selection of articles are presented along with indicative quotes. 
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Table 1.7: Better Together – Utterances of Economic (In)Security 
 
Economic  
(In) 
Security 
Article 
Date 
Article Title Indicative Quotes 
 
P
en
si
o
n
s 
27/03/14 Being part of the UK 
protects the pensions of hard 
working Scots 
‘In a devastating blow to the nationalist 
case for separation, it is now clear that 
breaking up the UK means the pension 
schemes of hard-working Scots could 
close.’ 
22/04/14 Being part of the UK secures 
the pensions of Scots – 
Gordon Brown 
‘It is clear that pensioners are better 
protected when the risks are spread 
across the UK.’ 
25/08/14 Independence risk to 
pensions – new poll 
‘A new poll released today has shown the 
vast majority of Scotland's pensioners are 
worried about the risk to their state 
pension if we leave the UK.’ 
17/06/13 Unanswered questions about 
how separation would affect 
our pensions 
‘Separation would cause “serious risks” 
to the payment of pensions. For many of 
Scotland’s pensioners that isn’t a risk 
worth taking.’ 
 
S
h
a
re
d
 c
u
r
re
n
cy
 
28/02/14 Keeping the security of the 
UK Pound matters 
‘Today we have the strength and security 
of the UK pound.’ 
12/09/13 The currency question: A 
roundup of what the experts 
say 
‘The choice of currency has huge 
economic implications. It would affect our 
mortgage rates, our trade with other 
countries, our financial stability, as well 
as how much our country could tax and 
spend.’ 
17/09/13 What would independence 
mean for our currency and 
mortgage rates? 
‘As part of the UK, we have our own 
currency. We set our own interest rates. 
We have the strength and security of the 
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bigger United Kingdom behind us if 
things go wrong.’ 
12/02/14 SNP Default Threat – What 
the Experts Say 
‘The security of the UK pound means 
more jobs, cheaper mortgages, lower 
credit card bills and more affordable car-
loans. The commentators and experts are 
increasingly asking why we would gamble 
that.’ 
13/02/14 They can’t even tell us what 
currency we would use 
‘Leaving the UK means leaving the 
security of the UK pound.’ 
 
J
o
b
s 
03/09/13 Being part of the UK allows 
us to maximise the North 
Sea’s potential 
‘North Sea oil and gas is good for 
Scotland’s economy. It sustains thousands 
of jobs, especially in the North East.’ 
19/10/13 The UK Armed Forces are 
the best in the world. Let’s 
keep it that way 
‘Why would we want to risk the jobs of 
thousands of people because of Alex 
Salmond’s obsession with independence?’ 
09/03/14 Alex Salmond has turned the 
ballot paper into a betting 
slip 
‘Leaving the UK means losing jobs’ 
27/07/14 Say No Thanks to putting 
our economic future at risk 
‘Putting a border between Scottish 
business and their customers elsewhere in 
the UK could cost our economy billions 
and put jobs in Scotland at risk, new 
analysis confirms’ 
 
C
o
st
 o
f 
li
v
in
g
 
23/07/14 Being part of the UK keeps 
energy costs down for 
families in Scotland 
‘Only by saying No Thanks to separation 
on 18 September can we…keep energy 
bills down for families in Scotland.’ 
09/12/13 UK Single Market keeps 
costs down, say supermarket 
bosses 
‘The bosses of top supermarkets in 
Scotland have said that leaving the UK 
could result in higher weekly shopping 
bills for Scottish families.’ 
22/05/14 Lower cost of living as part ‘The price of our weekly shop, energy 
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of the UK bills and mortgages all face significant 
rises if Scotland leaves the UK. In these 
difficult economic times the last thing we 
need is to add hundreds of pounds to our 
monthly expenses.’ 
13/06/14 Scottish TV licence set to 
soar 
‘A vote for independence on September 18 
could lead to a higher television licence.’ 
12/09/14 Being part of the UK keeps 
the cost down for families in 
Scotland 
‘The cost of everyday things would rise in 
a separate Scotland. That’s the message 
this week from retailers.’ 
 
M
o
rt
g
a
g
es
/b
o
rr
o
w
in
g
 
26/03/14 Employers say we are better 
and stronger together 
‘Being part of the UK is good for jobs and 
keeps down costs for families in Scotland.’ 
14/01/14 Salmond’s reckless threats 
on debt risk pushing up costs 
for families in Scotland 
‘It would be hard working families in 
Scotland who would suffer. Defaulting on 
debt would push up mortgage rates, 
borrowing costs for businesses and credit 
card charges.’ 
24/04/13 Scots on what separation 
could mean for your savings, 
pension and mortgage 
‘In these tough economic times Scots are 
concerned about their pensions, 
mortgages and savings.’ 
 
F
is
ca
l 
v
ia
b
il
it
y
 
09/10/13 What the SNP haven’t been 
telling you about tax rises, 
cuts & their oil fund plans 
‘We know that as part of the UK we get 
the benefit of North Sea oil without risking 
our public finances on its volatility.’ 
29/10/13 Experts say big cuts or tax 
rises if Scotland leaves the 
UK 
‘Two groups of leading economic experts 
have said that we would face deep cuts or 
tax rises, if Scotland was to leave the 
United Kingdom.’ 
20/03/14 Budget oil forecasts show 
that being part of the UK 
protects public services in 
Scotland 
‘Being part of the UK protects funding for 
Scotland’s schools and hospitals, Better 
Together said today.’ 
09/04/14 Experts say leaving the UK ‘On the money available to spend on 
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would put our public services 
at risk 
schools and hospitals, pensions and 
benefits, the expert NIESR report said that 
there would need to be bigger cuts than 
anything necessary as part of the UK.’ 
13/09/14 Leaving the UK would bring 
“severe austerity” 
‘Scotland would therefore have to engage 
in severe austerity, either by cutting 
public spending or raising taxes or both, 
to establish fiscal credibility.’ 
 
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
S
y
st
em
 S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
18/03/13 As Scots, we believe there is 
nowhere better. But we do 
know there is something 
bigger 
‘The fact that the UK was there to stand 
behind a failed Scottish bank – and this 
was a calamity made in Edinburgh – is 
only one example of the strength of 
sharing risks.’ 
30/06/14 Being part of the UK 
protects the jobs, savings and 
mortgages of Scots 
‘A global analysis of banks has shown 
that the UK economy offers more security 
and protection from shocks in the banking 
sector than would be possible in a 
separate Scotland.’ 
09/04/14 Being part of something 
bigger gives Scotland 
economic security without 
losing our unique identity 
‘I know from my own time as Chancellor 
that being part of something bigger means 
greater economic security for Scotland. It 
was because we had the back-up of the 
larger UK that we were able to prevent 
the collapse of the Scottish and UK 
economy.’ 
 
The most frequently uttered insecurities across the Better Together campaign, all of 
which independence was conveyed as being the harbinger of, were: 1) Threats to 
pensions, whereby an independent Scotland was argued to be unable to afford to pay 
the ever-growing pension bill associated with an ageing population; 2) Threats 
associated with the loss of a shared currency with the rest of the UK; 3) Threats to 
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jobs through lost economic opportunities (and public contracts) afforded under union; 
4) Threats to the cost of living for Scottish people, most notably energy and grocery 
bills, either through lost economies of scale, or shifting commercial ‘obligations’ to 
spread costs like distribution over such a broad and complex geography; 5) Threats 
associated with potentially higher borrowing costs in an independent Scotland, 
including that of mortgages; 6) Threats regarding the fiscal (un)viability of an 
independent Scottish state (see Chapter 5), wherein taxes would need to rise or public 
spending fall in order to compensate for Scotland no longer benefitting from a net 
transfer of public wealth in its favour; and, 7) Threats resulting from no longer having 
a financial system backed up by the UK’s much larger public purse (much was made 
by unionists of the measures taken by the UK Government to shore up large Scottish 
financial institutions during the financial crisis in 2008, which an independent 
Scottish government would almost certainly have not been capable of, and an 
otherwise separate UK state could not have been expected to do).  
 
Making a distinction between each of these insecurities is of course somewhat 
arbitrary given that many are related in very practical terms. For example, 
distinguishing between threats to a shared currency and threats to fiscal viability is 
difficult given the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy. Similarly, 
conceiving of threats to the oil industry as simply a threat to oil jobs (as per the 
indicative quote in Table 1.7 from the article ‘Being part of the UK allows us to 
maximise the North Sea’s potential’ published on the 9
th
 March 2013) ignores the fact 
that oil revenues are also deemed crucial to the fiscal viability of an independent 
Scottish state due to the much greater proportion of tax revenues it would have 
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accounted for. In fact, many articles will have comprised utterances of multiple 
insecurities from the above table.  
 
As such, it is not possible to illustrate the proportion of articles dealing with each of 
these insecurities in particular. Nor is it really possible - or terribly meaningful – to 
illustrate the extent to which each of these insecurities were significant in the overall 
articulation of the economic (in)securities of  independence by unionists, although as 
stated in Chapter 5, matters of public finance provided probably the single most 
important topic of debate. Incidentally, as the campaign period progressed it became 
increasingly common for articles to comprise utterances of numerous economic 
insecurities, because as economic arguments against independence became better 
rehearsed, there was a tendency for any given article to refer to a number of economic 
arguments, often beyond what may have been the principle topic of that article. Here 
we see a very clear instance of intertextuality, as earlier texts or communicative 
events are implicated through newer ones - in this case previously iterated insecurities 
– as part of an increasingly rehearsed narrative or discourse of the economic 
insecurities of independence. 
 
Intertextuality was also evident through commonly uttered words, terms or phrases in 
both unionist and nationalist texts. In the case of unionists, prominent examples were 
‘security’, ‘stability’ and ‘strength’, often uttered as single, repeated phrase. As they 
are constantly reiterated, these helped to act as organising tropes or signifiers in 
arguments against independence, around which the specific insecurities above could 
be organised or collated. If one was to ascribe a title to the overarching narrative, or 
discourse of unionists against independence, it might be that of ‘strength, security and 
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stability’. Put succinctly by Alisdair Darling in a speech given at Glasgow University 
in July 2013 (‘We Belong Together: The Case for a United Kingdom): 
“It's the choice to look outward, not inward. It's the choice to share, not to 
separate. It's the choice of economic strength, not financial uncertainty. It's the 
choice of stability and security, not risk and weakness" (Darling 2013). 
Similarly, in Better Together article published on 8
th
 September 2014 (‘Today the 
costs of separation became real’) the Shadow Foreign Secretary, Douglas Alexander 
is quoted as saying: 
“These are risks that we simply don’t have to take. There is a much better way 
to secure the future of Scotland. We can have more powers over tax and 
welfare for Scotland, backed up by the strength, security and stability of the 
larger UK economy. We should say No Thanks to taking on all the risks of 
separation on 18 September” (emphasis added) 
The next section of this chapter looks more closely at this argument about the greater 
strength, security and stability of being part of a larger UK economy, and drawing 
upon the conceptual themes developed in previous chapters, will state what this rather 
unremarkable looking argument in support of continued union in fact reveals about 
the taken-for-granted truths that make it possible.  
 
Imagining the Economy in Unionist ‘Texts’ 
 
In Chapter 6, it was explained that we are encouraged to think of our individual 
economic (in)security as inextricably bound up with those of the collective. Our 
economic circumstances are to a greater or lesser extent thought to be determined by 
the trajectory of ‘the economy’ and the community of economic fate within which we 
‘live’. The assumption is that people in Scotland have an especially shared economic 
circumstance at present (either within a Scottish economy or a UK economy) and will 
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have an especially shared economic circumstance (either improved or worsened) after 
the referendum either under continued union or in a newly independent state. 
 
Here we see another instance of intertextuality at work in the texts analysed. Insofar 
as the economy is largely imagined, and is but one – albeit largely accepted - view of 
reality, and way of organising politico-economic space, it can be considered to be a 
(contingent) narrative, or discourse. A methodological distinction was made in 
Chapter 2 between intertextuality and interdiscursivity. The latter is in fact an 
example of the former, but usefully describes how any given concrete text might draw 
upon grander texts, narratives or discourses. Texts must draw upon a much wider 
discursive context in order to convey meaning and it is possible to identify specific 
‘voices’ or discourses within that context. In this case, the very idea of ‘the economy’ 
can be considered to be such a discourse insofar as it renders meaningful the 
articulation of collective economic (in)security. Moreover, to the extent that discourse 
is inherently productive, said texts serve a performative purpose in helping to 
re/construct their discursive context, and the specific discourses implicated. Indeed, it 
is argued here that unionist articulations of the economic insecurities of independence 
both relied upon and potentially helped to further sediment the very idea of ‘the 
economy’. 
 
Crucially, where one discourse, or view of reality, is seen to dominate over others, it 
is often considered to be ‘hegemonic’. It is argued in this thesis, however, that the 
discourse of ‘the economy’ is not merely hegemonic, but can be seen as largely 
‘objective’. Phillips and Jørgensen (2004, p. 36) state that ‘hegemony comes between 
‘objectivity’ and ‘the political’’, and refers to instances whereby articulations 
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re/produce dominant or hegemonic discourses. In Chapter 2 is was explained that 
objectivity refers to those discourses that become so sedimented, so naturalised, that 
their contingency becomes forgotten, they appear apolitical; they are taken for 
granted, seen as ‘common sense’. To all intents and purposes, they appear 
to represent truths. In this respect, within economic arguments for and against 
independence, and articulations of economic (in)security, dialogicality (see Chapter 2) 
is almost entirely absent between given texts, and what is a taken-for-granted 
discourse of ‘the economy’. Essentially, this discourse of the economy is implicitly 
assumed rather than explicitly iterated.  
 
The UK Government document ‘Scottish Referendum: Money & the Economy’ 
stated: 
‘When it comes to the money in your pocket and the wider economy, the 
outcome of the Scottish referendum on 18th September 2014 will have long-
term consequences’ (HM Government 2014b, p. 1). 
‘The economy and our financial strength is important to understand, as 
ultimately it affects the security of your family, your finances and the future of 
generations to come. Our comprehensive analysis gives you the facts you need 
to make a more informed choice’ (HM Government 2014b, p. 2). 
Here ‘the economy’ is linked explicitly to individual (and family) economic 
(in)security. Crucially, articulating the shared insecurities of either independence or 
union both relied upon the conveyance of a distinct economic entity and 
corresponding community of economic fate whilst reciprocally serving to further 
sediment it. Of course, the principal referent for unionists was the UK economy and an 
associated UK economic community of fate, whereas for nationalists it was the 
Scottish economy and Scottish economic community of fate. However, this is not to 
say that nationalists only ever referred to the Scottish economy or unionists to the UK 
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economy. Unionists would commonly speak of a Scottish economy, but only ever 
with reference to it being inextricably bound up within a wider UK economy (i.e. the 
UK ‘scale’ would essentially be privileged as the determining entity) that is stronger, 
more stable, and more secure. If ever the Scottish economy was spoken of as an 
entirely separate community of fate, it was with reference to a future, independent 
Scottish economy characterised by insecurity once critically severed from the UK.   
 
One of the Better Together campaign’s central slogans was the ‘the best of both 
worlds’, which argued that under union the people of Scotland benefit from a level of 
self-determination afforded by devolution whilst also benefiting from the security of 
being a part of something bigger. The indicative quote in the fifth row of Table 1.8 
illustrates this. Coupled with the supposed opportunities of an integrated union, is the 
supposed security of being part of a larger, more stable economy in the face of 
external risks and shocks in the global economy. Table 1.8 provides a sample of 
articles from the Better Together campaign that illustrate this, along with key quotes 
to illustrate how Scotland and the Scottish economy was conveyed as being more 
secure as a part of a larger, more secure UK economy.  
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Table 1.8: Better Together – The Scottish Economy as part of the UK Economy 
Article 
Date 
Article Title Indicative Quotes 
06/05/13 “I should not have to, and 
will not, choose between 
being Scottish and British.”- 
Sir Robin Wales 
‘A strong Scotland as part of a United Kingdom 
sharing resources, risks and rewards.’ 
08/29/13 Tell us why you think we 
get the best of both worlds 
as part of the UK 
‘Our Scottish Parliament has been a real 
success – backed up by the strength and 
security of the bigger UK economy.’ 
09/04/13 Our economic future: 
greater opportunity and 
protection as part of the UK 
family 
‘Scotland benefits from being part of a larger, 
integrated UK economy.’ 
09/17/13 What would independence 
mean for our currency and 
mortgage rates? 
‘We have the strength and security of the bigger 
United Kingdom behind us if things go wrong. 
The nationalists’ plans put all of that at risk.’ 
09/19/13 New report evidence we 
benefit from the best of both 
worlds 
‘Devolution offers us the best of both worlds: 
we have a strong Scottish Parliament making 
key decisions here in Scotland about Scotland. 
But we still get the benefit of being backed up 
by the strength and security of the bigger UK 
economy.’ 
01/04/14 Experts say we’re better off 
together as part of the UK 
economy 
‘It is clear that the Scottish economy benefits 
enormously from being part of one of the 
biggest economies in the world.’ 
01/06/14 Devolution remains “the 
settled will of the Scottish 
people”, new poll confirms 
‘we benefit from the strength and security of the 
larger UK.’ 
01/28/14 SNP currency plans take a 
pounding… 
‘In these economically uncertain times, 
Scotland benefits from the absolute reassurance 
that comes from the financial back-up of being 
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part of the UK. The last thing we need is more 
uncertainty.’ 
04/09/14 Being part of something 
bigger gives Scotland 
economic security without 
losing our unique identity 
‘I know from my own time as Chancellor that 
being part of something bigger means greater 
economic security for Scotland. It was because 
we had the back-up of the larger UK that we 
were able to prevent the collapse of the Scottish 
and UK economy.’ 
04/26/14 “It’s because I am Scottish 
that I want Scotland to stay 
in the UK”, says Reid 
‘The positive case for our partnership of the UK 
lies partly in its capacity to reduce these risks 
through a larger, stronger economy, a 
centuries-old stable structure for investment 
and a greater capacity to weather the economic 
storms.’ 
04/29/14 Women in Business back 
the UK 
‘The UK single market, increased job 
opportunities and strength, stability and 
security of the UK Pound are major assets for 
Scottish business. Separating from the UK is an 
irreversible decision that businesses agree 
would cause major damage to the economy.’ 
05/19/14 Young Scots say we are 
stronger and better together 
‘…the brightest future for Scotland’s economy 
is as part of the UK.’ 
06/07/14 Polls show Salmond needs 
to come clean with a Plan on 
currency 
‘…being part of the UK is good for Scotland’s 
economy.’ 
06/16/14 More powers for Scotland 
guaranteed 
‘…strength, security and stability of being part 
of the larger UK economy.’ 
08/13/14 Women Together celebrate 
the success of the 100 
Letters campaign 
‘We can have more powers for Scotland 
guaranteed without losing the back-up that 
comes from being part of the larger UK 
economy. Why put that at risk?’ 
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Professor Jim Gallagher, a key protagonist in the unionist campaign, asserted:  
‘Economic union is a strategy for a small country in a globalised world. Not 
perhaps the only strategy but, I will argue, one that’s proved successful. It's 
about two things. First, free trade and the opportunities that offers individual 
Scots and Scottish businesses. Second, it’s a way of managing risk and 
uncertainty and coping with the effects of economic shocks, so as to provide 
economic stability and security’ (Gallagher 2013). 
Elsewhere Gallagher stressed ‘Free trade offers an argument for economic 
opportunity: by contrast, economic integration offers one from economic security’ 
and that ‘Larger economies tend to be less volatile, as risks and shocks are absorbed 
over a wider pool’ (2014, p. 71). This view of the Scottish economy (and thereby 
Scottish economic subjects) being more secure within a union with a larger UK 
economy relies upon the assertion of an environment of constant and inherent risk, 
which helps to bring the imagined boundaries of ‘the economy’ into focus. Here we 
see a notable difference between many utterances of economic insecurities compared 
to those of more conventional insecurities. In the case of the latter there is often a 
defined threat in the form of specified actors (traditionally states, but now terrorist 
groups, criminal gangs, individuals, etc.), but in the case of economic insecurities the 
designation of a threatening ‘other’ is sometimes apparent, but need not be, as with 
unionist arguments against independence. 
 
Articulating Economic (In)Security in the Absence of an ‘Other’ 
 
Social constructionist literature (see Burr 2015), of which poststructuralism is a key 
component, commonly stresses the importance of ‘the other’ in constructions of social 
identities. Put simply, this is based on the recognition that identities rely 
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fundamentally upon difference, and differences have to be articulated. Indeed, in the 
methodology, the importance of ‘othering’ in the construction of discursive 
formations was stressed. In the previous chapter it was argued that among others one 
reason why it might have been difficult to speak conventional (in)security in the 
independence referendum was the effective absence of an ‘other’ for the articulation 
of collective threat. The requirement for ‘othering’ in the case of articulations of 
economic (in)security is quite different. In many nationalist articulations of economic 
(in)security there was a clear ‘other’ in the form of ‘Westminster’, or a commonly 
associated signifier like ‘the union’, ‘the UK’, or ‘the UK Government’. However, in 
most unionist articulations of economic (in)security there was no obvious ‘other’. 
Arguably, this is often the case with articulations of economic (in)security due to the 
assumed, inherent insecurities of economic life (see Chapter 6) and the taken-for-
granted nature of ‘the economy’, such that to talk of shared insecurities within a given 
object space (i.e. the Scottish or UK economy) need not necessarily require the same 
level of validation. As explained in Chapter 6, economic insecurities are considered 
part and parcel of economic life according to economic liberalism. As such, whilst 
‘blame’ for either specific economic insecurities can certainly be attributed to certain 
actors they need not be. In place of an ‘other’ we see the ‘spectre’ of insecurity - the 
one constant in economic life.  
 
Intimately related to this doctrine is the discourse of globalisation, through which the 
spectre of insecurity is the consequence of necessarily being part of an increasingly 
integrated, competitive and potentially volatile, global economy. Globalisation is seen 
as the harbinger of both opportunities and dangers, but something that is ultimately 
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unavoidable. Bristow (2005) stressed this point with regards to regional 
competitiveness in the UK. 
‘Current policy documents extolling the language of ‘competitiveness’ tend to 
present it as an entirely unproblematic term and, moreover, as an 
unambiguously beneficial attribute of an economy. Competitiveness is 
portrayed as the means by which regional economies are externally validated 
in an era of globalisation, such that there can be no principled objection to 
policies and strategies deemed to be competitiveness enhancing, whatever 
their indirect consequences’ (Bristow 2005, p.285). 
Bristow (2005) argues, basically, that through conveying competitiveness threats to 
the regional economy, the latter is made governable. Whilst Bristow focuses on the 
regional (sub-state) level, the same discursive strategy can be seen at different scales, 
including the national and supranational. Rosamond (2002; 2012) has observed with 
regards to the ‘European economy’, for example, that it is imagined as a regional, 
supranational economy in the face of global competitiveness threats (see Chapter 4). 
In other words, ‘economies’ are seen as needing to be competitive in order to survive, 
much like the capitalist firm. The competitiveness of ‘economies’ in the face of 
globalisation, we are led to believe, is the critical existential consideration regarding 
their viability, and with it, the life-chances or economic (in)security of individuals 
therein.  
 
For some time now the Scottish economy has been imagined within the context of 
historical decline (in particular it’s de-industrialisation) in the face of structural shifts 
in the global economy and the growing competitiveness of other regions/parts of the 
world (Brown et al. 1998; Tomlinson 2014). The same is true in fact of the Welsh 
economy, although whereas the Welsh economy continues to be seen as especially 
disadvantaged (and therefore dependent upon fiscal transfers within the union), the 
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Scottish economy is increasingly imagined (not least through the efforts of the 
Scottish Nationalist Party) as having redressed much of its historical disadvantage, 
and as an economy set to benefit from the opportunities globalisation can afford. 
 
Nevertheless, the Scottish economy can still be thought to face the inherent threats 
associated with globalisation and must respond accordingly to remain competitive 
according to established thinking. The aforementioned UK Government’s national 
security strategy, current at the time of the referendum, entitled ‘A Strong Britain in 
an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy’, explains a context comprising 
both the need for closer ties with other economies, but also the inherent vulnerability 
of interdependence in light of a global financial crisis.  
‘The [most recent financial] crisis demonstrated the level of interdependence 
and the depth of integration of economies across the world. This trend towards 
closer integration is set to continue…The UK has strategic and economic 
imperatives to build closer ties with the new economic powers’ (HM 
Government 2010, p. 15). 
Whilst the latter ‘globalisation discourse’ does not always feature in unionist 
arguments against independence - in some it is explicitly stated, and in others only 
implied – the unionist argument that remaining part of a larger UK economy better 
ensures Scottish economic security relies upon the assumed, inherent uncertainty, 
instability and insecurity of being part of a turbulent global economy. This is clearly 
evident from the articles in Table 1.6.  
 
Here again we see an example of intertextuality between the specific utterances of 
insecurity and an assumed context (or discourse) of vulnerabilities and threat. 
Moreover, as with the idea of ‘the economy’ above, the dialogicality at work in such 
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utterances is almost invisible. Besides relying on the taken-for-granted discourse of 
‘the economy’, unionist utterances (and many nationalist ones too – See Chapter 8) of 
economic (in)security rely on commonly accepted views of ‘the economic’, namely 
those of neoliberalism, whereby economic life is (and should be) largely governed by 
the market, and wherein economic risks/vulnerabilities/insecurities are deemed to be 
part and parcel of economic life. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has looked at the significance of articulations of economic (in)security in 
unionist arguments against Scottish independence in the referendum debate. Chapter 5 
argued that whilst conventional security assurances are thought integral to the 
consolidation of the governance capacities and territorialisation of the state, economic 
(in)security assurances are also important. In the case of the Scottish independence 
referendum, articulations of conventional (in)security were all but non-existent from 
unionist ‘texts’ - as was the case with nationalist ‘texts’ (see Chapter 8) - and yet the 
(potential) re-territorialisation of political space was very clearly at stake.  
Moreover, revisiting the concept of the ‘economics-security nexus’ (Dent 2007; see 
Chapter 5) this chapter argued that, conversely to the standard formulation, where 
matters which might be thought to pertain to conventional (in)security were 
articulated they were in fact done so more for their proposed implications for 
economic (in)security than the converse. 
 
The remainder of the chapter addressed what we might think of as articulations of 
economic (in)security in their own right across unionist texts. As well as illustrating 
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the proportional significance of articulations of economic (in)security across the 
Better Together campaign’s online materials, the specific types of insecurities uttered 
were also revealed. In essence, the unionist case against independence was built on a 
narrative, or discourse, of the economic insecurities of independence, based on the 
assertion that the Scottish economy and Scottish people (or rather people living and 
working in Scotland) benefit from the stability and security of being part of a larger 
and stronger UK economy. 
 
Chapter 6 argued that articulations of economic (in)security are inextricable from 
imaginations of ‘the economy’. The insecurities posed by unionists can be seen as 
complicit in the construction of ‘the economy’. Articulating the insecurities of 
independence assumed the existence of a strictly material ‘community of fate’ 
(Williams 2003) within which Scots can be thought to reside, and within which the 
economic implications of independence would be especially shared. Besides 
exaggerating the extent to which such a thing as the Scottish/UK economy actually 
exists and is the determining context of people’s livelihoods and life-chances, this 
focus on economic insecurities also serves to obscure the necessarily political nature 
of ‘the economy’ as a spatial-scalar designation. Moreover, regardless of the actual 
motivations behind people’s ultimate choice in the referendum, by encouraging them 
to vote on the basis of material utility to the virtual exclusion of almost anything else, 
broader discussions regarding the politics of identity and legitimacy discussed in 
Chapter 3 were foreclosed.  
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Chapter 8: Articulating (Economic) (In)Security: The 
Nationalist Case For Independence 
 
This chapter follows a very similar structure to the previous chapter. Whereas the 
latter focussed on unionist ‘texts’ this one focuses on nationalist texts. As well as key 
government documents and speeches, materials from the official nationalist ‘Yes 
Scotland’ campaign are used to illustrate arguments for independence. As stressed in 
Chapter 5, there were notable and often explicit attempts by key protagonists to 
proffer what they professed to be a more rational and utilitarian argument for 
independence based upon economics. As in the case of unionist arguments against 
independence, one can consider these as arguments (at least largely) of economic 
(in)security.  
 
The nationalist proposition is that people in Scotland face specific economic 
insecurities under union, but will be more economically secure with independence. 
Interestingly, whilst certain components, or topics of economic (in)security, were the 
same across unionist and nationalist texts (albeit with the opposing sides disagreeing 
on the other’s assessment of them) nationalists also articulated a set of different 
insecurities, which revealed very different ideas about the economy and the political 
values thought representative of Scottish people. The first part of the chapter looks at 
the significance of utterances of ‘conventional’ (in)security in nationalist texts. The 
remainder of the chapter reveals the far greater significance of utterances of economic 
(in)security, the specific ‘types’ of economic threats uttered, as well as the ultimate 
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narrative or discourse that nationalists are attempting to construct with regards to 
independence.  
 
Conventional Versus Economic (In)Security: Revisiting the ‘Economics-Security 
Nexus’ 
 
As with Better Together texts in the previous chapter, Yes Scotland texts revealed far 
fewer instances of ‘conventional’ security concerns being uttered, and where they did, 
they referred more to the economic implications of defence arrangements than to 
conventional security concerns per se. Incidentally, the Yes Scotland website included 
a list of ‘categories’ under which articles were listed by way of aiding navigation of 
the website’s content, including that of ‘Will we be secure?’ (Figure 1.2).  
 
Figure 1.2: Yes Scotland - Sample Webpage 
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Besides being a navigational aid, the assignment of this category can also be seen as 
(perhaps deliberately) ‘performative’ insofar as it asserts that Scotland’s security is, or 
at least should be, a key consideration in the referendum debate. Incidentally, the 
overall website design changed during the campaign period, including the 
introduction of this and the other categories. It is highly likely that the introduction of 
this particular category was reactionary to a proliferation of unionist texts purporting 
the insecurities of independence. As discussed later in the chapter, several of the 
topics of economic (in)security uttered by nationalists mirrored those of unionists, and 
many of the Yes Scotland articles appear to have been reactionary to the outputs of 
the unionist campaign in this manner. In any event, what the inclusion of this ‘Will 
we be secure?’ category does afford us is an opportunity to discern what the 
nationalist campaign itself considered to be matters of (in)security, and whether this 
included conventional security concerns, economic security concerns, or indeed other 
formulations of security.  
 
Appendix 2.0 lists all 129 article titles within the aforementioned category of ‘Will we 
be secure?’ posted between 23
rd
 September 2013 and 16
th
 September 2014 (i.e. over 
the course of approximately one year). As with Better Together publications, the 
proportion of Yes Scotland articles dealing with conventional security concerns, even 
within this specific category, was very small indeed. Based on a content analysis of 
just the titles of the articles themselves, only 12 (or 9.4%) could be assumed to be 
about conventional security, and 3 of these pertained to the provision of emergency 
services (specifically policing) as opposed to matters of national defence 
arrangements (see Table 1.9). By comparison, 61 article titles (or 47.7%) pertained 
explicitly to economic concerns or threats. 
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Table 1.9: Yes Scotland – Threats to the Existing Security Infrastructure 
Article 
Date 
Article Title Indicative Quotes 
27/09/13 Defence forces designed 
for Scotland - and to 
support our service 
personnel  
‘A Yes vote means we can better ensure Scotland’s 
protection – with defence forces designed for 
Scotland’s needs.’ 
15/10/13 Reports of US accidents 
show risks of Scotland's 
nuclear weapons 
 
‘Recent reports about the very large number of 
"significant incidents" involving American nuclear 
weapons show the danger of having these weapons 
of mass destruction in our country.’ 
21/10/13 The Scottish Police 
Federation tells 
politicians to be honest 
about Westminster cuts 
 
‘Many things are important in deciding the future 
of our nation and the safety and security of our 
citizens has got to be at the very top of that list. 
The fine men and women of your police service…’ 
27/10/13 Independent Scotland can 
have first-class security 
service 
 
‘A former counter-terrorism chief says an 
independent Scotland can have a first-class 
intelligence and security service, built on the 
country’s wealth of experience and talent in this 
field.’ 
29/10/13 Yes vote will give 
Scotland the chance to 
build an excellent 
security service 
 
‘A Yes vote in next year’s independence 
referendum will give Scotland the opportunity to 
build a first-class intelligence and security service 
that meets our needs and priorities.’ 
12/11/13 Scottish Defence Force 
'would be better and cost 
less’ 
 
‘An expert report published today concludes that a 
Scottish Defence Force has the potential to 
“deliver a better defence for the citizens of 
Scotland”, and could be “delivered for less than 
Scottish taxpayers currently pay.’ 
22/11/13 Silly scare story about ‘Scotland is proud of its armed forces and we can 
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armed forces proved false 
 
look forward to a strong Scottish defence force 
capable of protecting our national interests after a 
Yes vote.’ 
17/12/13 Trident 'not an insurance 
policy, it’s a booby trap' 
 
‘Given the price, I’m not convinced the public 
think it would be such a terrible thing to get rid of 
nuclear weapons. With huge cuts in public 
spending, there is no convincing argument to 
spend billions on a redundant defence system.’ 
04/02/14 Daily Digest: MoD 
Relying on Twitter for 
Intelligence and Tory 
Sabre-Rattling Doesn’t 
Bode Well for a No vote 
‘In a country which such an extensive coastline 
and so many important offshore assets, the 
absence of either new maritime patrol aircraft and 
any major surface vessels from Scotland shows 
that the Ministry of Defence is not working for 
even the most fundamental of Scotland’s interests.’ 
15/08/14 Senior former police 
figures declare support 
for a Yes vote 
‘The police service - like so many other areas of 
Scottish public life - needs to be protected from the 
worst excesses of the cuts and austerity threatened 
from Westminster now and for years and years to 
come.  This referendum is the one opportunity to 
make sure Scotland avoids that fate.’ 
14/09/14 Yes support from senior 
Scottish military and 
diplomatic figures 
‘Scotland is in an excellent position to properly 
equip and maintain defence forces, just like other 
northern neighbours. I know many Royal Navy 
colleagues who would be delighted to serve in 
Scottish Defence Forces. More settled military 
service in Scotland will also be of huge benefit to 
defence dependent communities like those around 
Faslane and Coulport.’ 
16/09/14 Former police chief says 
a Yes vote will help 
secure a safer Scotland 
‘Ex-Chief Superintendent David O’Connor says he 
believes that independence will help guarantee the 
future of Police Scotland - the new single force he 
helped to create - and lead to a safer society.’ 
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As with the Better Together materials, the articles in Table 1.9 published between 27
th
 
October 2013 and 22
nd
 November 2013 were, in part at least, reactionary to the 
publication of the HM Government (2013) paper, ‘Scotland Analysis: Defence’. In 
essence, the majority of discussion (in both nationalist and unionist texts) pertaining 
to conventional security considerations of defence featured at this time. Two of the 
articles in Table 1.9 pertain to the maintenance of the UK’s nuclear deterrent sited in 
Faslane, Scotland. This has long been a contentious topic, with the Scottish 
Government vehemently arguing that it is an outdated security provision in the 
modern world, and that the cost of its maintenance directs public funds away from 
more worthy causes (see House of Commons 2013; Jamison 2006).  
 
Of all of the articles from Table 1.9, the article that is perhaps the best example of 
dealing exclusively with conventional security concerns is that published on 29
th
 
October 2013 (‘Yes vote will give Scotland the chance to build an excellent security 
service’). Not only does it argue that Scotland would be able to build a fit-for-purpose 
security service of its own, but also, drawing on views of various security ‘experts’, it 
argues that Scotland would be less likely to face some of the threats the UK as a 
whole faces due to the very different geopolitical position it would likely inherit (See 
Appendix 4.0 for full article). As with the Better Together articles that appear to be 
about conventional security, the content of these Yes Scotland articles, which 
ostensibly refer to conventional concerns, typically pertained instead to considerations 
of economic (in)security, such as misspent public funds in the case of the 
aforementioned UK nuclear deterrent, or threats to jobs through likely reduced 
defence budgets under continued union. Again, this suggests a reversing of the logic 
of the so called ‘economics-security nexus’ (Dent 2007; see Chapter 6). 
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As stated above, within the ‘Will we be secure?’ categorised articles, there is by 
comparison a much greater emphasis on economic (in)security. This is briefly 
illustrated in Table 2.0 with a selection of just 10 articles published across the space 
of one month at the end of 2013, and thereby comprising one of the 12 articles from 
Table 1.9 above. Besides that one article (‘Silly scare stories about armed forces 
proved false’) the remainder pertain largely to economic concerns. 
 
Table 2.0: Yes Scotland – Sample of ‘Will we be secure?’ Articles 
 
Article 
Date Article Title 
22/11/13 Spreading the benefits of wealth across all of Scotland 
22/11/13 Questions for No, as 'positive case for the Union' reaches new low 
22/11/13 Silly scare story about armed forces proved false 
28/11/13 A better deal for Scotland’s farming communities 
28/11/13 'Yes best for farming, best for Scotland' 
03/12/13 Economic experts deal double blow to No campaign scaremongering 
08/12/13 Westminster pensions raid gives insight to full cost of a No vote  
10/12/13 
A stronger economy with more support for small businesses' Attracting the 
talent to help build our prosperity 
13/12/13 More Westminster welfare cuts show why Yes is better for Scotland 
16/12/13 UK inequality is no 'myth' despite what Tories say 
 
As with the Better Together campaign, the majority of Yes Scotland materials 
emphasised the economic (in)security implications of independence. In what follows 
the chapter will look at nationalist utterances of economic (in)security across the 
campaign period. Conversely to conventional (in)security, it was perfectly meaningful 
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to speak of Scottish economic insecurities and a shared security imperative, 
potentially reinforcing the territorialisation of political space. Moreover, whilst 
unthinkable in conventional security terms, nationalists were even able to argue that 
the UK Government, Westminster, the union, or another commonly associated 
‘other’, was the key source of those insecurities, not just a failed protector from them. 
One key reason why it was meaningful to do so is the taken-for-granted, imagined 
economy and a corresponding community of shared economic fate. 
 
The Yes Scotland Campaign: The Opportunities of Independence versus the 
Insecurity of Union  
 
As with the analysis of Better Together materials in Chapter 7, the extent to which the 
Yes Scotland campaign was built on utterances of economic (in)security was assessed 
using a basic content analysis. The method that was used, or rather the measures that 
were used, were explained in Chapter 7. Whereas the analysis of Better Together 
materials was based on the entire published content of that campaign’s website, the 
following analysis of Yes Scotland materials is based on articles published between 
3
rd
 December 2013 and 16
th
 September 2014 (see Appendix 3.0). This was deemed to 
provide a sufficiently representative sample of texts. Moreover, outputs from Yes 
Scotland far outnumbered those of the Better Together campaign; even across this 
shorter time period there were 659 articles published compared with the 532 articles 
that comprised the entire Better Together collection. As with the analysis of Better 
Together materials in Table 1.4, Table 2.1 attempts to illustrate the extent to which 
the Yes Scotland campaign’s content was built on articulations of economic 
(in)security. Again, each data point within the table should be regarded as an instance 
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of an utterance of economic (in)security, albeit with some utterances perhaps more 
impactful than others. 
 
Table 2.1: Yes Scotland - Proportion of Articles Dealing with Economic 
(In)Security 
 
11.8% of article titles could be regarded as utterances of economic (in)security, 23.4% 
of titles could be assumed to regard utterances of economic (in)security, and 52.8% of 
articles comprised utterances of economic (in)security within their content. This can 
be compared therefore with figures of 14.7%, 38.6% and 63% respectively for Better 
Together content (See Table 1.4). This suggests a greater focus on utterances of 
economic (in)security in unionist arguments. If we compare the aforementioned Yes 
Scotland publications with Better Together publications across the exact same time 
period (i.e. 3
rd
 December 2013 – 16
th
 September 2014) then the greater focus on 
utterances of economic (in)security in unionist texts is even more apparent. Of the 367 
articles published, 69 (or 18.8%) of titles can be regarded as utterances of economic 
(in)security, 163 (or 44.4%) could be assumed to regard utterances of economic 
(in)security from the title, whilst 261 (or 71.1%) comprised utterances of economic 
 Clearly about 
economic 
(in)security in 
title 
Could be 
assumed to be 
about economic 
(in)security 
from title 
About 
economic 
(in)security in 
article 
Total 
Number of 
articles 
78 154 348 659 
% of 
articles 
11.8% 23.4% 52.8% 100.0% 
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(in)security in the article’s content. For this time period then, whilst the actual 
numbers of articles for each of the three measures are broadly comparable across both 
campaigns, there appears to be a much greater focus proportionally on economic 
(in)security in Better Together materials.  
 
This apparently greater focus on the economic insecurities of independence in 
unionist texts likely accounts, in part at least, for nationalists branding the Better 
Together campaign ‘project fear’. The following images from Yes Scotland materials 
are effectively attempting to satirise what nationalists argued was sensationalist fear-
mongering in unionist arguments against independence. 
 
Figure 1.3: Project Fear 
           
 
 
Certainly there were far fewer instances of positive sounding arguments being made 
by unionists, whom in principle one could assume, might have chosen to focus on the 
positive case for union as much as the negative case for independence. Scotland’s 
First Minister, Alex Salmond, stressed what he saw as a crucial deficiency of the 
unionist position in a speech as early as 2012. 
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“I hear occasionally from the Prime Minister that he is just about to make a 
positive case for the union, on the evidence of the last two weeks I think that 
positive case is still on the drawing board… Talking down to a country is 
never a good idea, and failure to present a positive vision to a country, is 
always a bad idea” (Salmond 2012). 
The same sentiment was evident in interviews carried out with members of the SNP in 
2012, as in the following quote from one respondent. 
“Have you seen any of the leaflets going out by the ‘Scotland isn’t up to much 
campaign’ [Better Together campaign], it’s basically, thirty one thousand Scots 
employed by the UK civil service, the implication being that all these folk will 
be on the dole [social security]; one million people work for companies owned 
by UK companies, the implication being ‘you’ll not have a job’, all their 
campaign is about is you’ll not have a job, you’ll be worse off…” (Respondent 
B). 
For their part, unionists seemingly attempted to redress this, albeit perhaps not very 
successfully. On the Better Together campaign’s website one of the main page 
headings (see Figure 1.4) was ‘the +ve case’, under which lay what was essentially 
their “mission statement”. Yet no such positive case was made therein, with the focus 
instead purely on asserting the negative ramifications of ending the union.   
Figure 1.4: Better Together –Webpage Extract 
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One possible explanation for this of course is that the insecurities of independence 
were in fact more ‘real’ than those of continued union and therefore easier to convey 
convincingly. Certainly, with regards state finances at least, the weight of expert 
opinion was that Scotland would likely be worse off (Johnson and Phillips 2012; see 
Chapter 5). Yet this could never really be proven given the wealth of indeterminacies 
involved, and nationalists certainly disputed these figures right up until the very end 
of the campaign period. Another likely explanation is that unionists were advocating 
what might have been viewed as the relative assurances of maintaining the status quo 
vis-à-vis the greater unknowns of independence. Conversely, whilst nationalists 
certainly articulated the insecurities associated with the status quo, as evidenced 
below, it is likely that they were also more greatly necessitated to convey the 
economic opportunities of independence so as to instil confidence in this project given 
the necessary disruption to the status quo, not to mention the need to combat the 
negativities being posited by unionists
17
.  
 
The result for nationalists was an argument which was still built on the articulation of 
economic (in)security, but often couched in more positive language of opportunity. 
Thus we see nationalists arguing how much more prosperous Scotland would be if 
independent, with new jobs being created and business opportunities forthcoming. 
The articles titles and indicative quotes in Table 2.2 illustrate this. 
 
 
                                                          
17
 Other research has been done that looks at the likelihood of economic arguments 
for independence resonating with different groups according to their economic 
circumstances, with people who are wealthier being less likely to view disrupting the 
status quo positively (Duchesne et al. 2003). 
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Table 2.2: Yes Scotland – Opportunities for Prosperity 
Article 
Date 
Article Title Indicative Quotes 
07/02/14 Scotland could be even richer 
than previously thought, say 
economic experts 
‘Yes Scotland today welcomed a report by 
economic experts which suggests that Scotland 
could be even wealthier than has been previously 
estimated.’ 
12/03/14 Daily Digest: Scotland one of 
the world’s wealthiest 
countries 
‘Scotland would be placed 14th in the rankings of 
the world’s wealthiest countries, the OECD - four 
places above the UK.’ 
 
23/06/14 Blueprint draws on best in the 
world to double Scotland's 
economic wealth 
‘Drawing together business, government and the 
public sector the strategy aims to boost GDP by 
86% by 2037, increasing GDP per capita by two-
thirds from around £27,000 to more than 
£45,000.’ 
 
Nationalists spoke frequently of the ‘two futures’ at stake in the independence 
referendum and their implications for the economic life-chances of people in 
Scotland. On the one hand an independent future of Scottish prosperity and security, 
and on the other hand a future of continued and growing insecurity under union. 
 
Figure 1.5: Yes Scotland – A better future 
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The following quotes illustrate these alternative futures and the corresponding idea of 
a distinct Scottish economy and/or community of economic fate. The first quote is 
from John Swinney MSP (Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Employment and Growth), 
the second is from Nicola Sturgeon MSP (then Deputy First Minister), and the third is 
from an SNP MSP interview respondent.  
“That is the choice of two futures open to voters on the 18
th
September next year 
and one I am confident will see Scotland take the steps we need to transform our 
economy for the benefit of all of Scotland” (Scottish Government 2013a, p. iii).  
“The choice on September 18 next year is one between two futures. Both these 
decisions have consequences. A vote for independence means control of our 
own resources and the ability to take decisions that will grow our economy 
faster. While a vote against independence means endorsing the current system. It 
means supporting the idea that Westminster will do a better job of running 
Scotland and the Scottish economy than the people who live here” (Sturgeon 
2013). 
“Some people might be too insecure to go for independence because they think, 
ooh well, you know, we don’t really know if we are better or worse off so why 
take the chance. We are hoping that people in Scotland will be slightly more 
optimistic about the future, and that, Scotland has chronically underperformed 
economically and not lived up to its potential over many, many years, if not 
decades, and that the vote yes to secure an independent future for Scotland will 
create and economic and cultural renaissance and will improve the quality of life 
in Scotland as well as our economic performance” (Respondent D). 
The alternative future is presumably one in which prosperity is hampered, jobs growth 
is restricted and business opportunities are frustrated. Moreover, nationalists did focus 
heavily on articulating a specific set of other extant economic insecurities under 
union, with independence presented as the only viable antidote to them.  
 
Table 2.3 comprises a selection of utterances of economic (in)security across Yes 
Scotland materials, as was done for Better Together materials above. Note that they 
consist both of attempts to convey the insecurities of union, as well as (i.e. in contrast 
to) the future security and opportunities of independence.  
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Table 2.3: Yes Scotland – Utterances of Economic (In)Security 
Economic 
(In)  
Security 
Article 
Date 
Article Title Indicative Quotes 
 
In
eq
u
a
li
ty
 
    
16/12/13 UK inequality is no 
'myth' despite what 
Tories say 
‘As we approach Christmas many thousands 
are forced to turn to foodbanks to feed 
themselves, real wages continue to fall, and 
the inequality between what’s earned by the 
rich and poor keeps increasing.’ 
21/03/14 Only a Yes vote can 
create the equality that 
Westminster has failed 
to deliver 
‘…the reality is that the UK is one of the most 
unequal countries in the developed world.’ 
27/05/14 Perspective: 'With 
Westminster, gap 
between rich and poor 
can only widen 
‘There is a pervasive and persistent gap in 
attainment between schoolchildren from the 
richest and poorest households in Scotland.’ 
24/06/14 Independence 'only 
way to address ever-
widening wealth gap' 
‘Independence is the only way to turn back 
the ever-widening wealth gap between the 
richest and poorest in Scotland.’ 
 
P
u
b
li
c 
F
in
a
n
ce
s 
&
 A
u
st
e
ri
ty
 
   
13/12/13 More Westminster 
welfare cuts show why 
Yes is better for 
Scotland 
‘At a time when hundreds of thousands of 
families are struggling to make ends meet, 
more and more children are being plunged 
into poverty and the gap between the richest 
and poorest in our society continues to widen, 
this underlines why a Yes vote next September 
is a better choice for Scotland.’ 
25/05/14 Only a Yes vote can 
protect Scotland's 
health service from cuts 
threat 
‘Only independence can protect Scotland’s 
health service from Westminster spending 
cuts - including the damaging financial 
impact of the privatisation already running 
rampant through the NHS in England’ 
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03/07/14 Yes for fair pay and an 
end to austerity cuts 
‘Deep and ongoing cuts to services…are 
driving thousands of workers into poverty.’ 
15/07/14 A Yes vote for 
prosperity and an end 
to Westminster 
austerity 
‘Independence supporters will today hear 
about the two futures on offer at Scotland’s 
referendum in September – one of increased 
austerity, the other of new Scottish 
prosperity.’ 
13/11/13 Bang goes the great 
unionist myth of 
subsidised Scotland 
‘The myth that the UK subsidises Scotland is 
one of the greatest confidence tricks in 
modern political history.’ 
11/05/14 How Westminster has 
mismanaged Scotland's 
oil wealth 
‘We find the crucial report advising 
Westminster not to pour the oil money down 
the drain.’ 
 
P
o
v
er
ty
 
     
  
 
23/10/13 Perspective: 
Independence and full 
employment offer route 
out of poverty 
‘…independence offers the opportunity for a 
road out of poverty.’ 
06/02/14 Committed Labour 
Party member backs 
independence to reduce 
poverty gap 
‘an independent Scottish Parliament would 
‘radically reduce the gap between rich and 
poor’.’ 
10/03/14 Daily Digest: Job 
insecurity, low pay and 
child poverty – 
Westminster isn’t 
working 
‘The growth of zero-hours contracts is one of 
the reasons why so many hard-working 
people are fearful for their jobs and 
struggling to make ends meet.’ 
13/03/14 Scottish poverty report 
reveals cost of voting 
No 
‘The appalling level of inequality in Scotland 
was revealed today with the publication of a 
report by the Child Poverty Action Group 
(CPAG).’ 
16/04/14 Soaring foodbank use 
“the tip of the iceberg 
‘The Trussell Trust has given out over 
900,000 emergency food parcels in the last 
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in terms of UK food 
poverty” 
year in the UK…despite the fact we have 
more millionaires than ever before.’ 
28/04/14 Daily Digest: More 
negative responses and 
‘A Scotland without 
Poverty 
‘Kevin McKenna’s column in the Observer 
where he wrote:  “The eradication of poverty, 
especially child poverty, in a land of plenty 
must be the top priority in the new, just 
society that… will follow after independence 
is gained”.’ 
07/05/14 Daily Digest: UK 
government paper 
misleading - and child 
poverty continues to 
soar 
‘New research by charity Save the Children 
shows why Scotland must be independent – so 
we can choose a different path from an 
increasingly  unfair system which will see five 
million UK children face being “sentenced to 
a lifetime of poverty” by 2020.’ 
01/07/14 Appalling child poverty 
figures show why we 
need Scotland’s wealth 
in Scotland’s hands 
‘…today’s paper shows that in-work poverty 
is on the rise in Scotland. 60% of children 
living in poverty come from a household 
where at least one adult is in employment.’ 
25/07/14 Yes vote is ‘the key to 
tackling poverty’ 
‘Independence is the only sure way to deal 
with the ever-growing gap between Scotland’s 
rich and poor.’ 
 
J
o
b
s 
  
07/02/14 A Yes vote is the route 
to more job security 
and better living 
standards 
‘A Yes vote is the path to greater job security 
and good standards of living, Deputy First 
Minister Nicola Sturgeon has said.’ 
27/02/14 A Yes means a stronger 
Scottish economy and 
more jobs 
‘…we'll be able to build a stronger and more 
diverse economy which can provide high-
quality employment opportunities for the 
people of Scotland.’ 
10/03/14 Daily Digest: Job 
insecurity, low pay and 
child poverty – 
‘The growth of zero-hours contracts is one of 
the reasons why so many hard-working 
people are fearful for their jobs and 
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Westminster isn’t 
working 
struggling to make ends meet, in spite of the 
recovery.’ 
24/06/14 A plan to create more 
jobs and opportunities 
‘Jobs are the backbone of any economy, but 
at present the most important economic 
powers that can be used to create more and 
better jobs and new opportunities are at 
Westminster.’ 
05/07/14 46 ways to create more 
and better jobs 
‘Scotland has a wealth of ideas about how we 
can make those resources work better for the 
people that live here – creating more and 
better jobs, and growing our economy.’ 
 
P
en
si
o
n
s 
   
23/09/13 Fairer pensions, tailor-
made for Scotland 
‘…for many, they will also provide concrete 
illustrations of how a Yes vote can deliver a 
fairer country, using our undoubted 
prosperity to make real and significant 
improvements to the lives of our older 
people.’ 
22/11/13 Disarming the pensions 
'time bomb' myth 
‘So is the No campaign right that Scotland is 
too old and frail to build a strong economy 
and welfare state?’ 
11/12/13 Westminster pensions 
raid gives insight to full 
cost of a No vote 
‘Young people in Scotland will bear the brunt 
of the UK government’s state pensions raid, a 
leading pensions expert said today.’ 
18/02/14 Daily Digest: Yes for 
Stronger Pensions and 
the Currency and EU 
threats crumble 
‘A Yes vote allows us to…protect and enhance 
pension and savings credits.  And we can put 
in place a lower state pension age…’ 
22/02/14 Why a Yes vote will be 
good news for 
Scotland's pensioners 
‘A Yes vote in September’s independence 
referendum provides the opportunity to 
provide fairer pensions.’ 
13/05/14 Pensioners 'let down ‘Independence offers people in Scotland full 
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time and time again by 
Westminster' 
control over the type of pensions system that 
they would like to see.’ 
 
C
u
rr
en
cy
 
    
29/01/14 Common sense from 
Carney on currency 
‘The Bank of England Governor, Mark 
Carney, today set out a common sense 
approach to a common currency between an 
independent Scotland and the rest of the UK.’ 
01/02/14 Sensible negotiations 
on currency will begin 
immediately upon 
independence 
‘…their argument against a monetary union 
after a Yes vote does not stand up to scrutiny, 
on a number of levels.’ 
17/02/14 Why a Sterling Area is 
in everyone's interests 
‘The FM reminded us just why a Sterling 
Area is in everyone's interests.’ 
23/03/14 Osborne’s opposition 
to currency union 
‘conjecture and 
fantasy’ 
‘Professor Leslie Young says the Chancellor’s 
reasons for opposing a shared currency post 
independence are ‘unsubstantiated’.’ 
01/04/14 Daily Digest: Royal 
Mail, research funding 
and more currency 
union woes for No 
‘The only coherent position on the currency 
we’ve heard from a No politician is the UK 
minister who on Friday confirmed that “of 
course there would be a currency union”.’ 
 
Table 2.3 reveals the most frequently uttered topics of economic (in)security by the 
nationalist campaign. Many of the articles are not so much asserting the insecurities of 
union as presenting the security of independence, countering the arguments of 
unionists (see Chapter 7) to allay fears regarding independence. Many Yes Scotland 
articles, including a number of those in Table 2.3, appear to have been largely 
reactionary to outputs from unionists. 
 
The topics of economic (in)security addressed by nationalists comprised: 1) The 
threat of extant and growing inequalities within Scotland - specifically the growing 
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wealth gap between the richest and the poorest in Scottish society; 2) Threats 
associated with the UK government’s management of public finances, and in 
particular the damage purportedly caused by the UK governments ongoing 
programme of austerity; 3) Poverty, which is clearly very closely related with the first 
two threats, specifically inequality and continued austerity; 4) Threats to jobs, or more 
commonly in this case, the hampered ‘opportunities’ for new and better jobs under 
union; 5) Threats to pensions, with nationalist arguing in direct contradiction to 
unionists that Scottish pensioners will in fact be better provided for under 
independence; and, 6) Threats associated with currency arrangements in an 
independent Scotland, with nationalists (and the Scottish government in particular) 
attempting to reassure Scots that an independent Scotland will remain within an 
official UK currency union contrary to the assertions of the UK Government and the 
Bank of England. As with the Better Together materials, clearly distinguishing 
between these topics of economic (in)security is largely arbitrary given their obvious 
interconnections (e.g. public finances, austerity and poverty). Nevertheless, as was 
also the case with Better Together materials in Table 1.7, the materials used in Table 
2.3 clearly illustrate the key insecurities employed in building an overarching 
narrative or discourse of the insecurities of union versus the security and opportunities 
of independence.  
 
The specific types of economic insecurity uttered in Yes Scotland materials are 
revealing of distinct differences between the assumptions underpinning nationalist 
conceptions of economic (in)security and unionist ones. As explored below, it reveals 
an attempt by nationalists to speak to a more ethical community of economic fate in 
addition to the purely material economic community of fate largely assumed 
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throughout texts from both campaigns. Most notable in this regard are insecurities 
associated with austerity, poverty and inequality (see Table 2.3). These insecurities 
resonate with one of the most commonly uttered themes in nationalist discourse; 
‘fairness’. Table 2.4 lists a selection of article titles employing this term of fairness.  
 
Table 2.4: Yes Scotland – A Fairer Scotland 
Article 
Date 
Article Title 
05/12/13 A Yes vote can deliver a better and fairer pensions system 
06/12/13 Top trade unionist says Yes is key to fairer, more balanced Scotland 
26/02/14 Daily Digest: A fairer Scotland and a fairer nation 
07/03/14 Why a Yes vote is the key to a better and fairer deal for women in 
Scotland 
09/06/14 100 days to go for a chance to build a better, fairer, more prosperous 
Scotland 
23/06/14 Independence is key to a fairer, equal and more democratic Scotland, say 
Lawyers for Yes 
08/07/14 Perspective: With Yes, we can work to create a fairer and more inclusive 
Scotland for us all. 
13/07/14 Vote Yes for fairness and prosperity – Plaid ex-Leader 
30/07/14 50 mums call for Yes vote for fairer Scotland 
14/09/14 Labour supporters sign open letter calling for a Yes vote to build a fairer 
Scotland 
 
Coupled with ‘prosperity’, and commonly uttered in the same breath, ‘fairness’ was 
one of the key signifiers with which the nationalist campaign’s argument for 
independence could be associated. If one of the key phrases reiterated throughout the 
campaign period by unionists was ‘strength, security and stability’, then ‘fairness and 
prosperity’ represented the nationalist response. Salmond, for instance, stated, 
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‘independence is an essential step if we are to build a better, more prosperous 
and fairer country’ (Salmond cited in Scottish Government 2013a, p. 3). 
In the Scottish Government’s latterly published industrial strategy, Salmond again 
explicitly correlates economic (in)security with fairness: 
‘In an independent Scotland we will have the powers we need to build a fairer 
and more secure economy’ (Scottish Government 2014, p. iii). 
In fact, these themes were selected by the Yes Scotland campaign as key ‘tags’ 
attributed to published content on the website. Earlier in the chapter it was explained 
that the Yes Scotland website utilised selected ‘categories’ as navigational aids for 
users to filter content, of which ‘Will we be secure?’ was one (See Figure 1.2). As can 
be seen in Figure 1.2, ‘Popular Tags’ were also used for a similar purpose. Figure 1.6 
is a screenshot of the webpage displaying the entire list of these tags. Notably, 
‘Fairness’ was the most commonly employed tag, whilst ‘prosperity’ was the third 
most common (Note that ‘volunteers’ was the second most popular tag due to there 
being a great many articles focussed on recruiting volunteers for the Yes Scotland 
campaign, and not because ‘volunteering’ was an important theme in arguments for 
independence). 
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Figure 1.6: Yes Scotland – Article ‘Tags’ 
 
But what do the specific types of insecurities uttered by nationalists and these themes 
of prosperity and fairness reveal about the way in which the nationalist argument for 
independence encourages us to imagine the Scottish economy and a corresponding 
community of economic fate? The following sections will address this question, 
revealing notable differences between the unionist and nationalist case.  
 
Moreover, nationalists stressed how the insecurities of union could be attributed to the 
union itself, or rather the economic policy choices imposed upon Scotland by UK 
Governments. As will be seen below, Westminster was essentially articulated as the 
threatening ‘other’ in nationalist arguments for independence. By conveying 
economic insecurity as inherent within the union the imagined boundaries of the 
‘Scottish economy’ are brought more clearly into focus in a way that simply would 
not have been possible, for example, with the articulation of more ‘conventional’ 
security threats (see Chapter 6). Crucially, this was largely made possible by the 
articulation of the aforementioned set of insecurities, which drew upon (and had the 
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potential to further sediment), the idea of a more distinctly ethical community of 
economic fate in Scotland.  
 
Articulating Economic (In)Security: Westminster as a Threatening ‘Other’ 
 
Nationalists projected an image of a Scottish economy currently doing very well 
under union whilst simultaneously hampered by it (see below), which in order to 
make tenable required crediting themselves for its successes whilst blaming the union 
for its failings. The Scottish Government’s Cabinet Secretary for Finance, 
Employment and Growth urged:   
“My simple point is that based on the performance of the Scottish economy 
since devolution when we got some control of economic policy here in Scotland, 
we’ve made good job of it and we’ve improved the long-term economic 
performance of Scotland, and if we have more economic levers at our disposal 
we could do much, much more to strengthen the Scottish economy and to create 
the real opportunities for our people” (Swinney 2013). 
Leaving aside the fact that this exaggerates the extent to which government policy can 
be credited for steering ‘economies’ anyway - either because of the multitude of 
(often more long-standing, structural) reasons why aggregate economic activity in 
Scotland might be improving, or because the extent to which there is such a thing as a 
‘Scottish economy’ to be steered is exaggerated – it illustrates the necessity of 
blaming the union, or a commonly associated ‘other’ like the UK, England, or more 
usually, ‘Westminster’.  
“We know that Westminster governments have made some disastrous 
mistakes which have damaged Scotland’s economy” (Sturgeon 2013). 
“So the costs and the losses to people in Scotland and to the Scottish economy 
of a Westminster system that isn’t working are clear” (Sturgeon 2013). 
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Whilst almost unthinkable insofar as conventional threats are concerned, 
Westminster is conveyed as being - if not always the main source of the threat - a 
significant part of the problem.  
 
In the previous chapter the importance of economic competitiveness threats and other 
volatilities associated with globalisation were shown to be central to the unionist 
arguments that union affords the stability and security of a larger and stronger UK 
economy. In nationalist articulations of (in)security the challenges associated with 
globalisation still speak to the seemingly inherent insecurities of the economic, but 
they are more commonly cast in a positive light by conveying the opportunities 
afforded to a small, successful, outward-looking economy, which as explained above, 
was required to project a positive independent future. Moreover, where those 
insecurities are uttered, ‘Westminster’ is conveyed as being both a failed protector 
from and creator of those insecurities. Commenting on the Scottish Government’s 
Chief Economist’s report on the ‘State of the economy’ (Gillespie 2012), John 
Swinney stated: 
“This report shows that while the Eurozone crisis and continued global 
uncertainty is slowing growth, the real impact on UK growth rates comes from 
the failure of the UK Government to invest in recovery, to get banks lending 
to small business and to build consumer confidence with support for 
household budgets” (Swinney 2012). 
Moreover, he stresses that despite the poor choices of the UK Government, the 
Scottish economy continues to fair better that the UK as a whole, arguing that 
Scotland’s recession has been ‘shorter and shallower’ than the rest of the UK 
(Swinney 2012).  
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Often, very explicit arguments were made within the nationalist campaign for 
independence that focussed on what it argued to be the misguided economic policies 
of Westminster and the resultant damage to the economic prospects of Scottish 
people. Nicola Sturgeon exclaimed in one speech:  
“What do we get from leaving our powers in the control of others?  A high risk 
economy and an eroding social fabric” (Sturgeon 2012a). 
“The poverty and inequality that is a scar on the face of our nation, the lag in 
economic growth, the flow of our brightest and best out of Scotland – these are 
not recent problems. These are long-standing and long-term challenges that UK 
governments of whatever colour have failed to address” (Sturgeon 2012a). 
“The UK today is the 4th most unequal society in the developed world. 1 in 5 
Scottish children live in poverty. 800,000 Scots live in fuel poverty” (Sturgeon 
2012a). 
In a separate speech at the Economics of Independence Conference, Sturgeon 
stressed: 
“We know too that the UK is the 4th most unequal economy in the developed 
world. Since 1975, income inequality among working-age people has risen 
faster in the UK than in any other OECD country. So this is not just about the 
economic policies of one government - it is a long-term trend that shows no sign 
of slowing down. What is true is that the policies of the current Westminster 
government are only going to increase the gap between the richest and the 
poorest. Based on estimates from the Institute for Fiscal Studies, we can predict 
that an additional 50,000 children in Scotland will be living in poverty by 2020” 
(Sturgeon 2013).  
The aforementioned Scottish Government (2013b, p. 8) document includes a section 
titled, ‘Economic policy-making: six examples of why Westminster isn’t working for 
Scotland’s economy’. Among the (in)securities articulated therein are: 1) The failure 
of the UK to establish an oil fund which would have put Scotland in a better financial 
position; 2) The UK governments ‘decision to allow the UK economy to engage in, in 
the words of the current UK Business Secretary, a “massive boom in credit and debt 
expansion” which allowed a “very dangerously unstable position” to develop’ – 
thereby holding the UK Government culpable for the financial crisis and subsequent 
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recession, although stopping short of actually saying as much; 3) ‘The decision to 
allow income inequality to grow dramatically’; 4) ‘The decision to impose a policy of 
austerity on Scotland, which according to the former Chancellor, Alistair Darling, is 
causing “immeasurable damage” to the economy’; and, 5) The decision to cut capital 
spending that could have generated 19,000 new jobs. Here we see the insecurities 
noted in Table 2.3, but with Westminster as the problem. 
 
Furthermore, the table below presents a small selection of article titles from Yes 
Scotland published over the space of a few months in 2014, each of which positions 
Westminster as the threatening ‘other’.  
 
Table 2.5: Yes Scotland – Westminster as a Threatening ‘Other’ 
 
Article 
Date 
Article Title 
09/03/14 Westminster austerity offers Scotland's children a bleak future 
10/03/14 Daily Digest: Job insecurity, low pay and child poverty – Westminster isn’t 
working 
16/03/14 Westminster's whirlwind of fear has failed 
21/03/14 Only a Yes vote can create the equality that Westminster has failed to deliver 
09/05/14 Daily Digest: Westminster’s cost of living crisis laid bare and Miliband first to 
offer “Jam Tomorrow” 
11/05/14 How Westminster has mismanaged Scotland's oil wealth 
13/05/14 Pensioners 'let down time and time again by Westminster' 
27/05/14 Perspective: 'With Westminster, gap between rich and poor can only widen' 
08/07/14 Westminster’s austerity obsession is harming people 
15/07/14 A Yes vote for prosperity and an end to Westminster austerity 
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It is no coincidence that ‘Westminster’ was a particularly popular referent in 
nationalist rhetoric, as it has long been portrayed as being both geographically and 
ideological detached from Scotland and Scottish interests. This points to a critical 
difference between nationalist and unionist arguments for and against independence, 
and the sorts of economic insecurities articulated, as nationalist texts not only drew 
upon a taken-for-granted material economic community of fate, but also hegemonic 
assumptions about a distinctly ethical Scottish economic community of fate too.  
 
Imaging the Economy in Nationalist ‘Texts’ 
 
In Chapter 6, it was explained that we are encouraged to think of our individual 
economic (in)security as inextricably bound up with those of the collective. Our 
economic circumstances are to a greater or lesser extent thought to be determined by 
the trajectory of ‘the economy’ and the community of economic fate within which we 
‘live’. The same assumption underpins the nationalist argument for independence as 
was argued to underpin the unionist argument in the previous chapter; people in 
Scotland have an especially shared economic circumstance at present and will have an 
especially shared (and improved) economic circumstance afterwards, within a newly 
independent state.  
 
In the previous chapter it was shown that unionists talk of a ‘Scottish economy’, but 
as intimately bound up within a wider UK economy and community of economic fate. 
Nationalists encourage the imagination of an already more discrete Scottish economy 
(albeit it still integrated into the wider UK economy) and economic community of fate 
under union, since the Scottish economy is typically conveyed as being more of a 
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functioning spatial-scalar entity of its own. In other words, of the two ‘scales’ 
addressed, the Scottish economy is privileged as the more important determinant of 
economic Scottish livelihoods. Far from being dependent on the UK for its successes, 
nationalists assert the relative successes of the Scottish economy despite the union, 
and how the Scottish economy’s potential for delivering even greater prosperity is 
ultimately held back by the misguided policy choices of the UK government. This is 
no doubt symptomatic of the requirement of nationalists to instil confidence in the 
electorate and allay fears about independence.  
 
In Chapter 3 it was stated that the Scottish economy has historically been seen as a 
disadvantaged and dependent upon the UK (Brown et al. 1998), characterised even by 
‘pathological failure’ (Tomlinson 2014). Whilst the unionist case suggests that the 
Scottish economy is still dependent upon the UK economy for its security, Scotland’s 
economic performance vis-à-vis the rest of the UK is now considered to be much 
improved. This fact has not been lost on Scottish nationalists, and has greatly 
supported the nationalist case for independence my making viable an economic case 
for separation (See Chapter 5). Examples of this, and how the Scottish economy was 
typically portrayed as an already functioning entity of its own, are revealed through 
the use of statistics in nationalist arguments for independence. 
 
A figure commonly reported by the nationalist campaign and used by the then Deputy 
First Minister for Scotland Nicola Sturgeon (2012b) when outlining the ‘Seven Key 
Strengths of the Scottish Economy’ was that based on current figures ‘[a]n 
independent Scotland would be ranked 6th in the OECD in terms of GDP per head, 
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compared to the UK's sixteenth place (in 2010)’. Elsewhere, the then First Minister, 
Alex Salmond stated:  
“In truth, it is absurd to suggest an independent Scotland will struggle to make 
its own way economically. On current figures Scotland would have the sixth 
highest per capita GDP in the OECD as an independent nation, the UK 
currently ranks sixteenth, and incidentally without Scotland would still rank 
sixteenth per capita” (Salmond 2012).  
Similarly, in the Scottish Government (2013b) document, ‘Scotland’s Economy: The 
Case for Independence’, a table of facts and figures (e.g. GDP and 
employment/unemployment rates) are presented to illustrate how Scotland is 
apparently better placed economically compared to the UK as a whole. In an article 
published by Yes Scotland on the 2
nd
 June 2014 entitled ‘16 Things You Need to 
Know about Scotland’s Economy’ (See Appendix 5.0 for full content) there is a list of 
facts and figures which present the same story. Finally, the following two quotes from 
John Swinney, the then Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Employment and Growth in 
the Scottish Government, also attempt the same.  
"While times remain challenging, Scotland's economy has grown faster than the 
UK over the last year to quarter two, with employment now at a five-year high 
and the economy growing for the fourth consecutive quarter” (Swinney 2013). 
"On figures for employment, unemployment, inactivity and youth employment 
Scotland continues to perform better than the UK as a whole” (Swinney 2013). 
At first, the presentation of these facts and figures seems perfectly reasonable insofar 
as they appear to be supporting the case for independence. However, a more 
considered reading reveals that the intention is not merely to stress that the Scottish 
economy is strong enough to be independent, but that it will actually be better off if 
independent. One can assume the latter for if Scotland’s economic performance is 
indeed so favourable within the union then these facts and figures could be read as an 
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argument for maintaining it. One might ask, why disrupt the status quo? What is 
suggested is the existence of an economy that is already a largely functioning entity of 
its own, for its relative successes are attributed to it in spite of union rather than 
because of it.   
 
The aforementioned facts and figures, along with many other representations of the 
Scottish economy, convey the notion of a distinct material community of economic 
fate in Scotland. This was revealed to also be the case in unionist arguments in the 
previous chapter. However, for unionists said community of fate was critically 
delineated by the union; the Scottish economy was seen as intimately bound up with 
the UK economy and reliant upon it for its survival. In both cases, what are presented 
are ‘real’ economies, existing irrespective of the norms, values, or indeed wishes of 
Scottish people. This thesis has argued that the extent to which the economy actually 
represents such a material community of fate is grossly exaggerated as a consequence 
of the taken-for-granted nature of ‘the economy’. As stressed with regards unionists in 
Chapter 7, to the extent that economic arguments vis-à-vis independence are built 
upon the assumption of such a material community, intertextuality (or dialogicality) 
between concrete nationalist texts and the discourse of ‘the economy’ is obscured.  
 
However, nationalists also made explicit attempts to ‘speak’ to a more ethical 
community in Scotland too, which are more revealing of intertextuality (and 
dialogicality) between nationalist texts and their wider discursive context. It was 
stressed in Chapter 4 that whilst such ethical foundations are not required for 
imagining an otherwise material community of fate, they are often evident and can 
play a part in defining governing legitimacies (Williams 2003). 
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Imaging the Scottish Economy: An Ethical Community of Fate  
 
It was outlined in Chapter 4 that the concept of a community of shared fate is built 
upon the recognition that such a community need not have ethical bases but can be 
thought of in largely material terms. 
‘A community of shared fate is not an ethical community as such. Its members 
are not bound to each other by shared values or moral commitments, but by 
relations of interdependence, which may or may not be positively valued by its 
members. Our futures are bound to each other, whether we like it or not. There 
is no plausible alternative to living-together’ (Williams 2003, p. 101).     
However, it was also pointed out that said communities may well have ethical bases 
too, and where they do, it may afford them greater legitimacy in the minds-eye of 
those subjects of which they are comprised: ‘legitimacy consists in the ability to 
justify actions to those who are affected by them according to reasons they can 
accept’ (Williams 2003, p. 101). Another way to conceptualise this is to think of the 
economy as being assigned a distinctive ‘personality’ (Rosamond 2012; see 
also Fetzer and Gilgrist forthcoming) that helps determine its governability.  
 
Essentially, nationalist economic arguments for independence attempted to convey an 
ethical substance that was not about national identity narrowly defined, but 
about Scottish people as sharing other distinctive ‘economic values’. Nationalists very 
often articulated economic (in)security (e.g. austerity, inequality, poverty, pensions) 
in a way designed to resonate with what have been considered to be Scottish ethical 
values associated with social democracy. Two of the key themes identified from the 
Yes Scotland materials above were ‘fairness’ and ‘prosperity’. Arguments pertaining 
to prosperity can be regarded as having largely revolved around expressions of a 
247 
 
material community of fate, whilst those pertaining to ‘fairness’, conversely, are 
clearly built on assumptions of a more distinctly ethical community too.  
Methodologically this is revealed through instances of intertextuality apparent in 
nationalist ‘texts’, and in the specific utterances of insecurity they contained. In such 
texts there are notable discursive efforts to draw intertextually upon a well-established 
discourse of Scottish social democracy. We see this where texts explicitly draw upon 
discussion of the post-war consensus, the values of welfarism, and of social 
democratic ideas. We see it in the adoption and constant reiteration of the signifiers of 
‘fairness’ and ‘equality’, themselves key signifiers or tropes around which a broader 
narrative or discourse of the insecurities of union are organised. Moreover, we see it 
specifically in the utterances of economic insecurities consonant with the values and 
ambitions of social democracy.  
 
Put succinctly by Nicola Sturgeon, the Scottish Government’s vision for an 
independent Scotland was of: 
“A country with a stable economy that works for the many and not just the 
few; one that knows it must create the wealth it needs to support the strong 
public services we value… My conviction that Scotland should be 
independent stems from the principles, not of identity or nationality, but of 
democracy and social justice” (Sturgeon 2012a). 
The above quote is taken from a speech by Sturgeon at Strathclyde University in 
December 2012, entitled ‘Bringing the powers home to build a better nation’, in 
which she makes perhaps the clearest case for Scottish social democracy as the means 
with which to ensure a more secure and fairer Scottish economy. The Scottish 
Government report ‘Building Security and Creating Opportunity: Economic 
Policy Choices in an Independent Scotland’ also makes the case that in an 
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independent Scotland the Scottish economy would be more secure and fairer, as the 
following quotes from that report indicate.  
‘The Scottish Government believes that the best option for Scotland is to 
become independent. It will create the opportunity to build an economy that 
takes advantage of Scotland’s unique strengths and size, and which delivers a 
more outward focussed, fairer and resilient economy’ (Scottish Government 
2013a, p. ii). 
‘While Scotland performs well as an economy within the UK, many other 
comparable independent countries perform better, not just economically, but 
also on measures of equality and well-being, pursuing economic models that are 
designed for their own needs and which deliver more sustainable and inclusive 
levels of growth’ (Scottish Government 2013a, p. iv).  
‘Building a new vision for the type of economy and society that captures the 
values of the people of Scotland’ (Scottish Government 2013a, p. v).  
In addition to asserting again that Scotland is ‘an economy within the UK’ (see 
second quote) - not just a portion of the UK economy but a distinct spatial-scalar 
entity in its own right - each extract also speaks to the capacity for a better, stronger 
and fairer economy under independence, one in which Scottish people will share in 
the opportunities afforded. 
 
As we have seen, one of the key insecurities articulated by nationalists was inequality 
(see Table 2.3). This perhaps more than any other illustrates the different 
understanding of the economy at stake in nationalist arguments for independence. The 
Scottish Government urged: 
‘The UK economic model has not always served Scotland well. It is prone to 
instability and has increasingly large social and regional inequalities – with the 
UK now one of the most unequal societies in the OECD across a range of 
measures’ (Scottish Government 2013a, p. iv).  
Crucially, the Scottish Government was keen to stress that inequality is not merely an 
undesirable by-product of the pursuit for economic growth, but that inequality and 
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growth are in fact two sides of the same coin, due to inequality being damaging for 
economic growth.  
“We do this because we believe that such services benefit the common weal of 
Scotland. They provide a sense of security and well-being, of equity within 
communities. Such a sense of security is essential to a sense of confidence. And 
as we have seen over the last three years confidence is central to any resumption 
of economic growth” (Salmond 2012). 
‘There is a recognition that an economy’s ability to tackle inequalities is not 
only important in its own right, but also for a country’s long-term economic 
growth potential. The Fiscal Commission Working Group was clear about 
inequality in the UK and its impacts: ‘Such patterns of inequality will continue 
to have a negative impact on growth and prosperity in the long-term’’ (Scottish 
Government 2013a, p. 30). 
“This matters. Not just because of the costs to individuals and society. The 
economic consequences are also disastrous. Christine Lagarde of the IMF noted 
earlier this year that:  “Excessive inequality is corrosive to growth; it is 
corrosive to society," and that “a more equal distribution of income allows for 
more economic stability, more sustained economic growth, and healthier 
societies with stronger bonds of cohesion and trust.”” (Sturgeon 2013). 
As well as revealing assumptions about an ethical community, this also reveals a 
different understanding of the economy, whereby social intervention is not merely 
normatively desirable, but seen as inherently productive; the Scottish Government 
argued, 
‘…we believe tackling inequalities will enhance our competitive position by 
increasing opportunity and participation’ (Scottish Government 2013a, p. 7). 
This is perhaps most clearly summed up in the title on page 7, ‘A competitive 
economy and a fairer society: two sides of the same coin’ (Scottish Government 
2013a, p. 7). 
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Scottish Social Democracy and the Dissolution of the Post-War Consensus 
 
As stressed in Chapter 3, social democracy is actually thought to have been crucial in 
the re-imagination of Scottish nationalism in recent years, largely in light of the 
perceived dissolution of the British post-war consensus, Scotland’s rapid 
deindustrialisation, and a popular distaste for Thatcherism, monetarism and 
neoliberalism. Support for social democracy remained strong elsewhere in the UK, as 
indeed it still does, however the concurrent revival of Scottish national identity made 
provision for a territorial expression of social democracy (and vice versa).  
Delivering his Hugo Young lecture in January 2012, the First Minister of 
Scotland Alex Salmond (2012) asserted the following: 
“The SNP will campaign confidently for independence, not just as an end in 
itself, but as the means by which the Scottish economy can grow more strongly 
and sustainably…and by which the Scottish people can best fulfil their potential 
and realise their aspirations. For much of the post-war period people in Scotland 
largely embraced the great social reforms that were implemented by Clement 
Atlee’s government, and sustained through much of the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s: 
national insurance, housing for all, the establishment of a national health 
service; these commanded a consensus which spanned political boundaries and 
national borders. There is a view that some of these post-war institutions, 
perhaps the National Health Service above all, forced a sense of cohesion and 
common-purpose between all the people of these islands. Professor Tom Devine 
of Edinburgh University, for example, has expressed an explicit view that in the 
post-war world the welfare state became the ‘real anchor of the union-state’. 
Now I’m not sure that the welfare state was in truth ever a direct consequence of 
the union. As the Nordic countries show very clearly, common aims and social 
policy don’t require a common state, but it probably is the case that Scotland 
subscribed particularly strongly to these values of the post-war consensus” 
(Salmond 2012). 
This quote demonstrates, firstly, the centrality of ‘the economy’ as an organising 
referent around which arguments for independence were made, but secondly, the 
explicit reassertion of Scottish adherence to the underpinning values of the post-war 
consensus and social-democracy as the determining characteristics of Scottish 
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political consciousness and identity. This was similarly asserted in speeches given by 
Nicola Sturgeon (then Deputy First Minister of Scotland) and John Swinney (Cabinet 
Secretary for Employment, Finance and Growth): 
“in the mid-20
th
 century, the creation of the welfare state played an 
overwhelming role in giving the union a new purpose. Britain lost the colony 
of India, but we all gained a new territory in the shape of free health care and 
social protection from cradle to grave” (Sturgeon 2012a).   
“So can we meet the aspirations of the many Scots who support a more 
prosperous, more socially democratic and a more equal society in the current 
framework? For much of the post-war period, the people of Scotland 
embraced the great social reforms first implemented by Clement Atlee. 
National insurance, housing for all and the establishment of the National 
Health Service commanded a consensus that crossed political boundaries and 
national borders. Scotland subscribes particularly strongly to the essential 
values of the post-war consensus” (Swinney 2012). 
 
In considering such assertions about the apparent decline of the post-war consensus it 
is important to consider the mutually constitutive relationship between state welfare 
policies and evolving commitments to (and identification with) the nation-state. It is 
commonly asserted that the establishment of welfare policies relies upon such 
commitments to the nation, due to the feelings of solidarity and mutual obligation 
required to establish systems of redistributive welfare (Millar 1995 cited in McEwen 
2002, p. 67) and, as such, ‘the welfare state served a nation-building purpose, 
reinforcing identification with and attachment to the state as a nation.’ (McEwen 
2002, p. 66). Whilst this may be true, the converse may equally be true.  
‘while justifying public policy in the name of ‘the nation’ presupposes a 
shared national understanding of who and what the nation represents, the sense 
of belonging to a national state can be reinforced by the substantive 
recognition of citizenship rights which address social and economic need. In 
other words, public policy designed to recognize citizenship rights may in turn 
reinforce the national identity and sense of national solidarity upon which they 
are founded’ (McEwen 2002, p 67). 
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McEwen argues that the neo-liberal shift in policy discourse from the late 1970s 
onwards, with its ideal of the flexible free-market with minimal state intervention, had 
implications for the extent to which the UK state was able to foster a sense of unity 
and solidarity around the values of welfarism. In the case of Scotland this certainly 
resonates with nationalist rhetoric regarding the dissolution of the post-war consensus 
and the promotion of an economic ideology with policy prescriptions considered to be 
at odds with ‘Scottishness’ itself (see Chapter 3).  
When asked if they believed there to be something particularly ‘Scottish’ about these 
values, interview respondents elicited some interesting (if not largely expected) 
responses. One SNP respondent stated: 
“Yeah, and I think that’s an historical one as well, and it’s also part of our 
future, and if we’re working towards building a Scottish constitution for our 
future then some of these values should underpin that, and it’s about fairness, 
it’s about justice, about integrity, and I think there is a very ethical, there’s 
always an ethical view to any business that Scotland does…A very strong 
ethical view is something that distinguishes Scotland” (Respondent E). 
Conversely, when asked if there is something about the economic ideals or ideology 
of Scots, a senior member of the Conservative Party in Scotland exclaimed:  
“I can’t think what that would be, no. And you can talk a load of old hooey 
over that!” (Respondent F).  
The latter respondent went on to stress the importance of removing values from one’s 
view of the economy. 
“I think there is a perception amongst some; a belief that somehow there can 
be something nobler about the Scottish economy, which I think is a bit far-
fetched. Economies are ultimately driven by businesses that create profit” 
(Respondent F). 
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A Conservative Party politician might be expected to take this view given that party’s 
politico-economic ideals are considered at odds with those of social democracy and, 
as described, much of the historical rhetoric regarding Scottish social democracy has 
been formulated on the basis of explicit opposition to the ideals and values of the 
Conservative Party.  
 
Nevertheless, the idea that the Scottish economy and Scottish people are especially 
‘social democratic’ is well established in Scottish political discourse, as illustrated by 
one Labour MSP respondent: 
“Politically, for example, it is expressed that Scotland tends to be more left of 
centre. But these things are often generalisations but in general terms Scotland 
tends to be more left of centre. There are lots of reasons for that. I don’t think 
we are innately less conservative – with a small c – than anyone else…but 
politically there has been a, possibly since Thatcher’s time because she was 
seen to be a little Englander and very anti-Scottish, there has been a hangover 
since then. But it has turned into a sort of virtue” (Respondent G). 
When asked specifically if there is something distinctive about the economic ideals or 
ideology of Scots this respondent stated: 
“I think that it is more perception that reality. I have seen enough academic 
studies of this to show that our behaviours on most things are absolutely 
identical as anybody in the rest of the UK. So we pride ourselves on difference 
but actually our behaviours are identical, not identical, but very, very similar. 
Most Scots in terms of voting behaviour are likely to be social democratic, left 
of centre, progressive. Most Scots like to think that they are less, less, not less 
selfish, but that idea, that rampant individualism that Thatcher preached, I am 
not saying it didn’t catch on here, but not in the same way” (Respondent H). 
A separate Labour MSP respondent said: 
“But I think Scottish people are equally prone to communitarian thought, and 
selfish thought, as anyone else in the UK” (Respondent G). 
“Scotland prides itself on thinking its more communitarian and more 
progressive. I am not entirely sure it is true in practice. But at the same time, if 
we think we are, then we sort of are” (Respondent G). 
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Significantly, this respondent recognises that his political party has traditionally 
benefitted from the assumed commitment to these communitarian values, for the 
Labour party was the left-of-centre party of choice in Scotland long before the rise 
and rise of the SNP. That said, one might expect a unionist politician to be reluctant to 
suggest that there is anything exclusively Scottish about such commitments.  
 
Incidentally, independent polling measuring Scottish attitudes to social welfare do not 
point to clear differences between Scots and Brits, and measured longitudinally it 
seems that Scots are less and less likely to support of redistributive policies 
(Curtice 2013).  Curtice (2013, pp. 6-9) showed that there was no statistically 
significant differences between Yes and No voters with regards their stance on ‘social 
democratic issues’. Similarly, McCrone and Keating argue that social democracy may 
be a widely shared reference point, but that its ‘definition and content are elusive’. 
More political substance might have been brought to the debate were unionists to 
challenge the assumption that Scots are more socially democratic, but this was 
unlikely to happen given that the unionist movement comprised a multi-party cohort 
among whom views on social welfare (whether genuine or rhetorical) clearly 
diverged. In any event, this thesis is not interested in assessing and/or commenting on 
how genuine were espoused commitments to social democracy, for almost regardless 
of this, the very idea is significant in itself for conveying a sense of ideological 
cohesion among Scots and the imagination of an ethical community of fate. The 
Scottish Government stated that: 
‘It is only through independence that Scotland can maximise its potential and 
deliver the type of economy and society that reflects the values of the people 
of Scotland’ (2013b, p. iii). 
255 
 
As the above respondent suggested, regardless of whether Scots are more 
communitarian and progressive, “if we think we are, then we sort of are” (Respondent 
G). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has looked at the significance of articulations of economic (in)security in 
nationalist arguments against Scottish independence. It assessed their significance vis-
à-vis conventional security utterances, and addressed the specificities of nationalist 
economic insecurities vis-à-vis unionist ones. In essence, the nationalist case for 
independence was built on a narrative or discourse of the opportunities and security of 
independence, versus the economic insecurities of continued union, based on the 
assumption of a really existing Scottish economy and associated community of 
economic fate (Williams 2003).  
 
As with unionists, the nationalist case assumed the existence of a largely material 
community of economic fate, within which economic (in)security is determined 
irrespective of any emotive or political attachment to that community. However, 
nationalists also attempted to speak to a more ethical community of fate too, revealed 
through the types of insecurity uttered, the employment of signifiers of fairness and 
social justice, and efforts to portray the Scottish economy as intimately wedded to the 
so called post-war consensus and the values of social democracy.   
 
It is possible to see how nationalist arguments which asserted a more ethical 
substance to the Scottish economy might have been seen as more overtly political and 
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ideological than unionist ones. However, is should not be assumed that unionist 
articulations of economic (in)security were any less ‘ideological’ or indeed somehow, 
therefore, more ‘real’. In fact, unionist arguments clearly relied upon an equally 
ideological understanding of economic (in)security, albeit one based upon economic 
liberalism, wherein threats are seen as part and parcel of the ‘forces’ of the market, 
and intimately tied to the ‘inevitable’ processes of globalisation.  
 
In summary, whilst ethical arguments may have been an important part of the 
nationalist case for many, they may not have been, and certainly need not have been, 
given the general taken-for-grantedness of ‘the (UK/Scottish) economy’ and 
corresponding material communities of economic fate. It is likely that many Scottish 
people could disassociate normative ideals upon which the economy ought to be 
governed from the ‘fact’ or ‘reality’ of an actually existing Scottish economy in their 
minds-eye, and with that the realisation (or not) of the economic insecurities 
associated with independence. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
This final chapter will bring together the key theoretical and empirical themes of the 
thesis. It will also reintroduce poststructuralist discourse theory and the grammar of 
concepts its provides - as outlined in the Methodology - to better understand the 
discursive ‘strategies’ at work in the articulation of economic (in)security in ‘texts’ 
from the independence debate. Finally, the chapter will discuss a few potential 
avenues for future research. First, however, the author wishes to draw briefly upon an 
experience which served as a stimulus to the ideas that have been presented in this 
thesis.  
 
More of a Scottish economy than ever before? 
 
Whilst at an international workshop on ‘Economic Nationhood and Globalisation’ at 
the Central European University (CEU), Budapest, in May 2013, the author was sat 
beside Professor Jim Tomlinson, who delivered an excellent paper entitled ‘Economic 
globalization and Scottish nationhood since 1870’. It argued that Scotland’s economy 
is now more national than ever before. These ideas were subsequently published in 
‘Imagining the Economic Nation: The Scottish Case’ (Tomlinson 2014). However, 
despite purporting to stress the imagined nature of the national economy, Tomlinson’s 
insights are inconsistent with regards their application of the concept of an imagined 
national economy (and community of fate), and can be considered, in fact, to be 
paradoxically complicit in perpetuating the very idea of a concrete, or ‘really existing’ 
Scottish economy. Whilst not explicitly stating whether or not the arguments therein 
support or refute the case for independence, framed as it was within the context of the 
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upcoming independence referendum, the paper is illustrative of how the ‘taken-for-
granted’ economy can fuel ‘economistic’ justifications for and against independence.   
  
As was explained in Chapter 3, de-industrialisation in the latter half of the twentieth 
century had a particularly notable effect on Scottish political economy and is thought 
to have been crucial in the emergence of Scottish nationalism. The discourse of de-
industrialisation (see Chapter 3) reflects very real changes in the economic lives of 
many Scottish people at that time, and to that extent, meaningfully speaks to the 
concrete economic insecurities that many will have experienced. As Tomlinson 
himself notes, this narrative, however, has had significant implications for the way in 
which the Scottish economy has been imagined in ‘declinist’ terms during much of 
the period since then, and as necessarily dependent, therefore, on the security afforded 
by the union. Accordingly, unionist arguments against independence have tended to 
focus on the supposedly inherent economic security of union.  
 
Tomlinson argues that previously, especially prior to 1914, Britain had the most 
globalised economy in the world due to its vast empire, and that in relative terms 
Scotland was even more globalised than Britain as a whole. Within this context of 
free trade, virtually non-existent welfare provisions and a very minimal public sector, 
there was little capacity for national economic management and to talk of the national 
economy at this time would have carried little meaning. However, Tomlinson argues 
that recent development have resulted in Scotland becoming ‘de-globalised’ and thus 
‘more of a ‘national economy’, imagined as an ‘economic community of fate’, than 
has been the case at any time in its modern history’ (Tomlinson 2014, p. 171).   
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What is not clear here is whether in employing the term ‘community of fate’ 
Tomlinson is referring to said community as ‘real’ or ‘imagined’ (i.e. a ‘real’ or 
concrete system which defines the material fate of the community, or something 
which is just collectively imagined to be ‘real’). To begin with he suggests the latter 
and presents useful insights about how the imagined national economy first came 
about (see Chapter 4), but then subsequently argues that due to the structural changes 
created by de/globalisation there has been less/more of an economic community of 
fate at different times in Scotland, seemingly referring to something more concrete, or 
‘real’.  
 
Whilst in one respect it might be meaningful to talk of the Scottish economy as more 
national than ever before in terms of economic activity being increasingly homespun, 
one should be mindful that in highlighting such ‘objective’ developments and trends 
within the Scottish economy, one is culpable for conveying them as something 
necessarily ‘Scottish’. This applies whether we assume those trends to be driven by 
endogenous or exogenous forces. For instance, we could point out, as Tomlinson 
does, that exogenous forces created by material or structural shifts in the global 
economy have been responsible for making the Scottish economy more national. But, 
while there may well have been (and may continue to be) exogenous challenges like 
competitiveness threats to manufacturers in Scotland, these threats still need to be 
imagined as ‘Scottish’ threats (and indeed those manufacturers as ‘Scottish’ 
manufacturers); as threats to a defined ‘Scottish’ referent, and as exogenous to a 
‘Scottish economy’. And where there are endogenous forces that may have resulted in 
the (Scottish) economy becoming more national than ever before (e.g. the 
introduction of the post-war welfare state and a burgeoning public sector) they are the 
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result of political decisions that have been taken by national executives (often justified 
as reactions to exogenous forces).  
 
In any event, empirically speaking, it makes little sense to talk of (and would be very 
difficult to validate the existence of) a Scottish economy as an especially functional 
economic area or entity, even though we might point to certain trends that suggest it is 
becoming more or less functional. Indeed, were we to zoom in or out to geographical 
scales above or below Scotland would we genuinely find spaces that are notably less 
functional? Yet in exaggerating the extent to which a ‘really existing’ Scottish 
economy and community of fate exists, assertions like Tomlinson’s can actually be 
regarded as complicit in perpetuating the very idea of a Scottish economy.  
 
None of this is terribly important so long as it is recognised that the economy is an 
essentially ‘arbitrary’ and ‘political’ designation. National governments will continue 
to have an interest in ‘measuring’ economic activity within their respective territories 
and attempting to govern it in accordance with the stated interests of the citizenry over 
which they preside. Indeed, their ‘effective legitimacy’ largely relies upon how well 
they are seen to be doing so. But it is such recognition that is almost entirely missing 
in most articulations of the economy. In the case of the Scottish independence 
referendum debate, it is clearly missing in articulations of economic (in)security, 
which are instead reliant upon the assumption of a concrete, or ‘real’ Scottish/UK 
economy that especially determines the economic circumstances or economic 
(in)security of subjects therein. As was shown in Chapter 4, the result is almost 
entirely ‘economistic’ arguments being made for and against independence by key 
protagonists and a frankly ‘sterile’ and ‘depoliticised’ debate. 
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Thesis Summary 
 
Chapter 2 outlined the key research questions along with the methodological 
framework for the thesis. Practical considerations including the types of data used and 
the methods for its collection were explained, but the bulk of the chapter was reserved 
for outlining the ontological and epistemological assumptions and attendant 
methodological implications of poststructuralist discourse theory. The specific 
grammar of concepts afforded by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and their successors in 
the Essex School (Howarth 2000; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Phillips & Jørgensen 
2004; Torfing 1999; Torfing 2005) was outlined. Discourse theory research tends to 
vary in the extent to which these concepts (and discourse theory generally) are fore-
grounded or back-grounded in their written analyses. It was stated in the Methodology 
that for the most part this very complex grammar of concepts largely sits behind the 
thesis, informing the ontological and methodological lens through which observations 
are made. It was felt that doing so allowed the author to develop the thesis’ key 
themes without constant reiteration of the specifics of discourse theory, and in a way 
that would be meaningful to readers both familiar and unfamiliar with a discourse 
theory approach. At times certain concepts have been used in passing, but this final 
chapter affords an opportunity to return discourse theory to the foreground and show 
what it reveals specifically about the ideas and observations that have been made. 
Crucially, doing so will help to explain the ‘hidden politics’ of the independence 
debate.  
 
Chapter 3 provided a short historical introduction to contemporary Scottish politics 
along with conceptual arguments pertaining to the so called shift from government to 
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governance within which Scottish politics need to be viewed. A number of key 
political concepts were elaborated, including ‘the state’, ‘the nation’, ‘identity’, and 
‘legitimacy’. Also, insights from political geography pertaining to ‘space’, ‘place’ and 
‘territory’ were introduced. It was stressed that whilst the aforementioned historical 
introduction and the latter conceptual insights provide some understanding of the 
discursive context for the referendum debate, a broader appraisal of the politics of 
identity and legitimacy is required to account for the predominant focus among both 
nationalists and unionists on the so called ‘economics of independence’. 
 
Understanding the implications of the predominantly economic focus of the 
referendum debate demands a better understanding of what ‘the economy’ means. 
This was the purpose of Chapter 4, which in many respects introduced the core 
conceptual argument underpinning the entire thesis, namely, that ‘the economy’, far 
from representing a material ‘reality’, is a largely imaginative abstraction. It is 
imagined both where it refers to a domain of (social) activity called ‘the economic’ 
and where it refers to specific, territorially defined, spatial-scalar entities, like the 
Scottish, UK or European economy. This chapter also introduced the concept of a 
‘community of fate’ (Williams 2003). This concept, as well as its capacity to account 
for both the ‘material’ and ‘ethical’ foundations of such communities, helpfully 
describes the way in which ‘the economy’ can be assumed to speak to the economic 
(in)security of a territorially defined community.  
 
Chapter 5 explained that claims about the economic implications of Scottish 
independence were central to the debate. Moreover, it showed that the presentation of 
largely ‘economistic’ cases for and against independence was in part a deliberate 
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‘strategy’ by the opposing sides. Whilst appearing to present practical, utility based 
justifications for and against independence, the reality was a sterilised debate within 
which economic implications could never really be ‘known’ and other political 
considerations were ignored. This chapter also revealed the intention to challenge the 
aforementioned common sense assumption that underpinned these economistic 
arguments, namely the idea of ‘the economy’ as a unifying object space within which 
economic (inter)subjectivities are cemented and economic circumstances are 
especially determined.  
 
It was argued in Chapter 6 that the idea of ‘the economy’ relies upon the assumption 
of shared economic (in)security. However, economic (in)security is very much under-
theorised (Dent 2007), and rarely dealt with in empirical literature, and yet the failure 
to do so given its potential importance for shaping political geography is regrettable. 
It was argued that economic (in)security is a fundamental feature of economic  
life under a modern capitalist mode of production, given that our capacity as 
individuals – people, firms, organisations, states, etc. – to satisfy our own material 
wants and needs are never wholly within our purview. Economic insecurities are 
largely ‘accepted’ as part and parcel of modern economic life. We tacitly recognise 
that much of our capacity to satisfy those economic wants and needs (our economic 
security) are also determined by numerous circumstantial factors largely beyond our 
control. 
 
Chapters 7 and 8 provided an analysis of unionist and nationalist ‘texts’ respectively. 
They revealed the way in which the opposing Better Together and Yes Scotland 
campaigns based their arguments regarding independence on the articulation of 
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economic (in)security. In both cases the proportion of utterances of ‘conventional’ 
security vis-à-vis those of economic security was revealed, along with the specificities 
of the insecurities articulated. Essentially, the unionist argument was one of the 
‘strength, security and stability’ of a larger UK economy, whilst the nationalist 
argument attempted to convey the ‘fairness, prosperity and security’ of an 
independent Scotland. Both of these discourses encouraged Scots to imagine 
themselves as bound up within a largely material community of fate, but the 
nationalist discourse also attempted to convey an ethical substance to this community 
(i.e. an ethical community of fate) built upon supposed Scottish preferences regarding 
social democracy (see Chapter 3). This is revealed through the employment of 
signifiers of fairness, equality, and social justice, and is evident from the specific 
‘types’ of insecurity uttered, namely poverty, austerity and inequality. Irrespective of 
whether Scots view themselves as united by such ethical commitments, the claim that 
people in Scotland will have had a necessarily shared economic experience of 
independence is conveyed through unionist and nationalist texts as an objective truth 
or matter of fact requiring little or no validation. 
 
Yet articulations of ‘the economy’ are fundamentally political insofar as they serve, 
deliberately or not, to convey a space (and populace) as governable, and insofar as it 
is only really meaningful to talk of ‘the economy’ in correspondence with a political 
space. The taken-for-grantedness of the economy was highlighted here with regards 
the debate on Scottish independence, for whilst the opposing campaigns disagreed on 
the economic implications of independence, and attempted to speak to different 
communities of economic fate, both fundamentally reasserted the assumption that 
economies are ‘real’ and within them our economic (in)security is both shared and 
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largely determined. The intention here has been to reveal the ‘hidden politics’ at play 
in this constitutional debate and the truth claims that served to obscure them. 
 
Poststructuralist Discourse Theory reminds us that all ideas, discourses, or meanings, 
are fundamentally re/constructed. They are never whole, or complete, but always 
vulnerable to that which is excluded in their re/articulation. In the case of given 
examples of ‘the economy’ as economic realities (e.g. the Scottish economy, the UK 
economy, the European Economy, the global economy) they have to be continually 
reasserted through discursive practices to appear and/or remain seemingly real to 
people. However, in some circumstances, certain ideas, or discourses, become so 
naturalised, or taken-for-granted, that they appear a-political. ‘The economy’, as a 
way of thinking about the aggregation of economic activities, may be thought of as an 
example of such a taken-for-granted. Yet objectivity can be challenged at any time 
and established ideas can once more re-enter the ‘play of practice’ as their meaning is 
renegotiated. It is the aim of critical investigation to highlight such taken-for-granted 
truths and reveal their contingency. The purpose of this thesis has been to show how 
this truth made possible economistic arguments for and against independence that 
seemed divorced from other normative, political or ideological judgements or 
considerations. The grammar of concepts that poststructuralist discourse theory 
presents us with helps us to understand how arguments for and against independence, 
whilst disagreeing on the economic implications of independence, served to 
perpetuate this idea.   
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Discourse Theory and the ‘Hidden Politics’ of Independence 
Poststructuralism reminds us that ‘signs’ are essentially arbitrary as they have no 
necessary meaning. The signifier ‘the economy’ means nothing without being 
articulated through chains of equivalence with other signifiers that give it meaning 
and define the object space that we think of when that term is uttered. As 
Torfing states, ‘Within discourse, meaning is constructed either in terms of difference 
or equivalence…; Most often, meaning is constructed both through the assertion of 
difference and the articulation of chains of equivalence’ (2005, p. 14). Through an 
analysis of various texts ‘chains of equivalence’ can be discerned through which 
certain key signifiers are invested with meaning by being linked to other signifiers. It 
is through acts of articulation that elements become moments in a given discourse. As 
Philips and Jørgensen explain, ‘What the key signifiers have in common is that they 
are empty signs [and]…mean almost nothing by themselves until, through chains of 
equivalence they are combined with other signs that fill them with meaning’ (2004, p. 
50). The economy is an example of an ‘empty signifier’. As with the state, the myriad 
of signs that fill ‘the economy’ with meaning are understandably vast. Moreover, 
discourse is ‘performative’ too, and like the state, ‘the economy’s’ meaning, far from 
being neutral or without consequence, encourages a particular view of reality and with 
it the actions and interests of subjects.  
 
As shown in Chapter 4 ‘the economy’ did not used to mean what it does today, and it 
has not come about through conceptual development or indeed as a consequence of 
‘economies’ becoming (more) ‘real’. Nevertheless, it is now regarded as representing 
something real, and as something ontologically given. It acts performatively through 
helping to make governable given political spaces. It appears to speak to an 
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aggregation of all of the ‘everyday’ activities we think of as inherently ‘economic’, 
despite in fact being just social activities like any other. What is often excluded by 
this discourse of ‘the economy’ is discussion of all the others ways in which political 
legitimacies, or political authority, ought to be determined. It makes it possible to 
convey seemingly practical justifications for governing rationalities (in this instance, 
independent statehood) without recourse to supposedly less rational, emotive 
considerations, such as national identity. 
 
As outlined in the Methodology, the concept of ‘interpellation’ helps to make sense of 
how subject positions are intersubjectively constituted. The following explanations of 
interpellation help us understand the discursive construction of ‘the economy’ and 
how it becomes sedimented as ‘common sense’.  
‘Interpellation refers to a dual process whereby identities or subject-positions 
are created and concrete individual are ‘hailed’ into (Althusser 1971, p. 174) 
or interrelated by them’ (Weldes 1996, p. 287). 
‘Once they identify with these subject-positions, the representations make 
sense to them and the power relations and interests entailed in them are 
naturalized. As a result, the representations appear to be common sense, to 
reflect ‘the way the world really is’’ (Weldes 1996, p. 287).  
‘Social constructions become common sense when…they are treated as if they 
neutrally or transparently reflected [sic] reality’ (Weldes 1996, p. 303). 
It is argued here that the idea, or discourse, of ‘the economy’ helps bind people into 
what one can refer to as a (largely material) community of fate. 
 
Security is central to this process. ‘The economy’ does not mean anything unless it 
speaks to our view of a broader system in which we are a part, and within which our 
material circumstances are at least partly determined. In other words, the economy 
relies upon the articulation of shared opportunities and vulnerabilities (or shared 
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(in)security) which help to define it as an object space within which our material 
realities are realised, either positively or negatively. This is what makes the 
interpellation of subjects possible - a (largely) material community of fate is conveyed 
to subjects on the assumption that their economic fates, both positive and negative, 
are to a greater or lesser extent bound up with each other’s. In the case of nationalists 
the aim is to articulate a Scottish economy currently defined by both material 
successes and hampered by the insecurities of union, contrasted with an alternative 
future Scottish economy of security and prosperity. In the case of unionists the aim 
was the opposite, to articulate the UK economy as the principal determining context 
of economic fates of people in Scotland – even where ‘the Scottish economy’ is 
uttered by unionists it is seen as inherently bound up with the wider UK economy as 
the principal determining context – with security under continued union, contrasted 
with significant economic insecurities of an independent Scotland. Whilst the people 
of Scotland ultimately voted against independence, it is difficult to tell how 
‘convincing’ the opposing arguments will have been. Some prior polling evidence 
suggested the unionist’s economic case against independence was shaping public 
opinion (ICM Research 2013; Curtice 2014; ScotCen 2014), and subsequent survey 
research revealed the impact of economic risk on voter choice in the referendum 
(ESRC 2014).  
 
Nationalist and unionist arguments for and against independence were based on the 
articulation of discourses of economic (in)security. Obviously these discourses 
disagreed on the economic (in)security implications of independence, and through 
building chains of equivalence (or organising elements into moments) within their 
respective discourses revealed differing projections of what those insecurities were. 
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We have also seen that they disagreed to some extent on where the (imagined) 
boundaries of ‘the economy’ exist, as a consequence of the necessity to speak to 
different communities of economic fate. However, what remained fundamentally 
unchallenged by either side, was the taken-for-granted idea of ‘the economy’ as a real 
spatial-scalar entity within which the economic fortunes and (in)security of people in 
Scotland is especially determined. This was highlighted in Chapters 7 and 8 as 
revealing an instance of ‘intertextuality’ (or ‘interdiscursivity’) insofar as the very 
idea or discourse of ‘the economy’ effectively renders meaningful such articulations 
of economic (in)security. Moreover, it was observed that ‘dialogicality’ between 
concrete unionist and nationalist texts and the wider discourse of ‘the economy’ was 
largely non-apparent. This is in fact typical of such practices. The idea of ‘the 
economy’ has become so entrenched in popular consciousness as to appear not like an 
idea at all but an objective reality, or truth, when the real truth is that economies, at 
least as we are encouraged to imagine them, do not exist at all.  
 
This latter point helps to account for what has been referred to as the ‘depoliticisation’ 
of the independence debate. It was explained in the methodology that all discourses 
are fundamentally contingent. However, in certain circumstances, their contingency is 
obscured, or forgotten. Torfing explains, 'Discourse is defined as a relational 
ensemble of signifying sequences; but if the relational and differential logic prevailed 
without any limitation or rupture, there would be no room for politics’ (1999, p. 91).  
The concept of ‘objectivity’ in discourse theory explains those discourses that become 
so sedimented, so naturalised, that their contingency becomes forgotten, they appear 
apolitical. However, insofar as it is meaningful to talk about ‘the economy’ it is only 
with reference to the political space or territory with which it is thought to 
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correspond, in the exact same way as the state. In any event, it is this idea of the 
economy that the articulation of economic (in)security relies upon (and vice versa).  
 
Discourse Theory reminds us that all discourses are necessarily contingent, and must 
constantly be re/articulated. They are always vulnerable to alternative understandings 
of reality. As such, they can at any time be destabilised (along with the subject 
positions they make possible) and re-enter what Milliken refers to as the ‘play of 
practice’. Here lies the ‘critical’ aspect of postructuralism generally, to 
‘problematise’, ‘deconstruct’, ‘juxtapose’, ‘destabilise’, or simply challenge taken-
for-granted or accepted truths. However, this is not always easy, far from it. In this 
thesis, for example, it is shown that the imagined economy is just that, largely 
imagined and not ‘real’, and that this had significant implications for shaping the 
terms of the Scottish independence debate. The intention is therefore to challenge an 
accepted view of social reality. Yet clearly, changing this received wisdom would 
require enormous discursive effort. A secondary, and perhaps more realistic 
expectation here, is to encourage the reader to consider some of the political 
implications that this received wisdom might have had in the context of the Scottish 
independence referendum debate, specifically how it may have shaped the terms of 
the debate (i.e. to be based on the articulation of the shared economic (in)security 
implications of independence) and how it may have served to ‘depoliticise’ it. 
 
From a postructuralist position, all concepts, and all meanings, can be thought of as 
essentially ‘contested’ (see Gallie 1956). We have seen, however, that ‘the economy’ 
remains “essentially” uncontested. Yet the same is not true of the concept of security, 
which as explained in Chapter 6 is increasingly subjected to alternative 
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conceptualisations seeking to challenge its dominant formulation. In the language of 
discourse theory, whilst conventional accounts of the meaning of security remain 
‘hegemonic’, the ‘antagonistic struggle’ over its meaning is revealed through 
alternative accounts which aim to rearticulate the meaning of security. Through 
evidencing the significance of articulations of economic (in)security in the Scottish 
independence debate this thesis has followed a similar vein. Political geographers and 
International Relations scholars have regularly highlighted the importance of 
(conventional) security in the (re)territorialisation of the state, but articulations of 
conventional (in)security were almost absent from the independence debate, and yet, 
the (potential) (re)territorialisation of the state was very clearly at stake. This thesis 
can be regarded as an example of an alternative account of security based on the 
assumption that its meaning is fundamentally constructed, and the product of 
discursive practice.    
 
It was proposed here that we might think of unionist and nationalist arguments 
pertaining to independence as fundamentally underpinned by the articulation of 
economic (in)security. Crucially, the methodology explained that ‘general 
equivalents’ can either be ‘empty’ or ‘floating’. Arguably, across the opposing 
nationalist and unionist discourses, ‘economic (in)security’ can be regarded as a 
‘floating signifier’. Defined simply, a floating signifier is ‘a signifier that is 
overflowed with meaning because it is articulated differently within different 
discourses’ (Torfing 1999, p. 301). 
‘Floating signifiers are general equivalents that have multiple meanings because 
actors grounded in multiple discourses are seeking to hegemonise their meaning 
during a period of dislocation’ (Jeffares 2007, pp. 58-59). 
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Though there were clear similarities in the types of (in)security uttered between 
unionists and nationalists (e.g. the impact on Scotland’s fiscal position) – albeit with 
disagreement on the actual implications of independence for these (e.g. whether 
Scotland’s fiscal position would be improved or damaged) - there were also clear 
differences. Within nationalist texts it was possible to discern an attempt to articulate 
a more social democratic conception of economic (in)security, which drew 
‘intertextually’ upon an established discourse of Scottish social democracy. Chapter 8 
revealed how nationalist arguments for independence drew upon signifiers of social 
justice, equality, and most notably of all, ‘fairness’. Arguably where this was done it 
will have been seen, by some at least, as a more overtly political argument, speaking 
as it does to more overtly political values. Almost irrespective of this social 
democratic understanding of economic (in)security presented, such nationalist 
articulations still took as given the existence of a ‘Scottish economy’ and 
corresponding community of fate as a material reality sitting beneath any ethical 
community.  
 
Unionist arguments had no such ethical connotations and relied purely on the 
economic threats associated with necessarily being part of a competitive global 
economy. Economic (in)security is articulated as pertaining to threats that are taken as 
given within accepted (neoliberal) economic doctrine (see Chapter 6). Conversely to 
nationalists, no attempt is made to speak to a discourse of Scottish social democracy, 
not least, one would assume, because of the multi-party make-up of the unionist 
movement and attendant ideological disagreements between parties. In other words, 
unionists will have more readily suffered from a subject position that was essentially 
‘overdetermined’. Any given articulation of economic (in)security from any given 
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protagonist is inevitably done so from a given subject position within a wider 
discursive context, and for the Better Together campaign to appear harmonious it may 
have been necessary to put aside ideological disagreements among subjects. This is 
not an issue if one is seen to be focusing instead on the seemingly more practical, 
material, economic arguments against independence.  
 
Yet this unionist argument was no less ‘political’, or ‘ideological’ than nationalist 
articulations of (in)security. As with nationalist articulations of economic (in)security, 
unionist ones offer clear instances of ‘intertextuality’, whereby the ‘outside’ of a text 
is brought ‘inside’ by drawing on earlier communicative events, or ‘texts’ (Fairclough 
2003, p. 17; Philips & & Jørgensen 2004, p. 73). However, in the case of unionist 
texts this was done much more implicitly. Related to intertextuality is the concept of 
dialogicality, which refers to the extent to which different ‘voices’ or ‘texts’ are 
apparent is discursive utterances. Coincidentally, Fairclough uses by way of 
illustration the example of a European Union text in which globalisation, in particular 
global economic change along neoliberal lines, is seen as an inevitable development 
distinct from human agency (2003, p. 45). In the case of nationalist articulations of 
(in)security, where the discourse of social democracy was drawn upon more 
explicitly, dialogicality is more apparent. However, such ‘dialogicality’ was more 
readily obscured in unionist texts. In unionist texts especially, the political or 
ideological underpinnings of the argument is obscured, appearing instead to speak 
only to objectively verifiable truths about the economic implications of independence. 
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Avenues for Future Research 
 
In terms of further empirical applications of the ideas developed in this thesis, it 
would be interesting to look at the role of the imagined economy and associated 
articulations of economic (in)security in other areas of the world where secessionist 
movements exist and there are elite debates comprising economic justifications for 
independence. Notable inclusions would be Catalonia and Quebec, where typically 
deliberative discourse regarding legitimacy has tended to focus on national identity 
issues, but economic justifications seem increasingly important (Duch et al. 2000; 
Duchesne et al. 2003; Howe 2009; Muñoz & Tormose 2015a; 2015b).   
 
Another potential application of this thesis’ ideas regards the UK referendum on 
membership of the EU in June 2016, which revealed very similar ‘economistic’ 
arguments being made by the opposing sides. Those who favoured remaining in the 
EU (the so called ‘remainers’) made significant discursive efforts to articulate the 
economic insecurities of leaving, whilst those who favoured leaving (the ‘leavers’) 
stressed the converse, and mirroring nationalist claims about unionists in the Scottish 
referendum debate, branded the remain campaign ‘project fear’. However, just as 
matters of national identity are thought to have been significant determinants of the 
Scottish vote despite elite discourse strictly avoiding the topic, it is highly likely that 
issues of national identity, notably ethnic formulations, were a significant determinant 
of voter choice on membership of the EU too, despite elite discourse in this case also 
refusing to engage with these issues.  
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This latter observation regards what might be seen as a growing disjuncture between 
what might be referred to as ‘elite’ and ‘everyday’ discourse. If the former refers to 
the deliberative debate of politicians and other elites as reported through the 
mainstream media, then the latter might be given to refer to debates comprising the 
views, opinions and arguments at the level of the citizenry (increasingly done on 
social media platforms). It has been noted in the case of the Scottish referendum that 
such ‘everyday’ discourse often focussed on more heated and emotive matters of 
national identity despite elite debate not doing so (ESRC 2014) and the same was very 
clearly the case in the lead up to the EU referendum, with strong and heated views 
being exchanged. If a challenge for future research is to better understand the extent 
to which economics and/or identity drives voter choices in such referenda, a challenge 
for politicians and for civil society is to better ensure a more meaningful and engaging 
debate that better takes account of the views of the electorate.   
 
In terms of theoretical avenues for future research the opportunities are many. In was 
stated in the introduction that the author regards this thesis as making a contribution to 
what is a limited literature on the importance of the imagined economy and its role in 
determining governing legitimacies (Rosamond 2002 & 2012; Herrera 2007 & 2010; 
Tooze 1998). The project of exploring the multifarious ways in which the taken-for-
granted economy is imagined might comprise a vast body of works. Moreover, from a 
more ‘critical’ perspective, the project of ‘problematising’ the imagined state has 
provided a vast body of works on postsovereignty (see Chapter 3) and has been a 
topic of interest to students of class, gender, the environment, etc. In that regard the 
project of exploring the implications of the taken-for-granted, imagined economy, 
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including the many ‘hidden voices’ that potentially result from it, also presents a 
multitude of opportunities for future research.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1.0 Better Together Articles 
Date Article Title 
01/30/13 A victory for the campaign for a fair referendum 
01/30/13 Scottish Science, UK Funding 
02/01/13 Share to win a free T-Shirt 
02/07/13 Materials page launched 
02/11/13 It’s time Scottish Ministers released their legal advice 
02/13/13 Better Together Ups Pressure on Scottish Government to Release Legal Advice 
02/13/13 Phil Anderton joins board of Better Together 
02/17/13 Will you join Emma on our National Campaign Weekend? 
02/18/13 Emma on why she’s pledging to help deliver one million leaflets 
02/21/13 Better Together launches unprecedented campaign activity 
02/22/13 Glasgow Uni students vote Better Together 
02/22/13 Nationalist plans on currency and tax are falling apart 
02/24/13 National Campaign Organiser (Grassroots) talks national campaign weekend 
02/26/13 Victoria on why we’re looking forward to the SCVO’s The Gathering 
02/27/13 Charities need the facts 
02/28/13 Better Together marks first birthday of Devo Plus 
03/04/13 Our NHS doesn’t recognise borders 
03/07/13 One thing in public, another in private 
03/08/13 Read Alistair Darling’s speech to COSLA Conference 
03/08/13 Better Together Women launches on International Women’s Day 
03/11/13 The strength of the UK pension system 
03/11/13 You can’t believe the nationalists on oil 
03/12/13 Better Together Youth Rep, Michael, on votes at 16 and how young people can get involved 
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08/09/14 One of Scotland’s top surgeons says Scotland’s NHS is better protected as part of the UK 
08/09/14 More embarrassment for Alex Salmond as top nationalist star rejects his plans to break up the BBC 
08/10/14 We can have the best of both worlds for Scotland 
08/10/14 Pooling and sharing our resources across the UK supports those in need 
08/10/14 Alex Salmond has no tenable plan for currency, says expert 
08/11/14 More and more people are saying No Thanks as Salmond fails on Plan B 
 292 
08/11/14 Being part of the UK secures the pensions of Scots 
08/11/14 Expert evidence shows Salmond needs to name Plan B on currency now 
08/12/14 A Campaign increasingly talking to itself 
08/12/14 Our economy is stronger in the UK 
08/12/14 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey shows that the economy is the key issue 
08/12/14 UK shipyard deal protects 800 jobs in Scotland 
08/12/14 VAT on our kids’ clothes? No Thanks 
08/13/14 Women Together celebrate the success of the 100 Letters campaign 
08/13/14 Doctors say the best way to protect our NHS in Scotland is to stay in the UK 
08/13/14 The stakes couldn’t be any higher 
08/14/14 Alex Salmond should stop the scare stories on the NHS 
08/15/14 Breaking up the UK would mean cuts to our public services 
08/15/14 How much more of a pounding can the SNP’s economic plans take? 
08/17/14 Alex Salmond is offering austerity plus in an independent Scotland 
08/17/14 Make sure you, your friends and your family can all vote to say No Thanks to separation 
08/18/14 Leading Scottish business figure calls for currency Plan B 
08/19/14 Rural leaders back Scotland staying part of UK 
08/20/14 Six key questions on currency that Scots deserve answers to 
08/20/14 Separation would break up the BBC 
08/21/14 Television production here is on a roll - let’s keep it rolling by saying No Thanks 
08/21/14 Energy expert fatally undermines Salmond’s economic case for separation 
08/21/14 NHS scare stories are a “total and utter lie” say top doctor 
08/22/14 SNP Oil Lies 
08/22/14 Alistair Darling takes up James McAvoy’s Ice Bucket Challenge 
08/23/14 Experts hit out at SNP NHS lies 
08/23/14 SNP NHS Lies 
08/23/14 Nationalist scaremongering on the NHS is a “big, huge lie”. 
08/24/14 The nationalists’ own poll shows our NHS is more secure as part of the UK 
08/25/14 The United Kingdom, Solidarity and Community - Carwyn Jones, First Minister of Wales. 
08/25/14 European Court Judge demolishes SNP tuition fee policy for a separate Scotland 
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08/25/14 Independence risk to pensions – new poll 
08/25/14 Salmond stretching the truth 
08/26/14 Families will pay a price for Salmond’s debt default threat 
08/26/14 Director’s Cut - Debate Reaction 
08/27/14 Football legend Archie Macpherson says No Thanks to separation 
08/27/14 Prof Susan Shaw says No Thanks to separation to protect world class university research 
08/27/14 Yet more business leaders are saying No Thanks to separation 
08/29/14 SNP Government plan for tuition fees in ruins 
08/29/14 Statement from Jim Murphy on suspending his tour 
08/30/14 Salmond’s currency chaos exposed 
08/31/14 Being part of the UK keeps costs down for Scottish families 
08/31/14 SNP defence plans “amateurish and unrealistic” says former NATO chief. 
09/01/14 Say No Thanks to keep our universities world class 
09/02/14 Being part of the UK is best for our families, our future and our country. 
09/02/14 Families would lose most from Salmond’s debt default threat. 
09/02/14 Alex Salmond’s currency chaos hits EU prospects. 
09/03/14 For the sake of our families, Scots are saying No Thanks to independence 
09/03/14 Independence offers nothing for the working class 
09/03/14 Currency chaos would mean painful cuts to public spending, say experts. 
09/04/14 White Paper fundamentally flawed on security - Sir David Omand 
09/04/14 Independence wouldn’t put an end to austerity, it would make it worse 
09/04/14 Disabled people up and down the UK need each other now, more than ever 
09/05/14 We are stronger when we stand together 
09/05/14 Independence would cost families in Scotland dear, says expert 
09/06/14 SNP claims on welfare don’t add up 
09/07/14 Big pension firms moving money out of Scotland over separation risks 
09/07/14 Trade unions back a No vote 
09/08/14 A separate Scotland could have to wait 6 years for EU membership 
09/08/14 The risks of leaving the UK are “huge” says Nobel prize winner (Paul Krugman) 
09/08/14 Today the costs of separation became real. (Refers to Krugman article as above) 
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09/08/14 The truth about the NHS and separation 
09/09/14 Change is coming to Scotland with a No vote 
09/09/14 B&Q boss warns of higher costs in a separate Scotland. 
09/10/14 Black Wednesday: The day the economic case for separation crumbled 
09/10/14 A Proud Nation 
09/11/14 Seven days to make a difference 
09/11/14 Reality and risk 
09/11/14 Scottish Businesses say No Thanks to the risks of separation 
09/11/14 Experts expose SNP NHS lies 
09/11/14 With 7 days to go, we sum up today in 7 tweets 
09/12/14 A number of high street banks prepare contingency plans to move out of Scotland 
09/12/14 The costs of separation laid bare 
09/12/14 Expert confirms ‘There will be no oil bonanza’ 
09/12/14 Being part of the UK keeps the cost down for families in Scotland 
09/12/14 Vote No to keep our NHS healthy 
09/13/14 Leaving the UK would bring “severe austerity” 
09/13/14 Separation could lead to increased costs, say mobile and broadband firms 
09/14/14 If you don’t know, vote No 
09/15/14 Labour heavyweights nail SNP NHS lies 
09/15/14 David Beckham joins the No team 
09/15/14 The poorest would be the hardest hit by separation, says top economist 
09/15/14 Former Performance Director of British Cycling backs a No vote 
09/15/14 Property website warns that separation would see house prices fall 
09/15/14 Aviva boss warns of public spending challenges in a separate Scotland 
09/15/14 Scotland’s top economists back Scotland staying in the UK 
09/16/14 A letter to the Scottish Government and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders work-in veterans 
09/16/14 REVEALED: Explosive leaked paper exposes SNP NHS lies 
09/16/14 Is this Plan B? 
The above materials can be accessed from: http://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20140915210710/http://www.bettertogether.net/  
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Appendix 2.0 Yes Scotland Articles (Will we be secure?) 
Date Title 
23/09/2013 Fairer pensions, tailor-made for Scotland 
25/09/2013 Scotland better placed to defuse pensions time bomb 
26/09/2013 Challenge to bankers' bonus cap will cost taxpayer £1m 
26/09/2013 Yes to an economic recovery that benefits all 
27/09/2013 Defence forces designed for Scotland - and to support our service personnel 
02/10/2013 UK economy 'will thrive' after Scotland becomes independent 
02/10/2013 The oil funds we could have had - and could still have 
02/10/2013 Correcting Alistair Darling on oil and gas 
03/10/2013 Young people next in line for Cameron’s welfare cuts 
04/10/2013 Balls and Darling – more scare stories but no genuine debate 
06/10/2013 Yes vote can lead to a greener, more sustainable Scotland 
07/10/2013 Green conference highlights range of Yes possibilities  
10/10/2013 No campaign opposed to sharing energy wealth fairly 
11/10/2013 Perspective: 'The benefit of equality and self-determination' 
14/10/2013 Closing Westminster’s £35bn tax gap 
15/10/2013 Reports of US accidents show risks of Scotland's nuclear weapons 
21/10/2013 The Scottish Police Federation tells politicians to be honest about Westminster cuts  
22/10/2013 Growing bedroom tax arrears highlight necessity of Yes 
23/10/2013 Bright future for renewables after Yes 
23/10/2013 Perspective: Independence and full employment offer route out of poverty 
24/10/2013 Yes vote will underline Aberdeen’s status as economic powerhouse 
27/10/2013 Independent Scotland can have first-class security service 
29/10/2013 Making Scotland’s wealth work for all 
29/10/2013 Yes vote will give Scotland the chance to build an excellent security service 
31/10/2013 Prison Officers trade union supports Yes campaign 
31/10/2013 We can build a safer Scotland 
 296 
31/10/2013 'I've lost my fear of Scottish independence' 
04/11/2013 Call for the rights of disabled people to be enshrined in a written constitution 
04/11/2013 Tax powers for a purpose – new report shows opportunities of a Yes vote 
06/11/2013 Audio: Patrick Harvie talks about the green case for Yes 
10/11/2013 Study explodes myth that Scotland is subsidised by UK  
11/11/2013 Farming for Yes reacts to UK snub to Scottish farming 
12/11/2013 Scottish Defence Force 'would be better and cost less' 
13/11/2013 Bang goes the great unionist myth of subsidised Scotland 
13/11/2013 Westminster votes to keep the Bedroom Tax opposed by Scotland 
14/11/2013 Green Yes unveils vision for independent Scotland 
19/11/2013 Listen: George Kerevan on the IFS report 
19/11/2013 Positive choices and a better future with Yes 
22/11/2013 Disarming the pensions 'time bomb' myth  
22/11/2013 Spreading the benefits of wealth across all of Scotland 
22/11/2013 Questions for No, as 'positive case for the Union' reaches new low 
22/11/2013 Silly scare story about armed forces proved false 
28/11/2013 A better deal for Scotland’s farming communities 
28/11/2013 'Yes best for farming, best for Scotland' 
03/12/2013 Economic experts deal double blow to No campaign scaremongering 
08/12/2013 Westminster pensions raid gives insight to full cost of a No vote  
10/12/2013 A stronger economy with more support for small businesses' Attracting the talent to help build our prosperity 
13/12/2013 More Westminster welfare cuts show why Yes is better for Scotland 
16/12/2013 UK inequality is no 'myth' despite what Tories say 
17/12/2013 Trident 'not an insurance policy, it’s a booby trap' 
18/12/2013 Imbalanced UK is fundamentally unstable and wasteful 
20/12/2013 Blair Jenkins welcomes Wealthy Nation to independence debate 
10/01/2014 Norwegians point the way as 'oil fund millionaires' 
12/01/2014 50 questions the No campaign must answer  
15/01/2014 No camp adviser sees independent Scotland’s 'accelerated' EU membership as 'likely' 
 297 
15/01/2014 Nicola Sturgeon challenges Westminster to accept ‘common-sense’ position on EU 
16/01/2014 PM's refusal to debate 'bizarre' as Hague sent north 
20/01/2014 Scotland can get a triple-win from tidal energy 
23/01/2014 They won’t erect a border. For a start, they couldn’t get it to work 
29/01/2014 Daily Digest: Westminster's mixed messages on currency and immigration 
29/01/2014 Common sense from Carney on currency  
30/01/2014 Daily Digest: exports, currency union and debates in the Lords 
31/01/2014 Daily Digest: Patrick Harvie, Westminster Cuts and No campaign pushing the boundaries of fair debate - again 
01/02/2014 Why a Yes vote will be good news for Scotland's small business community 
01/02/2014 'Sensible negotiations on currency will begin immediately upon independence' 
03/02/2014 Financial Times analysis underlines that an independent Scotland's got what it takes 
04/02/2014 Daily Digest: MoD Relying on Twitter for Intelligence and Tory Sabre-Rattling Doesn’t Bode Well for a No vote  
05/02/2014 Yes Scotland welcomes Bedroom Tax agreement 
06/02/2014 Daily Digest: bedroom tax banished and Bob Holman backs Yes 
07/02/2014 Scotland could be even richer than previously thought, say economic experts 
10/02/2014 Daily Digest: Voters believe Scottish Parliament should have control of immigration policy 
11/02/2014 Daily Digest: Scotland’s hydro and a tale of two futures 
12/02/2014 Daily Digest: They said one thing last week – but something starkly different this week 
13/02/2014 Daily Digest: Henry McLeish calls Osborne’s bluff 
14/02/2014 Daily Digest: Osborne’s posturing backfires and U-turns 
17/02/2014 Daily Digest: Barosso continues with absurd comparisons and Osborne’s visit not well-received 
17/02/2014 Why a Sterling Area is in everyone's interests 
18/02/2014 Daily Digest: Yes for Stronger Pensions and the Currency and EU threats crumble 
24/02/2014 Seven in 10 North Sea oil workers back Yes, survey reveals 
25/02/2014 'It is better for Scotland to manage its remaining reserves' says Academics 
25/02/2014 Scotland’s future should be in Scotland’s hands 
25/02/2014 Common sense on Scotland and the EU 
27/02/2014 Scotland is a wealthy nation and will be a great place to do business 
27/02/2014 Daily Digest: Scotland a good place from which to run business 
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27/02/2014 A Yes means a stronger Scottish economy and more jobs 
28/02/2014 Daily Digest: Scotland worthy of top credit rating and British Airways CEO - Independence “positive” 
01/03/2014 We've heard it all before 
06/03/2014 'With a Yes vote, we can expand the community' 
06/03/2014 'Hauntingly familiar ring to the No campaign’s woe forecasts' 
07/03/2014 Boss of UK's biggest insurance giant says referendum a matter for Scots 
07/03/2014 Daily Digest: Aviva chief says referendum a matter for Scots.  
07/03/2014 Perspective: The importance of International Women's Day 
10/03/2014 Why we can, should and must be independent 
10/03/2014 Daily Digest: Job insecurity, low pay and child poverty – Westminster isn’t working 
11/03/2014 Daily Digest: TV #indyref bias to be explored and Leading economist backs shared currency after Yes 
12/03/2014 Daily Digest: Scotland one of the world’s wealthiest countries 
13/03/2014 Daily Digest: Yes support continues to grow and Yes to fair pay 
24/03/2014 Dennis Canavan answering your #indyref questions 
25/03/2014 'No campaign demolishes its own argument' 
25/03/2014 Former Liberal Democrat chief executive Andy Myles backs Yes 
26/03/2014 Daily Digest: YouGov opinion poll boost and continuation of common research area after Yes 
28/03/2014 Another leading Lib Dem says Yes is right answer for Scotland and the rest of UK 
28/03/2014 There are many reasons why Lib Dems will be attracted to campaigning for Yes #sldconf 
28/03/2014 Clegg can't persuade liberals to vote No. He has little chance of convincing Scotland 
31/03/2014 Daily Digest: No camp's currency union crisis and shipbuilding to continue after Yes 
31/03/2014 'My whole family are voting Yes - that is six former Labour voters' 
01/04/2014 Only Yes can end the democratic deficit that gave us the Poll Tax and Bedroom Tax 
01/04/2014 Daily Digest: Royal Mail, research funding and more currency union woes for No 
02/04/2014 Daily Digest: voter registration, Muscatelli on currency, Westminster benefits cuts 
24/06/2014 Only a Yes vote will give Scotland's NHS the protection it needs 
05/07/2014 'If we vote Yes, Scotland can become more prosperous' 
06/07/2014 Building a wealthier country 
07/07/2014 Top European science advisor says Scotland’s elite status will remain after Yes vote 
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14/07/2014 Yes Scotland says new poll shows there is everything to play for 
15/07/2014 Senior former police figures declare support for a Yes vote  
24/08/2014 Former Scottish Labour chairman says NHS is safe only with a Yes vote 
27/08/2014 Former boss of betting giant William Hill says smart money is on voting Yes 
30/08/2014 Cameron must reverse policy on Westminster farming cash grab 
09/09/2014 Generation Yes sets out to win the grandparent vote 
10/09/2014 UK Benefits Crisis 
11/09/2014 Former RBS boss says bank announcement will have no impact on jobs in Scotland 
12/09/2014 Banks' move are a credit to Yes 
13/09/2014 Independent Scotland will have a successful and secure banking sector, says former Lloyds risk manager 
13/09/2014 Cash-and-Carry boss dismisses supermarket scare story 
13/09/2014 Generation Yes and National Collective set out to win the grandparent vote 
14/09/2014 Former Lloyds risk manager dismisses scaremongering over bank jobs and investment 
14/09/2014 Yes support from senior Scottish military and diplomatic figures  
16/09/2014 Former police chief says a Yes vote will help secure a safer Scotland 
 
Note:  
The official archive of Yes Scotland materials sits with the National Library of Scotland. 
The above materials can be accessed from: http://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20140916211421/http://www.yesscotland.net/ 
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Appendix 3.0 Yes Scotland Articles 
Date Title 
03/12/2013 Henry McLeish criticises 'uncompromising and consistently' negative No campaign 
03/12/2013 Economic experts deal double blow to No campaign scaremongering 
04/12/2013 Childcare Policy in an independent Scotland: Independence for women and working families 
05/12/2013 A Yes vote can deliver a better and fairer pensions system 
05/12/2013 The costs of a No become clearer 
06/12/2013 Top trade unionist says Yes is key to fairer, more balanced Scotland 
08/12/2013 Westminster pensions raid gives insight to full cost of a No vote  
09/12/2013 Crowdfunding our community campaigning 
10/12/2013 Attracting the talent to help build our prosperity 
10/12/2013 'A stronger economy with more support for small businesses' 
11/12/2013 Mary Dejevsky - I would have voted yes to Scottish independence 
11/12/2013 Think tank demolishes myths about EU membership after a Yes vote 
12/12/2013 Yes Scotland welcomes Third Sector support for independence 
13/12/2013 More Westminster welfare cuts show why Yes is better for Scotland 
16/12/2013 UK inequality is no 'myth' despite what Tories say 
17/12/2013 Trident 'not an insurance policy, it’s a booby trap' 
17/12/2013 Tory donations for No campaign should be wake up call for Labour supporters 
17/12/2013 Perspective: We can change things for the better 
18/12/2013 Imbalanced UK is fundamentally unstable and wasteful 
18/12/2013 Only a Yes can deliver economic transformation 
20/12/2013 Blair Jenkins welcomes Wealthy Nation to independence debate 
20/12/2013 We can empower Scotland's workers by Working Together after a Yes vote 
21/12/2013 No campaign admits a No vote is a vote against Scotland's interests 
23/12/2013 No campaign plans relaunch, but will never trump Yes 
29/12/2013 Yes vote can deliver real improvements to lives of working people 
29/12/2013 Yes continues on winning path as No camp in-fighting escalates 
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30/12/2013 2014: However you say it, say Yes to a better Scotland 
31/12/2013 2014 is the Year of Yes - and can also be the Year of Yes Labour 
31/12/2013 Your Year of Yes resolutions 
03/01/2014 Thatcher's secret plan to slash millions from Scots budget 
05/01/2014 Former Labour council chief is latest high-profile figure to say Yes 
05/01/2014 More evidence of Westminster acting against interests of Scotland 
06/01/2014 Only a Yes vote will meet demands for more powers 
06/01/2014 Nicola Sturgeon questions likelihood of additional powers after No vote 
06/01/2014 ‘2014 is the year of hard truths’ for the UK – and for the No campaign 
07/01/2014 More hard questions about a No vote 
08/01/2014  Former BBC journalist demands greater scrutiny of No campaign 
09/01/2014 If Cameron isn't right to debate Scotland, why is he right to govern Scotland? 
10/01/2014 Norwegians point the way as 'oil fund millionaires' 
10/01/2014 Scottish farmers' support for independence grows 
12/01/2014 Survey underlines why an independent Scotland has got what it takes  
12/01/2014 50 questions the No campaign must answer  
13/01/2014 Yes Scotland hails 'common sense' UK Treasury debt decision 
15/01/2014 No camp adviser sees independent Scotland’s 'accelerated' EU membership as 'likely' 
15/01/2014 Nicola Sturgeon challenges Westminster to accept ‘common-sense’ position on EU 
15/01/2014 School #indyref debate produces spectacular swing to Yes 
16/01/2014 PM's refusal to debate 'bizarre' as Hague sent north 
16/01/2014 Perspective: Independence means that people of Scotland would get the governments they vote for 
16/01/2014 Every local #indyref debate producing a swing to Yes Scotland 
17/01/2014 False barriers to independence will vanish after a Yes vote 
20/01/2014 Scotland can get a triple-win from tidal energy 
21/01/2014 'If this is the way the UK is really heading, I would rather get out’ 
21/01/2014 Yes Scotland - Response to Social Attitudes Survey 
23/01/2014 They won’t erect a border. For a start, they couldn’t get it to work 
23/01/2014 This is the Year of Yes: 2016 can be the Year of Labour  
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24/01/2014 River City star says Yes to independence 
24/01/2014 Yes Daily Digest: Traditional values of social justice 
24/01/2014 Yes is a vote to empower the people of Scotland 
25/01/2014 'Yes puts women in the driving seat of our own destiny' 
26/01/2014 Poll shows Yes is gathering pace and momentum 
26/01/2014 The Scotsman: Yes campaign playing the long game 
27/01/2014 Daily Digest: A choice of two futures 
28/01/2014 Hamish Macdonell: 'Yes campaign right back in the hunt' 
28/01/2014 Daily Digest: 'We need a recovery that benefits all' 
29/01/2014 Daily Digest: Westminster's mixed messages on currency and immigration 
29/01/2014 Common sense from Carney on currency  
30/01/2014 Scottish trade unions stay secure from Westminster’s attack 
30/01/2014 Daily Digest: exports, currency union and debates in the Lords 
31/01/2014 Daily Digest: Patrick Harvie, Westminster Cuts and No campaign pushing the boundaries of fair debate - again 
01/02/2014 Why a Yes vote will be good news for Scotland's small business community 
01/02/2014 'Sensible negotiations on currency will begin immediately upon independence' 
03/02/2014 Yes Edinburgh Super Saturday 
03/02/2014 Daily Digest: No campaign empty promises and Spain 'won’t interfere' in referendum 
03/02/2014 Financial Times analysis underlines that an independent Scotland's got what it takes 
04/02/2014 Daily Digest: MoD Relying on Twitter for Intelligence and Tory Sabre-Rattling Doesn’t Bode Well for a No vote  
05/02/2014 Yes campaigners appeal to the 'Missing Million' to register for #indyref vote 
05/02/2014 Daily Digest: Signing up the Missing Million and Scotland Working to End Bedroom Tax 
05/02/2014 Yes Scotland welcomes Bedroom Tax agreement 
06/02/2014 Massie: Victory is within reach of the Yes campaign 
06/02/2014 Committed Labour Party member backs independence to reduce poverty gap 
06/02/2014 Daily Digest: bedroom tax banished and Bob Holman backs Yes 
06/02/2014 Why a Yes vote is good for Scotland's trade unions and working people 
06/02/2014 Glasgow's No campaign adopt cowering Cameron’s approach to debates 
07/02/2014 Scotland could be even richer than previously thought, say economic experts 
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07/02/2014 Daily Digest: David Cameron, Bedroom Tax arrears & No's negativity 
07/02/2014 A Yes vote is the route to more job security and better living standards 
09/02/2014 Scottish Parliament campaigner remains sceptical of further devolution 
09/02/2014 Yes Scotland response to trio of polls 
10/02/2014 Daily Digest: Voters believe Scottish Parliament should have control of immigration policy 
11/02/2014 Daily Digest: Scotland’s hydro and a tale of two futures 
12/02/2014 Daily Digest: They said one thing last week – but something starkly different this week 
13/02/2014 Daily Digest: Henry McLeish calls Osborne’s bluff 
13/02/2014 Silent Auction - Give the gift of Yes this Valentine's Day 
14/02/2014 Why a Yes vote will be good news for Scotland's young people 
14/02/2014 Daily Digest: Osborne’s posturing backfires and U-turns 
16/02/2014 Only with a Yes vote can Scots feel the full benefit of our vast wealth 
16/02/2014 Massive credibility gap in the Commissioner's comments 
16/02/2014 Yes Scotland response to the Baroness Jay 
17/02/2014 Free higher education can be secured only with independence, say Academics for Yes 
17/02/2014 Daily Digest: Barosso continues with absurd comparisons and Osborne’s visit not well-received 
17/02/2014 Why a Sterling Area is in everyone's interests 
18/02/2014 Only way to get the powers most Scots want is with a Yes vote 
18/02/2014 Daily Digest: Yes for Stronger Pensions and the Currency and EU threats crumble 
18/02/2014 Scotland's strong economy is another reason why Yes is the right choice 
19/02/2014 Yes Scotland hails union branch backing for independence 
20/02/2014 Yes Scotland welcomes polls showing #indyref gap is narrowing 
20/02/2014 Daily Digest: Opinion poll boost and Alexander has no answers on inequality  
20/02/2014 The No camp's status quo is no longer a viable option 
21/02/2014 Daily Digest: Trade Union members ‘more attracted’ to Yes and More doubts about more powers if there is a No 
21/02/2014 Yes Scotland continues to triumph in #indyref social media battle 
22/02/2014 Sturgeon to address PCS union consultative conference 
22/02/2014 Why a Yes vote will be good news for Scotland's pensioners 
23/02/2014 Yes Scotland welcomes union's decision to reject No campaign  
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23/02/2014 Polls show that Yes is winning the arguments 
24/02/2014 Recent polls chart a steady direction towards growing Yes 
24/02/2014 Voters believe #indyref result be closer than polls currently suggest 
24/02/2014 Daily Digest: No campaign playing a bad hand today and Momentum remains with Yes 
24/02/2014 Seven in 10 North Sea oil workers back Yes, survey reveals 
25/02/2014 'It is better for Scotland to manage its remaining reserves' says Academics 
25/02/2014 Daily Digest: Commons sense from Cameron on EU and National Insurance the next Tory target 
25/02/2014 Scotland can be a successful, independent country 
25/02/2014 Scotland’s future should be in Scotland’s hands 
25/02/2014 Common sense on Scotland and the EU 
26/02/2014 Daily Digest: A fairer Scotland and a fairer nation 
26/02/2014 Business figures ramp up the pressure on No 
27/02/2014 Scotland is a wealthy nation and will be a great place to do business 
27/02/2014 Daily Digest: Scotland a good place from which to run business 
27/02/2014 A Yes means a stronger Scottish economy and more jobs 
27/02/2014 Yes for a better standard of life 
27/02/2014 The economic strengths of an independent Scotland 
28/02/2014 Another Labour stalwart declares support for Yes 
28/02/2014 British Airways Boss sees benefits of Yes vote in #indyref 
28/02/2014 Daily Digest: Scotland worthy of top credit rating and British Airways CEO - Independence “positive” 
28/02/2014 Common sense on currency 
05/03/2014 'My Scotland. My future. The future of my children and my children’s children' 
06/03/2014 We still need more women’s voices being heard  
06/03/2014 Daily Digest: Putting citizens at the heart of the debate and Osborne ‘not serious on currency’ 
06/03/2014 'With a Yes vote, we can expand the community' 
06/03/2014 'Hauntingly familiar ring to the No campaign’s woe forecasts' 
07/03/2014 A Yes vote allows us to 'do what’s right for older Scots' 
07/03/2014 Boss of UK's biggest insurance giant says referendum a matter for Scots 
07/03/2014 Perspective: I am excited at the prospect of what an independent Scotland can do 
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07/03/2014 Why a Yes vote is the key to a better and fairer deal for women in Scotland 
07/03/2014 Daily Digest: Aviva chief says referendum a matter for Scots.  
07/03/2014 Perspective: A vote for independence is a vote for women 
07/03/2014 Perspective: Female involvement is vital in all aspects of this debate 
07/03/2014 Perspective: A country where we can look after all of the people, all of the time 
07/03/2014 Perspective: The importance of International Women's Day 
08/03/2014 Perspective: 'The UK is certainly not OK for many women' 
09/03/2014 'A campaign based almost entirely on fear has lost the argument' 
09/03/2014 Westminster austerity offers Scotland's children a bleak future 
10/03/2014 Why we can, should and must be independent 
10/03/2014 Daily Digest: Job insecurity, low pay and child poverty – Westminster isn’t working 
10/03/2014 A Yes vote is the way to achieve tax and welfare powers Scotland needs 
11/03/2014 Daily Digest: TV #indyref bias to be explored and Leading economist backs shared currency after Yes 
12/03/2014 Daily Digest: Scotland one of the world’s wealthiest countries 
12/03/2014 GERS: Scotland’s got firm financial foundations to be a successful independent state 
12/03/2014 Yes Scotland chalks up student vote win in the heart of Glasgow 
13/03/2014 New poll shows 'Project Fear' is failing as support for Yes continues to rise 
13/03/2014 Daily Digest: Yes support continues to grow and Yes to fair pay 
13/03/2014 French politicians say Oui to Scotland’s EU membership 
13/03/2014 Scottish poverty report reveals cost of voting No 
14/03/2014 Tories kicking further devolution into the long grass 
14/03/2014 Daily Digest: Cameron back in Scotland and Survey finds independence could boost tourism in Scotland 
14/03/2014 Scotland is a backseat passenger in the Union 
14/03/2014 'No' chiefs start to shift towards Yes 
14/03/2014 Cameron's speech exposes 'more powers' for Scotland as a sham  
15/03/2014 Momentum continues to build for Yes with two more debate wins 
16/03/2014 Judo champ Connie throws her weight behind the Yes campaign 
16/03/2014 Stars of TV, film and stage back a Yes vote in #indyref 
16/03/2014 Westminster's whirlwind of fear has failed 
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17/03/2014 Daily Digest: MoD wants to dump more waste into the Clyde and Charles Kennedy calls for No to be less negative 
17/03/2014 Yes welcomes plea for No to drop negativity, but fears it will go unheeded 
17/03/2014 Only a Yes vote guarantees the powers people want and Scotland needs 
18/03/2014 Yes movement has grown arms and legs 
18/03/2014 We’ve been building the biggest grassroots movement in Scottish history 
18/03/2014 Daily Digest: 6 months to Yes and Labour's promises fall short 
18/03/2014 With six months to go, it's vital to stay focused on the big picture of Yes  
18/03/2014 As Labour retreats on more powers now is the time to join Yes, says Jenkins  
18/03/2014 Labour's biggest donor Unite refuses to endorse the No campaign 
19/03/2014 Yes Scotland polling numbers are on the increase - and so is the coffee intake 
19/03/2014 Daily Digest: Reaction to Labour leadership’s devolution fudge and Reflections on 6 months to go 
19/03/2014 Actor Brian Cox appeals to America to support a Yes vote 
19/03/2014 Yes Scotland is winning battle of engagement over No campaign 
20/03/2014 New poll shows Yes continues to close the gap on No and is on a winning path 
20/03/2014 Independent analysis demolishes Labour leadership's 'more powers' figures 
20/03/2014 Daily Digest: Another opinion poll shows Yes support rising and Osborne’s budget for Tories 
20/03/2014 Women for Independence welcome Carol Fox 
21/03/2014 Former Labour chairman appeals to party colleagues to join him in backing Yes 
21/03/2014 Daily Digest: Talks taking place on post-independence intelligence and security 
21/03/2014 Perspective: Labour's prospects in an independent Scotland would be very strong indeed 
21/03/2014 Only a Yes vote can create the equality that Westminster has failed to deliver 
21/03/2014 Next chief executive says independence not a ‘business issue’ 
23/03/2014 ICM poll confirms ‘more and more people are moving to Yes’ 
23/03/2014 Income tax proposals dropped after Balls intervention 
23/03/2014 Osborne’s opposition to currency union ‘conjecture and fantasy’ 
23/03/2014 Yes wins Shetland debate on Scottish Secretary’s home turf 
24/03/2014 Dennis Canavan answering your #indyref questions 
24/03/2014 Allan Grogan: 'Independence could lead to the fair Scotland Labour has always stood for' 
24/03/2014 Daily Digest: Another opinion poll shows momentum with Yes and EU membership common sense 
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24/03/2014 'No campaign demolishes its own argument' 
25/03/2014 Monthly poll of polls shows gap halved since November 
25/03/2014 Former Liberal Democrat chief executive Andy Myles backs Yes 
25/03/2014 Scots TV star Freya Mavor is backing Yes in the #indyref 
25/03/2014 Daily Digest: “Don’t believe defence scares” says expert and Job losses at Royal Mail 
26/03/2014 New poll shows Yes continues to close the gap on No 
26/03/2014 Brian Cox Responds to Eddie Izzard 
26/03/2014 Daily Digest: YouGov opinion poll boost and continuation of common research area after Yes 
26/03/2014 Common sense on shared energy market and research areas 
27/03/2014 Daily Digest: Osborne’s bluff called on currency – No’s negative messaging continues to grate  
28/03/2014 Another leading Lib Dem says Yes is right answer for Scotland and the rest of UK 
28/03/2014 Daily Digest: Scotland’s renewables can blossom and Westminster’s complicated tax system isn’t working 
28/03/2014 Joan Burnie leaves Daily Record with Yes message 
28/03/2014 There are many reasons why Lib Dems will be attracted to campaigning for Yes #sldconf 
28/03/2014 Yes is the start of great things for Scotland's young people 
28/03/2014 I cannot wait to go to the polling station bright and early on the 18th September 2014 
28/03/2014 Clegg can't persuade liberals to vote No. He has little chance of convincing Scotland 
28/03/2014 Graeme, 22, student: Why I'm voting Yes 
28/03/2014 A good week for Yes at debates 
29/03/2014 Young people should grab independence with both hands 
29/03/2014 Generation Yes: Largest youth and student movement in Scotland launches  
30/03/2014 Why the Dowager Duchess of Hamilton will be voting Yes 
31/03/2014 Daily Digest: No camp's currency union crisis and shipbuilding to continue after Yes 
31/03/2014 'My whole family are voting Yes - that is six former Labour voters' 
01/04/2014 Only Yes can end the democratic deficit that gave us the Poll Tax and Bedroom Tax 
01/04/2014 Daily Digest: Royal Mail, research funding and more currency union woes for No 
02/04/2014 Perspective: Colin Fox on the socialist case for Yes 
02/04/2014 Daily Digest: voter registration, Muscatelli on currency, Westminster benefits cuts 
03/04/2014 Scotland's world renowned universities will thrive after Yes vote 
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03/04/2014 DailyDigest: No vote EU risk, Yes will bring workplace improvements 
03/04/2014 Business as usual for Sky and Waitrose after Yes vote 
04/04/2014 Daily Digest: Oil jobs boom, childcare and Sky 
04/04/2014 Margo MacDonald MSP 
05/04/2014 Trident, Nuclear Disarmament and Scottish Independence 
06/04/2014 Panelbase: Highest support for Yes so far in #indyref campaign 
06/04/2014 Fetlar-born Louise Thomason: I’ll be voting Yes in September, but I wasn't always going to. 
07/04/2014 Daily Digest: Greens launch ideas and Energy report details plans for common energy market after Yes 
07/04/2014 The Internationalist Case for Scottish Independence 
08/04/2014 Glasgow Clyde students back Yes in #indyref Vote 
08/04/2014 Daily Digest: Worst of welfare cuts still to come and Lord George Robertson’s rattled ramblings 
08/04/2014 Former Labour councillors join growing numbers moving to Yes 
09/04/2014 Daily Digest: Lord Robertson receives frosty reception and Irish visit shows the way ahead 
09/04/2014 Making our energy resources work for all of Scotland 
09/04/2014 Scottish independence will open more self-development opportunities for Poles 
10/04/2014 Yes for stronger local democracy – and the opportunity to transform Scotland 
10/04/2014 Daily Digest: Friends of the Earth attack Westminster nuclear subsidies and Onshore renewables also threatened 
10/04/2014 New Poll: Yes 47% - Strong majority would vote Yes in #indyref if better off 
11/04/2014 #YouYesYet are mobilising our generation 
11/04/2014 Blair Jenkins to deliver guest speech at SNP conference 
12/04/2014 Former Scotland manager calls for Cameron v Salmond debate 
12/04/2014 World voices tell Scotland to ‘go for it’ 
13/04/2014 Edinburgh’s Asian community to hear case for Yes 
13/04/2014 Yes vote increases with prospect of Tory and Labour general election victory 
13/04/2014 Scots trade unions shackled by Westminster 
14/04/2014 Daily Digest: Westminster’s currency bluff has crumbled and “Murkier and more offensive” No campaign scare stories 
14/04/2014 Top Labour official is backing independence 
15/04/2014 Daily Digest: David Cameron will resign if Scotland votes Yes 
15/04/2014 Busy time for Trade Unionists for Yes at STUC Congress 
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16/04/2014 Overwhelming majority want more positive campaign from 'No' - poll 
16/04/2014 Soaring foodbank use “the tip of the iceberg in terms of UK food poverty” 
16/04/2014 Scottish foreign policy will see world through a more ‘ethical lens’ 
16/04/2014 Green Yes – “Digital Rights Are Civil Rights”  
17/04/2014 Daily Digest: Yes to help our universities attract top talent and Expert explains energy bill bonus with Yes 
18/04/2014 STUC sets priorities as Yes momentum builds in Scotland’s trade union movement 
19/04/2014 Why I'll move to Scotland after I graduate if it votes yes  
20/04/2014 Polls shows highest support for Yes so far 
20/04/2014 New poster shows we CAN be a thriving independent country 
20/04/2014 Yes Scotland asks No campaign to detail guaranteed new powers 
21/04/2014 Carolyn Leckie: 'Bercow has exposed culture of sexism at Westminster' 
21/04/2014 Daily Digest: Momentum continues to build towards “Yes” 
22/04/2014 Daily Digest: Britain is sleepwalking towards a retirement timebomb 
22/04/2014 Julie Fowlis: A once in a lifetime opportunity - Scotland's #IndyRef 
23/04/2014 The patron saint of optimism 
23/04/2014 Glasgow's #BigIndyDebate says Yes 
23/04/2014 From Scunthorpe Conservative to Yes campaigner 
23/04/2014 Daily Digest: St. George's Day, Gordon Brown and more CBI resignations 
24/04/2014 Perspective: Yes is an opportunity to better manage Scotland's resources 
24/04/2014 Daily Digest: Welfare scare stories, High-Speed Rail study and Welsh Barnett funding 
24/04/2014 Yes supporter gets on bike to cycle from Rome to home 
24/04/2014 Canavan challenges Brown to independence debate 
25/04/2014 Labour activists launch site about Labour in an independent Scotland 
25/04/2014 Daily Digest: Labour after Indy, Small Nations and Remembering Margo 
27/04/2014 Rebus actor Ken Stott declares support for Yes 
28/04/2014 Daily Digest: More negative responses and ‘A Scotland without Poverty’ 
29/04/2014 Mums for Change launch campaign for a Yes vote in #indyref 
30/04/2014 Daily Digest: Westminster caught out again and UK currency position untenable 
30/04/2014 Academics for Yes welcomes university research proposals 
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01/05/2014 Poll of polls reveals steady rise in support for Yes vote in #indyref 
01/05/2014 Daily Digest: Yes supporters more likely to vote in #indyref 
01/05/2014 Yes voters more likely to vote in referendum, says latest attitudes survey 
01/05/2014 Perspective: 'Scottish Independence would boost solidarity' 
01/05/2014 Five green gains of Scotland's independence 
04/05/2014 Why a Yes vote will put a spring in our nation's step. 
04/05/2014 Sunday Herald declares support for a Yes vote 
04/05/2014 Why independence can make Scotland a healthier and more confident country 
05/05/2014 Daily Digest: Sunday Herald says Yes and Prime Minister happy to debate on TV – but not Scotland 
06/05/2014 'Real threat to research in Scotland’s universities is the Union' 
06/05/2014 Daily Digest: More criticism of No negativity and Academics anticipate thriving research base after Yes 
07/05/2014 Daily Digest: UK government paper misleading - and child poverty continues to soar 
07/05/2014 Daily Digest: State Pensions will be paid in an independent Scotland and Cameron “toxic” for No campaign 
07/05/2014 With a Yes vote we can use Scotland's wealth to halt the scandal of child poverty 
08/05/2014 Daily Digest: Don’t believe Westminster promises 
09/05/2014 BT to stay in Scotland after independence 
09/05/2014 Daily Digest: Westminster’s cost of living crisis laid bare and Miliband first to offer “Jam Tomorrow” 
09/05/2014 It's time to take control and determine our future in Europe ourselves 
10/05/2014 No campaign organiser defects to Yes 
11/05/2014 Yes Scotland publishes details of campaign donations 
11/05/2014 How Westminster has mismanaged Scotland's oil wealth 
11/05/2014 Yes Scotland welcomes support from chief devolution architect  
12/05/2014 Scotland’s pensioners losing out 
12/05/2014 A Yes vote allows us to do what’s right for older Scots 
13/05/2014 Pensioners 'let down time and time again by Westminster' 
13/05/2014 Irish for Yes group launches 
13/05/2014 Daily Digest: Tories ahead in the polls and London dominance being felt across the UK 
14/05/2014 New poll shows gap between Yes and No slashed to single figures 
14/05/2014 Daily Digest: Referendum there to be won and Standard Life myths scotched 
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15/05/2014 Stars of sport say Yes to an independent Scotland 
15/05/2014 Perspective: 'Fight for equality at Westminster moving at pace of a bad sludge metal band' 
15/05/2014 'Scotland’s fishing industry has suffered terribly under successive UK Governments' 
15/05/2014 Daily Digest: Osborne upsets, Inequality laid bare, and Cameron in Scotland 
16/05/2014 Rival cup final fans show their solidarity for a Yes 
16/05/2014 Daily Digest: Cameron's 'jam tomorrow' promises & common sense on currency 
16/05/2014 ONS highlights massive wealth gap and growing North/South divide 
18/05/2014 Panelbase poll finds undecided voters leaning to Yes 
18/05/2014 Labour and Lib Dem MEPs confirm independent Scotland's place in EU 
19/05/2014 
Daily Digest: No campaign MEPs admit common sense position on EU membership; Clegg latest to promise “Jam 
Tomorrow” 
19/05/2014 Top TV chef adds spice to referendum campaign 
19/05/2014 Scotland's young people have the most to gain from a Yes vote 
20/05/2014 Perspective: Scotland can save the last of what made Britain great 
20/05/2014 Daily Digest: Wages lag behind rising living costs once again; UK tax gap estimated at around £40 billion 
21/05/2014 Generation Yes call on school leavers to examine the case for Yes 
21/05/2014 A Yes means more and better jobs closer to home 
21/05/2014 Daily Digest: Evidence to Holyrood, 2014 v 2016, and more 'jam tomorrow' 
22/05/2014 Daily Digest: Darling’s involvement in currency and Privatised Royal Mail threatening universal service  
22/05/2014 Scotland will see clearer priorities for its people without Westminster 
23/05/2014 Third Sector poll, broken Westminster, academics rebuff funding concerns 
23/05/2014 Third Sector poll shows overwhelming support for a Yes vote 
25/05/2014 Darling urged to lift the secrecy on talks with Treasury chief 
25/05/2014 Only a Yes vote can protect Scotland's health service from cuts threat  
25/05/2014 Independence is an opportunity to create a better Scotland. 
26/05/2014 NHS for Yes, another No myth debunked and EU elections 
27/05/2014 Perspective: 'With Westminster, gap between rich and poor can only widen' 
27/05/2014 Scotland's extraordinary potential and closing the attainment gap 
27/05/2014 Perspective: 'Look at Norway and stop worrying! ' 
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31/05/2014 Let’s make Scotland’s wealth work better for people living here 
01/06/2014 'Scotland would be better represented by our own people, our own government, our own choices' 
02/06/2014 16 things you need to know about Scotland's economy 
03/06/2014 The Yes side in this debate has a vision of a better future for the people of Scotland 
03/06/2014 Firm foundations for a more successful Scotland 
03/06/2014 Alex Salmond: A vision of a better future for the people of Scotland with Yes 
03/06/2014 Yes Scotland’s response to Gordon Brown and Johann Lamont’s United With Labour rally 
04/06/2014 A Yes vote is best way for Scottish Labour voters to show solidarity with England 
06/06/2014 We can maximise our children’s potential by giving them a head start 
06/06/2014 I have to ask myself, are we really better together?  
06/06/2014 Audrey Birt - I believe we can do it, if we are willing to put the work in. 
06/06/2014 Rock guitarist adds to string of Yes declarations 
06/06/2014 Yes Scotland welcomes endorsement from sitting Labour MP  
08/06/2014 Taggart star Alex Norton backs a Yes vote  
08/06/2014 Leading Labour figure Anum Qaisar backs a Yes vote  
09/06/2014 100 days to go for a chance to build a better, fairer, more prosperous Scotland 
09/06/2014 Poll shows Yes Scotland is running the most effective campaign 
09/06/2014 With 100 days to go Yes is on course for success as Declaration signatures near 800,000 
10/06/2014 Independence promises a better future 
10/06/2014 More high school debate wins for Yes 
10/06/2014 100 days to go and 100 years apart 
11/06/2014 Senior Labour Party official backs Yes 
11/06/2014 The campaign for Scottish independence has reached new heights - the roof of Africa. 
12/06/2014 Poll shows Yes vote is within reach as gap continues to narrow 
12/06/2014 Yes will start a race to the top on wages 
13/06/2014 Poll success as a majority of young people say Yes 
13/06/2014 A Yes vote can revitalise Scotland’s industry 
13/06/2014 Briefing: Yes to better support for our carers 
14/06/2014 The only word on my lips on September 18 will be Yes, says River City star 
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15/06/2014 Yes support climbs to campaign high 
15/06/2014 Former STUC president and leading Labour figure declares support for Yes 
15/06/2014 Cameron McNeish: Why I’m voting Yes 
16/06/2014 Quebec experience says Scots will ‘pay a price’ after No vote 
16/06/2014 Making our island wealth work better for our island communities 
16/06/2014 The people will be sovereign 
17/06/2014 Young people will be better off with a Yes 
17/06/2014 'Young people have the most to gain from independence' 
18/06/2014 Six in 10 people trust Holyrood more than Westminster to make best decisions for Scotland - poll 
18/06/2014 The power to close the wealth gap should be in Scotland’s hands 
18/06/2014 Equal Pay: Poll highlights #indyref Opportunity 
18/06/2014 Rural Scotland is best served by a Yes Vote 
22/06/2014 Athletics icon Cameron Sharp supports Yes 
23/06/2014 Independence is key to a fairer, equal and more democratic Scotland, say Lawyers for Yes 
23/06/2014 Another myth debunked - No campaign’s latest claims on set-up costs “bizarrely inaccurate”  
23/06/2014 Blueprint draws on best in the world to double Scotland's economic wealth 
23/06/2014 The Spirit of Yes 
23/06/2014 “Scotland Means Business” strategy is right to set ambitious targets for Scotland  
24/06/2014 First Minister joins young farmers in push for Yes vote 
24/06/2014 Labour could use full powers to give our generation job security 
24/06/2014 A plan to create more jobs and opportunities 
24/06/2014 Only third of Scots trust Westminster parties to deliver more powers 
24/06/2014 Academics for Yes dismisses scare stories on medical research 
24/06/2014 Only a Yes vote will give Scotland's NHS the protection it needs 
24/06/2014 Independence 'only way to address ever-widening wealth gap' 
25/06/2014 Veteran broadcaster John Duncanson campaigns for Yes vote 
25/06/2014 Braveheart stars stage support for Independence 
25/06/2014 Gains of Yes for hard-pressed households 
25/06/2014 New report shows need for a Yes vote to tackle Scotland's wealth inequality 
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25/06/2014 Nearly a quarter of people more likely to vote Yes because of UKIP 
26/06/2014 Seafood company boss takes the Yes message on the road 
26/06/2014 We share this unique opportunity to make Scotland an even better place to live 
26/06/2014 Only way to get equal status and sovereignty is with a Yes vote 
26/06/2014 A Yes vote will enhance the social union across the British Isles 
27/06/2014 More and more Labour supporters moving to Yes 
27/06/2014 Yes Labour supporters challenge Ed Miliband to independence debate 
27/06/2014 Major boost as Unison representatives sign declaration of support for independence 
27/06/2014 Boss of Scotland's top women's football team says Yes 
27/06/2014 Balls up for the No campaign 
28/06/2014 A plan to reindustrialise Scotland 
29/06/2014 Unison reps sign declaration of support for independence 
30/06/2014 Scotland to deliver greater financial security for people and families 
30/06/2014 A Yes vote is essential so we have powers to deliver greater financial security 
01/07/2014 Appalling child poverty figures show why we need Scotland’s wealth in Scotland’s hands 
01/07/2014 Senior citizens champion marks 15th birthday of Scottish Parliament by declaring for Yes 
02/07/2014 Scotland's continuing EU membership after a Yes vote. 
02/07/2014 Vote Yes for bairns, not bombs 
02/07/2014 Firefighters for Yes join the growing Yes movement 
03/07/2014 A plan to end austerity 
03/07/2014 Yes for fair pay and an end to austerity cuts 
03/07/2014 Rampant privatisation of NHS in England is key reason to vote Yes 
04/07/2014 A plan to make Scotland’s economy grow 
04/07/2014 'I'm voting for a country, not a party or its leaders' 
04/07/2014 The austerity of No or prosperity of Yes - the stark choice facing voters in referendum vote 
05/07/2014 46 ways to create more and better jobs 
05/07/2014 'If we vote Yes, Scotland can become more prosperous' 
06/07/2014 Former Labour government minister declares for Yes 
06/07/2014 The hills are alive with the sight of Yes 
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06/07/2014 Building a wealthier country 
06/07/2014 Outlander actor Sam Heughan backs a Yes vote 
06/07/2014 The only way to guarantee the powers Scotland wants and needs is with a Yes vote 
06/07/2014 Cream of Scotland's literary community gather to say why they are voting Yes 
07/07/2014 Even Westminster agrees that pensions are secure with a Yes vote 
07/07/2014 Expert report highlights an independent Scotland's 'uninterrupted' EU membership 
07/07/2014 Academics for Yes welcome statement by Glasgow University principal 
07/07/2014 Top European science advisor says Scotland’s elite status will remain after Yes vote 
08/07/2014 Perspective: With Yes, we can work to create a fairer and more inclusive Scotland for us all. 
08/07/2014 Westminster’s austerity obsession is harming people 
08/07/2014 Yes Scotland responds to No campaign pensions paper 
08/07/2014 Yes Scotland response to the Electoral Commission donations publication 
09/07/2014 NHS Scotland - Westminster controls the purse strings 
09/07/2014 Senior Labour member back Yes for Scotland’s workers 
10/07/2014 A Yes vote can help tackle fuel poverty in Scotland 
10/07/2014 Yes from distinguished academic and former Royal Society president 
10/07/2014 Oui picnic in the park organised by French for Yes on Bastille Day 
10/07/2014 Support for Yes rises to new high in Survation poll 
11/07/2014 What Yes means for older people 
11/07/2014 Voting Yes for Scotland’s families 
13/07/2014 Yes Scotland says new poll shows there is everything to play for 
13/07/2014 Vote Yes for fairness and prosperity – Plaid ex-Leader 
14/07/2014 Asian business tycoon signs up for Yes  
14/07/2014 Making the most of rural Scotland’s vast potential with a Yes 
14/07/2014 Yes Scotland donor sees great potential after independence 
14/07/2014 Yes Scotland says new poll shows there is everything to play for 
15/07/2014 A Yes vote for prosperity and an end to Westminster austerity 
16/07/2014 Scotland has rejected the industrial privatisation of the health service  
16/07/2014 New economic opportunities with a Yes 
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16/07/2014 Scotland's economy has grown to record levels 
17/07/2014 Only a Yes vote can ensure our NHS remains fully protected 
17/07/2014 Membership drive success leads to launch of Yes Thornhill group 
17/07/2014 Former Labour defence minister backs a Yes vote 
18/07/2014 Highest Yes rating in TNS referendum poll 
18/07/2014 Growing Labour movement who want to see an independent Scotland 
18/07/2014 Scotland’s LGBT communities have much to gain from a Yes vote 
18/07/2014 Poll of polls shows Yes continues to close the gap as independence vote draws closer  
18/07/2014 'You don't have to choose between voting Yes and voting Labour; you can do both' 
19/07/2014 Val McDermid and Richard Holloway add to growing support for Yes 
20/07/2014 Ending austerity with a Yes can support 30,000 jobs and stronger public services 
20/07/2014 Welcome for view that Yes could be 'very positive' for Scotland's health 
21/07/2014 A Yes vote is the chance of a lifetime for Labour voters, says Sturgeon  
21/07/2014 Scotland’s shipyards have a bright future – after a Yes vote 
21/07/2014 Edinburgh Festival Fringe goes #indyref 
21/07/2014 Independence – the business opportunity of a lifetime for Scotland’s small businesses 
22/07/2014 Welsh support for Yes welcomed by independence campaign 
22/07/2014 Edinburgh’s first female Lord Provost declares for Yes 
24/07/2014 Yes Scotland endorsed by Pride Glasgow Chief Executive  
25/07/2014 Yes vote is ‘the key to tackling poverty’ 
27/07/2014 River City star moving back to Scotland to join campaign for independence 
27/07/2014 Support for Yes is solid - a swing of just four points will put Yes ahead 
27/07/2014 William McIvanney and Frank Skinner voice support for a Yes vote 
28/07/2014 Carmichael undermines claims of more powers for Scottish Parliament 
28/07/2014 What do young people have to gain from a Yes vote? 
29/07/2014 NHS for Yes responds to Andy Burnham privatisation speech 
29/07/2014 A Yes means a joined up energy policy 
29/07/2014 Scotland's fishing industry will thrive with a Yes vote 
30/07/2014 50 mums call for Yes vote for fairer Scotland 
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30/07/2014 A Yes means real gains for Scotland’s people – but it’s our NHS that will see the biggest cost if it’s a No 
31/07/2014 Canavan appeals to Scotland's 'missing million' - make sure you vote to protect our NHS 
06/08/2014 ICM snap poll shows Yes support boosted by debate - up to 47% 
06/08/2014 New report highlight Scotland’s business opportunity of a lifetime 
06/08/2014 Vote Yes to scrap Trident 
06/08/2014 Another prominent Liberal Democrat joins Yes campaign 
07/08/2014 One Opportunity - to use our wealth for Scotland 
07/08/2014 A reply to the No campaign's celebrities 
08/08/2014 Former No campaign councillor calls for a Yes vote 
08/08/2014 Football couple make their pitch for a Yes vote 
08/08/2014 John Lambie adds to Team Yes managerial experience 
08/08/2014 Ed Miliband must admit the NHS is not safe with Westminster 
08/08/2014 Warning to Miliband from Labour heartland – ‘More than 30% of your voters back Yes’ 
09/08/2014 Yes is Scotland's one opportunity to protect our NHS, says Sturgeon 
09/08/2014 Leading Environmental Campaigners Welcome 5 Green Gains of Yes 
10/08/2014 Poll of polls analysis shows narrowest gap so far 
10/08/2014 A Yes will see Scotland re-emerge as a nation of enlightenment, says Brian Cox 
10/08/2014 Teachers for Yes launches with ‘hands off’ message to Westminster  
10/08/2014 Boris tells Scotland ‘there’s no need’ for new powers 
11/08/2014 Actor Brian Cox hits the Dundee campaign trail with Yes message 
12/08/2014 Yes is the key to unlocking Scotland's entrepreneurial spirit 
12/08/2014 Independence creates Jobs 
12/08/2014 UCS workers predict bright future for shipyards in an independent Scotland  
12/08/2014 The key offer from independence is a written constitution 
12/08/2014 New high for Yes among those certain to vote in TNS poll 
13/08/2014 Only a Yes vote can end the scandal of poverty in wealthy Scotland 
13/08/2014 NHS for Yes applauds pledge to protect Scotland's health service in written constitution  
13/08/2014 No campaign has no Plan A for Scotland’s future 
13/08/2014 Four Past Presidents of the National Farmers Union Scotland throw their weight behind Yes 
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13/08/2014 3 things the No campaign don’t want you to know about the NHS 
14/08/2014 Yes Scotland challenges Alistair Darling on NHS funding hypocrisy 
14/08/2014 Godfather of Devolution urges voters to vote Yes and take the ‘Road of Hope’ 
14/08/2014 Expert Economist moves from Devo Plus to Yes 
14/08/2014 Two weeks before first postal ballots are cast, we still don't know Darling's Plan A for Scotland 
15/08/2014 Senior former police figures declare support for a Yes vote  
15/08/2014 Only a Yes can protect our NHS 
15/08/2014 We don’t have to march to protect our NHS – we just have to vote Yes 
16/08/2014 Study shows gap just 5 points when people are asked for probable vote 
17/08/2014 New poll shows referendum is on a knife edge 
17/08/2014 Leading historian Sir Tom Devine joins growing number of Scots moving to Yes  
17/08/2014 A Yes vote is Scotland’s one opportunity to protect the NHS 
18/08/2014 An opportunity that's too good to miss 
18/08/2014 One month to go - one opportunity to protect the NHS and build a better Scotland 
18/08/2014 Disabled People for Yes join growing Yes movement  
19/08/2014 Six ways we can strengthen our NHS with independence 
19/08/2014 Letter from 50 Scottish Farmers on why Yes is best 
19/08/2014 Darling faces challenge to come clean on real threat to the NHS 
19/08/2014 Leading nursing trade unionists back Yes to protect our NHS 
20/08/2014 Scotland's leading children's campaigner backs Yes vote as best way to tackle inequality 
20/08/2014 Why I will vote Yes on September 18 - by Anne Houston 
20/08/2014 No campaign must answer six questions on Scotland’s health service 
20/08/2014 Sturgeon to outline ‘one opportunity’ for women voters in Leith 
20/08/2014 Vote Yes for our children’s future 
21/08/2014 People of Scotland expect budget cut after a No vote - new poll finding 
21/08/2014 Scotland will be the wealthiest country ever to have gained its independence 
21/08/2014 Senior Liberal Democrats make the move to Yes 
21/08/2014 Fishing for Yes welcomes new report detailing key gains of independence 
22/08/2014 Target hit as one million people sign the Yes Declaration 
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22/08/2014 Sir Donald MacKay responds to Sir Ian Wood's remarks on oil and gas 
22/08/2014 Five reasons to vote Yes 
22/08/2014 Scotland has a bright future with Yes according to American-Scot 
23/08/2014 Yes Scotland launches campaign to win over EU migrants 
23/08/2014 Use a Yes to save the NHS, urges Sturgeon and Harvie  
23/08/2014 Why are the No campaign saying different things north and south of the border? 
24/08/2014 Former Scottish Labour chairman says NHS is safe only with a Yes vote 
24/08/2014 Singing star Michelle says a Yes vote will deliver the 'opportunity for change' 
25/08/2014 Top land reform campaigner Wightman backs a Yes vote 
25/08/2014 We are in safe hands with independence, say Carers for Yes  
25/08/2014 Scotland’s future in Scotland’s hands  
25/08/2014 There is a vision on the Yes side  
25/08/2014 BBC referendum debate - a convincing win for Yes 
26/08/2014 Three things we learned from the BBC #indyref debate 
26/08/2014 Debate moves on to who best runs Scotland 
26/08/2014 Yes Scotland appeals to 'missing million' - make sure you vote to protect our NHS 
27/08/2014 Former boss of betting giant William Hill says smart money is on voting Yes 
27/08/2014 Only a Yes vote can guarantee protection of Scotland's NHS 
27/08/2014 Star of Shetland crime series Douglas Henshall declares for Yes 
27/08/2014 Creating jobs with independence 
28/08/2014 Top business leader says a Yes vote will be good for Scotland - and the rest of the UK 
28/08/2014 Video: Yes Means 
28/08/2014 New No campaign revelations show why Scotland must be independent  
28/08/2014 Constance visits college with message for young voters 
28/08/2014 Tory Minister’s no guarantee comments create fresh fears for Scottish NHS 
28/08/2014 New poll confirms momentum is with Yes 
29/08/2014 Scotland’s referendum result is ‘on a knife edge’ 
29/08/2014 We have one opportunity to invest in our children’s future 
29/08/2014 Five point plan for Scotland’s veterans 
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30/08/2014 Cameron must reverse policy on Westminster farming cash grab 
31/08/2014 NHS activists in England call for Yes vote to protect health service in Scotland 
31/08/2014 Leading health expert says only Yes will protect Scotland's NHS 
31/08/2014 A night for Scotland as stars take to the stage in bumper #VoteYes concert 
01/09/2014 Gay rights campaigners urge ‘Vote Yes for equality’ 
01/09/2014 Make sure you can have your say on Scotland’s future 
01/09/2014 Yes on the hill 
01/09/2014 Breakthrough poll shows that Yes has the big momentum 
02/09/2014 Momentum with Yes as eight-point swing away from No in just three weeks 
02/09/2014 Independent Scotland could be ‘model to us all’ - Westwood 
02/09/2014 More and more people are realising why we must be independent 
02/09/2014 Surge in Labour support for independence 
02/09/2014 Yes wins Glasgow Disability Debate 
03/09/2014 Former NATO ambassador backs Yes vote 
03/09/2014 River City actress to join Blair Jenkins at Kirkintilloch public meeting 
03/09/2014 Leading business figures accuse Westminster of playing politics over the pound 
04/09/2014 North Sea offshore oil and gas could net Scotland £600bn 
04/09/2014 RMT union members vote Yes 
05/09/2014 Skye Liberal Democrat and independent councillors back Yes 
05/09/2014 The best way to protect our Scottish NHS is to vote Yes, says children's doctor 
05/09/2014 When I looked at all the facts, I knew Yes was the right thing to do 
05/09/2014 Fresh embarrassment for No as Tesco reject supermarket scares 
05/09/2014 Pop icon Amy Macdonald to take to the stage for Yes 
06/09/2014 Young people say Yes vote will deliver 'better Scotland'  
06/09/2014 YouGov poll shows Yes support surge to 51 per cent 
07/09/2014 Alan Cumming Campaigning 
07/09/2014 Italians for Yes becomes 50th group to join broad Yes movement  
07/09/2014 Osborne 'more powers' gimmick already mired in confusion 
08/09/2014 No party politicians confirm: England’s NHS privatisation hurts Scotland’s NHS too 
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08/09/2014 Osborne’s gimmick has a ‘whiff of desperation’ – Canon Wright 
08/09/2014 Hollywood star Alan Cumming joins Nicola Sturgeon on the campaign trail for Yes 
08/09/2014 New TNS poll shows surge in Yes support 
09/09/2014 Top energy and defence figure: Why I've switched from No to Yes 
09/09/2014 Canavan urges Labour voters to win a famous and historic victory for Yes 
09/09/2014 Poll shows voters trust Yes leaders far more than No politicians to deliver for Scotland 
09/09/2014 Iconic chef Albert Roux says Yes is best  
09/09/2014 No campaign proposals 'nothing like home rule Keir Hardie would have wanted' 
09/09/2014 Generation Yes sets out to win the grandparent vote 
09/09/2014 Keir Hardie and Independence 
09/09/2014 Labour member for half a century critical of Brown’s devo strategy 
09/09/2014 Which path to tackle inequalities 
09/09/2014 One opportunity to give Scotland a voice in Europe  
09/09/2014 Sir George Mathewson dismisses No campaign's financial markets fears 
10/09/2014 Prescott is off-the-ball with his 'bizarre' Scotland football team claims 
10/09/2014 UK Benefits Crisis 
10/09/2014 Survation poll shows Yes in touching distance of success 
10/09/2014 BUPA chairman announcement should act as a call to vote Yes 
11/09/2014 Architects poll gives Yes a solid lead 
11/09/2014 Former RBS boss says bank announcement will have no impact on jobs in Scotland 
11/09/2014 Rural Scotland will prosper with independence 
11/09/2014 Visiting Westminster MPs should be honest about NHS in Scotland 
11/09/2014 Szkocja daje gwarancje polskim obywatelom 
11/09/2014 Westminster caught co-ordinating latest wave of scare stories 
11/09/2014 YouGov poll shows Yes in touching distance of success 
12/09/2014 Professor of Petroleum Accounting backs Yes 
12/09/2014 Scotland's strength lies in tolerance and diversity, not a narrow UKIP-driven agenda 
12/09/2014 Banks' move are a credit to Yes 
12/09/2014 Head of NUS Scotland is latest backer of Yes 
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13/09/2014 Senior NUS figures declare for Yes 
13/09/2014 Independent Scotland will have a successful and secure banking sector, says former Lloyds risk manager 
13/09/2014 Cash-and-Carry boss dismisses supermarket scare story 
13/09/2014 Generation Yes and National Collective set out to win the grandparent vote 
13/09/2014 Committed Labour family are voting Yes from the heart 
13/09/2014 Poll shows everything to play for in countdown to referendum 
13/09/2014 Conservative MP confirms a 'No' is a vote for the status quo 
13/09/2014 New ICM poll puts Yes 8 points ahead - the polls all show everything to play for in countdown to referendum 
13/09/2014 Panelbase poll puts Yes at record high, within touching distance of success 
14/09/2014 Labour supporters sign open letter calling for a Yes vote to build a fairer Scotland 
14/09/2014 Former Lloyds risk manager dismisses scaremongering over bank jobs and investment 
14/09/2014 A Yes vote will protect Scotland’s NHS from privatisation – Sir Harry Burns 
14/09/2014 Yes support from senior Scottish military and diplomatic figures  
14/09/2014 'Scottish vision and values are different from those dominant south of the Border' 
15/09/2014 Nationalists? We're the People's Movement  
15/09/2014 Labour Mayor asks Scots to vote Yes - to help England too 
15/09/2014 Scotland will carve out a unique and valuable role in international development.  
15/09/2014 Forces veterans issue open letter responding to Lord Dannatt 
15/09/2014 Same old story of empty threats and empty promises from David Cameron, says Jenkins 
15/09/2014 Only a Yes vote will give Scotland's farmers and fishermen a top table seat in Europe 
16/09/2014 Robert Burns actor John Cairney says Yes 
16/09/2014 Dundee United's Stephen Thompson signs for Yes Scotland 
16/09/2014 Former police chief says a Yes vote will help secure a safer Scotland 
16/09/2014 Lawyers call emergency meeting to combat 'absurd' No campaign scare tactics 
16/09/2014 Not just a seat at the top table - we will bring the top table to Scotland 
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Note:  
The above article list omits 10 articles from March 2014 and 15 articles from August 2014. The official archive of Yes Scotland materials sits 
with the National Library of Scotland. Due to access issues it was not possible to access these 25 articles. 
The above materials can be accessed from: http://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20140916211421/http://www.yesscotland.net/ 
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Appendix 4.0 
YES VOTE WILL GIVE SCOTLAND THE CHANCE TO BUILD AN 
EXCELLENT SECURITY SERVICE  
 
A Yes vote in next year’s independence referendum will give Scotland the 
opportunity to build a first-class intelligence and security service that meets our needs 
and priorities. 
Rejecting claims by Home Secretary Theresa May that an independent Scotland’s 
ability to detect and prevent terrorist and criminal threats might be reduced, Yes 
Scotland Chief Executive Blair Jenkins said: “This amounts to yet another Project 
Fear fiction from a Tory minister on a flying visit to talk Scotland down.” 
-UK security has multiple organisations fight for power and influence, and 
inappropriate UK Govt interference is rife. 
-An independent Scotland would face less of a threat as we would not add to 
international tension by taking part in illegal wars. 
-An independent Scotland as a nuclear-free state potential terrorist targets would be 
removed from our country. 
Mr Jenkins pointed out that only a few days ago the former police chief in charge of 
counter-terrorism in Scotland had declared that an independent Scotland would be 
able to create an “excellent” intelligence and security service. 
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Allan Burnett, who was the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland 
(ACPOS) Co-ordinator of Counter Terrorism from 2008-10, said he had witnessed 
first-hand “the great Scottish talent in military, secret and police intelligence services, 
and can readily envisage the huge ability, energy, integrity and innovation they would 
pour into this exciting mission.” 
He said the starting position for security experts was to establish the threats faced, and 
their probability and impact.” 
Mr Burnett said: “I believe an independent Scotland would face less of a threat from 
terrorism for a number of reasons. We would not add to international tension by 
taking part in illegal wars, and as a nuclear-free state potential terrorist targets would 
be removed from our country.” 
Mr Burnett’s previous roles, in a distinguished 30 year career, included being the 
Director of Intelligence, and Force Race Relations Officer for Strathclyde Police. He 
now works in the security industry. 
He said: “Based upon my experience, I simply do not accept these criticisms of 
Scotland’s abilities to have effective security arrangements. 
“I have no doubt that an important part of the remit (after a Yes vote) would be to 
maintain and enhance existing relationships and build new ones. Our friends, 
including those south of the border, will want Scotland as allies as much as we want 
them. Our Scottish intelligence service will be welcomed as a professional, trusted 
ally. 
“UK security is a long way from being perfect. Multiple organisations fight for power 
and influence, and inappropriate UK Government interference is rife. Trust and 
information sharing can be lacking - witness the struggling Borders Agency. There is 
a great opportunity for an independent Scotland, where cooperation is a reality and 
not just an aspiration, to do very much better.” 
Mr Jenkins said: “Security is very much a matter of international cooperation and we 
look forward to Scotland’s security services playing their part. As our nearest 
neighbours, we can expect a particularly close working relationship with the security 
services of rUK, to our mutual best interests. 
“That makes sense for Scotland and for the rest of the UK and Theresa May knows 
it.” 
Posted by Peter Dempsie, 29.10.13 
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Appendix 5.0 
16 THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SCOTLAND'S 
ECONOMY 
 
 
Scotland’s got what it takes to be independent, with strong public finances, a range of 
successful industries and abundant natural resources. Here are sixteen key facts which 
add up to a bright and successful future for Scotland as an independent country. 
1. Scotland’s bank balance is healthier than the UK’s. Over the past five years, 
Scotland has been better off than the UK as a whole to the tune of £1,600 per 
person. 
2. We’ve generated more tax per head than the rest of the UK in each of the last 
33 years. 
3. Scotland has a lower fiscal deficit than the UK – averaging 7.2% of GDP 
compared to 8.4% for the UK as a whole over the past five years. 
4. In terms of national wealth per head, Scotland is the 14th wealthiest nation in 
the OECD club of developed nations – that’s ahead of the UK at just 18th 
place. 
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5. Scotland is the top location in the UK for foreign direct investment outside 
London and the South-East of England – a great expression of confidence in 
Scotland’s economic future. 
6. Analysis from the Financial Times shows Scotland’s exports total £73.6bn a 
year – and that’s even without Scotland’s North Sea oil production. 
7. Scotland’s food and drink industry turns over more than £13 bn every year, 
and last year the equivalent of 40 bottles of Scotch whisky were sold overseas 
every second. 
8. Our life sciences sector is one of the fastest growing in Europe – the value it 
adds to Scotland’s economy stood at £960million in 2011, up 9% on 2010. 
9. Scotland’s creative industries have a combined turnover of £5bn – with 
growing strengths across our heritage, artistic and cultural industries. 
10. Manufacturers in Scotland export £15.4bn worth of goods abroad annually. 
11. Scotland’s tourism sector employs almost 200,000 people and contributes 
£3.1bn to the economy annually. 
12. Scotland has one of the world’s strongest higher education sectors, with the 
most top universities relative to our size – producing talented graduates to 
contribute to our economy. 
13. Scotland has 60% of the EU’s oil reserves, with the North Sea generating 
around £34.3bn in the next five years. 
14. There remains up to £1.5 trillion wholesale value of oil and gas in the North 
Sea, with production forecast to continue to the 2050s and beyond. 
15. We’ve got 25% of Europe’s offshore wind and tidal energy potential, putting 
Scotland at the forefront of the coming renewables boom. 
16. And we have 10% of Europe’s wave energy potential – with projects in 
Scotland leading the way in this cutting edge sector. 
 
Posted by Kevin Gilmartin, 02.06.14 
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Appendix 6.0 - Interview Participants 
 
Respondent A  
November 2010  
Interviewee remained anonymous  
Labour SNP 
 
Respondent B  
November 2010  
Christina McKelvie 
Scottish National Party SNP 
 
Respondent C  
November 2010  
Interviewee remained anonymous  
Scottish National Party SNP 
 
Respondent D  
November 2010  
Linda Fabiani  
Scottish National Party SNP 
 
Respondent E  
November 2010  
Interviewee remained anonymous  
Scottish National Party SNP 
 
Respondent F  
November 2010  
Jackson Carlaw 
Conservative MSP 
 
Respondent G  
November 2010  
Ken Macintosh 
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Labour MSP 
 
Respondent H  
November 2010  
Interviewee remained anonymous  
Labour MSP 
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